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The three essays of this dissertation examine managerial actions and strategies in
response to firm-specific situations, and the resulting firm and managerial performance.
Essay 1 disentangles managerial ability and firm efficiency and examines managerial
ability conditional on firm efficiency. Prior research on managerial ability overlook under-
lying firm efficiency. Observing that the two measures of quality are highly correlated,
I disentangle managerial ability from firm efficiency and create new measures for innate
(pure) managerial ability and relative managerial ability (conditional on firm efficiency).
I categorize managers as underrated (high managerial ability, low firm efficiency), typical
(managerial ability and firm efficiency at par), and overrated (low managerial ability, high
firm efficiency), and examine the consequent corporate strategies, firm performance and CEO
compensation. Overrated managers inherit (i.e., are in charge of) dynamic firms but adopt
conservative strategies themselves; the opposite is true for underrated managers. Overrated
managers elicit negative firm performance while underrated managers engender positive firm
performance. In contrast, overrated managers are overcompensated and underrated man-
agers are undercompensated; innate (pure) managerial ability, by itself, has no bearing upon
compensation. These results indicate the importance of disentangling managerial ability
from firm efficiency to better understand the relevance of corporate quality towards corpo-
rate strategies, firm performance and CEO compensation. It may be inferred that managerial
ability, per se, is likely a hype.
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Essay 2 studies the impact of non-compete clause enforcement on firm performance
and employees. Existing literature on non-compete clauses (NCCs) focuses on the effect on
firm characteristics other than performance, and the effect on top executives rather than gen-
eral employees. My research examines the effect of NCC enforcement on firm performance
and general employees. For the full sample of firms NCC enforcement has a non-significant
relation to firm financial performance, a positive, significant relation to firm operating per-
formance, and a negative, significant relation to employee metrics (total employees, total
employee expense and average wage). The results, however, change drastically for subsam-
ples: firms with low versus high performance, and firms with weak versus strong policies.
NCC enforcement has a positive (negative), significant relation to firm financial performance
for firms with low (high) financial performance and a nonsignificant (negative) relation to
firm financial performance for firms with weak (strong) corporate governance with mixed
effects of NCC enforcement on operating performance. Taken together my findings provide
initial evidence that NCC enforcement has a beneficial effect on the worst firms, a detrimental
effect on the best firms, and a detrimental effect on employees overall.
Essay 3 looks into the behavior of firm managers in response to success and distress.
I examine prospect theory in the context of corporate decision making: how firm managers
change corporate strategies in response to firm-specific success and firm-specific distress.
Based on these changes in corporate strategies I categorize the behavioral disposition of
managers as house money effect, status quo effect, conservatism effect, trying-to-break-even
effect, status quo effect, and snake bite effect; and examine the subsequent firm performance
of each group. Managers are more risk-avoiding if the intensity (duration) of success is
higher (longer); managers are more risk-taking if the intensity (duration) of distress is higher
(longer). Following success, house money effect managers have the smallest decrease in
firm performance while conservative managers have the largest; following distress, trying-to-
break-even managers have the largest increase in firm performance while snake bite effect
managers had the largest decrease in firm performance. In addition, younger (smaller) firms
are more risk-taking following distress (following success and distress) and firms with payout
ii
are more risk-avoiding following both success and distress. Younger (shorter tenured) CEO’s
are also more risk-taking following distress (following success and distress) and female CEO’s
are more risk-taking following distress. Overall, this paper provide supports for prospect
theory in a corporate finance decision-making setting: firm managers have very different
risk behaviors following gains (success) and distress (losses); and the risk attitude depends
on the intensity and duration of success/distress. In addition, following either success or
distress, risk-taking managers are rewarded with higher subsequent firm performance while
risk-avoiding managers are punished with lower subsequent firm performance.
iii
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Chapter 1
Disentanglement Of Managerial Abil-
ity From Firm Efficiency: Effects On
Corporate Strategies, Firm Performance
And CEO Compensation
1.1 Introduction
Firm efficiency measures the ability of a corporate entity to convert inputs into out-
puts. It involves achieving a peak level of performance by using the least amount of inputs
to achieve the highest amount of output. This allows a firm to minimize the waste of in-
puts while achieving the desired level of output. Specifically, firm efficiency measures how
effectively a firm uses the amount and mix of resources at it’s disposal to generate profits.
Managerial ability is the component of firm efficiency not due to firm-specific at-
tributes and hence is attributable to managers. It involves the ability or talent of a manager
to make decisions in a firm. Specifically, managerial ability measures how effectively a man-
ager can transform a firm’s resources into profits.
Prior research into managerial ability (or talent), has found that managerial ability
can have an important effect on the decisions made by firms. Gan (2012) finds that higher
ability CEO’s make more efficient investment decisions while Jiraporn, Leelalai and Tong
1
(2016) find that firms with higher ability executives are more likely to pay dividends as well
as pay significantly larger dividends. Lin, Hu and Li (2018) find that firms with high ability
CEO’s maintain low levels of leverage while Yung and Chen (2017) find that higher ability
managers are more receptive to risk-taking and that lower ability managers avoid taking
risks.
In addition, prior research has found that managerial ability also has a significant
impact on a firm’s subsequent outcomes. Leverty and Grace (2012) find that higher man-
agerial ability is related to a firm spending less time in distress as well as a lower likelihood
and cost of firm bankruptcy while Demerjian, Lev, Lewis and McVay (2013) find that higher
managerial ability is related to higher earnings persistence and higher quality earnings es-
timations. Brookman and Thistle (2013) find that higher managerial ability is related to
higher CEO compensation and that managerial ability is the most important determinant
of CEO compensation.
While managerial ability is important, firm efficiency is also relevant. Similar to
managerial ability, prior research has found that firm efficiency also has an important effect
on firm decisions as well as on subsequent firm outcomes. Margaritis and Psillaki (2010)
find that higher firm efficiency is related to higher leverage. Frijins, Margaritis and Psillaki
(2012) find that higher firm efficiency is related to higher stock returns while Sun, Wei and
Huang (2013) find that higher firm efficiency is related to higher CEO compensation.
Prior research into managerial ability (most papers) and firm efficiency (relatively
few papers) examine each one in isolation despite some indications from the findings of
separate papers that managerial ability and firm efficiency might have a large, positive
relation. Leverty and Grace (2012) find that managerial ability is positively related to firm
performance while Frijins, Margaritis and Psillaki (2012) find that firm efficiency is also
positively related to firm performance. Similarly, Brookman and Thistle (2013) find that
managerial ability is positively related to CEO compensation while Sun, Wei and Huang
(2013) find that firm efficiency is also positively related to CEO compensation. Given that
2
prior research has examined either managerial ability or firm efficiency in isolation such
possibilities are not addressed in the literature and raises the question what is driving the
results is it managerial ability, firm efficiency or a combination of both?
However, prior research has not recognized that managerial ability and firm efficiency
are highly correlated. For example, for my data sample I find that there is a large, positive
correlation of 0.5724 between managerial ability and firm efficiency. In addition, based on
orthogonality tests I also find that managerial ability and firm efficiency are not orthogonal to
each other (i.e. variance inflation factor of 1.49 and tolerance of 1.22 versus 1.00 required for
orthogonality and covariance of 0.0214 versus 0 required for orthogonality). The high degree
of overlap between managerial ability and firm efficiency is not surprising given separating
equilibrium arguments that high quality firms tend to attract better quality managers, and
low quality firms are likely compelled to accommodate low quality managers. High quality
firms are able to pay high compensation and also have a good reputation which tends to
attract better quality managers. In contrast, low quality firms are not able to pay as high
compensation and also have a poor reputation which tends to make these firms compelled
to accommodate lower quality managers.
Examining managerial ability and firm efficiency together is not enough. It is also im-
portant to disentangle managerial ability from firm efficiency. This is because it is likely that
managers at lower efficiency firms face more constraints (e.g. cash and cash flow constraints,
financing constraints, etc.) than managers at higher efficiency firms which also impacts how
effectively managers are able to apply their ability. As a result given two managers of equal
ability, the manager working at a high efficiency firm is more likely to succeed, get more
recognition and be compensated more than the manager working at a low efficiency firm.
For example this can be seen in the case of Apple CEO Tim Cook and BlackBerry CEO
John Chen. On the one hand, Tim Cook took over as CEO of Apple from Steve Jobs in
August 2011 at a time when Apple was experiencing tremendous success (from 2009-2011,
sales increased from $42.91 billion to $65.23 billion to $108.25 billion while net income also
increased from $8.24 billion to $14.01 billion to $25.92 billion over the same period). On the
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other hand, John Chen took over as CEO of BlackBerry from Thorsten Heins in November
2013 at a time when BlackBerry was experiencing a tremendous decline (from 2011-2013,
sales decreased from $19.91 billion to $18.44 billion to $11.07 billion while net income also
decreased from $3.41 billion to $1.16 billion to −$646 million over the same period). As
a result, Tim Cook as CEO of Apple likely faced significantly less constraints, was more
likely to succeed, get more recognition and be compensated more than John Chen as CEO
of BlackBerry. Based on this it would be incorrect to draw any conclusions based on their
managerial ability without first disentangling it from their firm’s efficiency.
In addition to disentangling managerial ability and firm efficiency, it is also important
to examine managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency. This is because it is possible
that outliers (in terms of both managerial ability and firm efficiency), can have a significant
impact on a firm’s decisions as well on the firm’s subsequent outcomes. More specifically,
it is possible that lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms can have a significant
detrimental effect on a firm. For example this can be seen in the case of the CEO’s of Sears
following the 1980’s. These managers rode on Sears past high firm efficiency in obtaining high
CEO compensation and perks. However, they put little effort into updating Sears outdated
business model which is cited by Fortune and Bloomberg as one of the main reasons for the
decline and collapse of Sears. Conversely, it is also possible that higher ability managers at
lower efficiency firms can have a significant beneficial effect on a firm. For example this can
be seen in the case of Louis V. Gerstner Jr. as the CEO of IBM. In 1993 Louis V. Gerstner
Jr. became the CEO of IBM after IBM had just reported an $8.10 billion net loss (at that
time the largest reported single year loss in US history). However, by 1997 he had turned
IBM around by drastically increasing cash holdings and ensuring the firms divisions worked
together instead of competed against each other resulting in a $6.09 billion net profit for the
year. Taken together the potentially detrimental and beneficial effects of outliers provides
motivation for also examining managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency.
Prior research has also focused primarily on managerial ability/firm efficiency and it’s
impact on firm decisions, firm performance and CEO compensation (consequences). It is also
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however important to examine the relation between managerial ability/firm efficiency and
firm characteristics and CEO attributes (attributes). These attributes can potentially vary
between low versus high efficiency firms and between low versus high ability managers. As a
result, differences in these attributes could potentially impact the subsequent consequences.
In this paper, not only do I examine the consequences of both managerial ability and firm
efficiency but I also perform a comprehensive examination of the attributes of both as well.
In this paper I disentangle managerial ability from firm efficiency and create new
measures for innate (pure) firm efficiency, innate (pure) managerial ability, relative manage-
rial ability (conditional on firm efficiency), excess managerial score (managerial ability in
excess of firm efficiency) and managerial strategy score (captures the degree and direction
of divergence of a manager’s corporate strategies relative to other managers). I then exam-
ine managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency by categorizing managers as underrated
(high managerial ability, low firm efficiency), typical (managerial ability and firm efficiency
at par), and overrated (low managerial ability, high firm efficiency). In addition, managers
are further subcategorized as proactive (significant increases in corporate strategies), status
quo (no significant change in corporate strategies) and apprehensive (significant decrease in
corporate strategies). Consequent CEO attributes, firm characteristics, corporate strategies,
firm performance and CEO compensation are then examined.
I find that for CEO attributes younger as well as longer tenured CEO’s are more
likely to be underrated (higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms) while older as
well as shorter tenured CEO’s are more likely to be overrated (lower ability managers at
higher efficiency firms). Female CEO’s are also more likely to be underrated and founder
CEO’s are more likely to be underrated. In addition, outsider CEO’s (i.e. CEO’s hired
from outside the firm) are more likely to be underrated and insider CEO’s (i.e. CEO’s
hired from inside the firm) are more likely to be overrated. Proactive managers (managers
that significantly increase corporate strategies), status quo managers (managers that have
no significant change in corporate strategies), and apprehensive managers (managers that
significantly decrease corporate strategies), are found to have no significant relation with
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CEO attributes.
In addition, younger as well as smaller firms are more likely to have an underrated
manager (higher ability manager at a lower efficiency firm) while older as well as larger firms
are more likely to have an overrated manager (lower ability managers at a higher efficiency
firm). Firms that have no payout (i.e. no dividends and no share repurchases) are more
likely to have an underrated manager while firms with payout are more likely to have an
overrated manager. I also find some evidence that firms not in the finance industry are more
likely to have an underrated manager while firms in the finance industry are more likely
to have an overrated manager. In addition, older as well as larger firms are more likely
to increase corporate strategies (proactive) while younger as well as smaller firms are more
likely to decrease corporate strategies (apprehensive). Firms with no payout are more likely
to increase corporate strategies (proactive).
Following this examination of attributes, I also examine the subsequent effect on
corporate strategies, firm performance and CEO compensation. Overrated managers (lower
ability managers at higher efficiency firms), are found to be in charge of firms with the highest
levels of corporate strategies while underrated managers (higher ability managers at lower
efficiency firms) are in charge of firms with the lowest levels of corporate strategies. However,
overrated managers also adopt much more conservative strategies compared to underrated
managers (i.e. decreasing versus increasing corporate strategies).In addition, low ability
managers working at low efficiency firms are more likely to be have significant decreases in
corporate strategies (apprehensive) while high ability managers working at high efficiency
firms are more likely to have significant increases in corporate strategies (proactive).
For firm performance I find momentum in both firm efficiency and managerial ability.
High efficiency firms have higher subsequent performance than low efficiency firms and high
ability managers have higher subsequent performance than low ability managers. In addi-
tion, managerial ability matters more than firm efficiency in subsequent firm performance as
underrated managers (higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms) are related to posi-
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tive firm performance while overrated managers (lower ability managers at higher efficiency
firms) are related to negative firm performance. This provides evidence that higher ability
managers at lower efficiency firms can turn around the fortunes of their firm while lower
ability managers at higher efficiency firms can stifle their firms performance.
In contrast, I find that while high efficiency firms have higher CEO compensation than
low efficiency firms, high ability and low ability managers receive similar CEO compensation.
Firm efficiency is also found to matter more than managerial ability in subsequent CEO
compensation as underrated managers (higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms)
are related to lower CEO compensation while overrated managers (lower ability managers
at higher efficiency firms) are related to higher CEO compensation. This provides some
indication that the hype around CEO’s matters more than their ability when determining
CEO compensation.
Taken together these results contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the
importance of examining both managerial ability and firm efficiency together. I contribute
to firm performance literature by finding that managerial ability matters more than firm
efficiency. In contrast, I contribute to CEO compensation literature by finding that firm
efficiency matters more than managerial ability. Overall, the findings in this paper demon-
strate the importance of disentangling managerial ability and firm efficiency and examining
managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency as both firm efficiency and managerial abil-
ity are shown to be jointly relevant to corporate strategies, firm performance and CEO
compensation. It may also be inferred that managerial ability, per se, is likely a hype.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I examine the literature on
firm efficiency and managerial and their consequences in terms of corporate strategies, firm
performance and CEO compensation as well as describes the important relation between
firm efficiency and managerial ability. Section 3 describes the data and variables used in this
paper. In Section 4, I explain the construction of initial firm efficiency and managerial ability
following Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) as well as my construction of newly disentangled
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firm and managerial performance measures and how I use these measures to categorize the
behavior of managers. Section 5 describes the results in terms of CEO attributes and firm
characteristics across managerial behavioral categorization measures as well as the relation
of these managerial behavioral categorization measures to subsequent corporate strategies,
firm performance and CEO compensation. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
I categorize discussions on all relevant literature into the following groups: firm ef-
ficiency and its overall consequences, managerial ability and it’s consequences on corporate
strategies, firm performance and CEO compensation and the relation between firm efficiency
and managerial ability.
1.2.1 Firm Efficiency And Its Consequences
Initially, the neoclassical view was that there was full efficiency in the economy.
Stochastic frontier models introduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen
and Van Den Broeck (1977) relaxed this assumption by treating inefficiency as an unobserved
random variable which allowed both inefficiency and its determinants to be measured.
These models were initially used in production literature as in papers by Battese
and Coelli (1992), Battese and Coelli (1995), Caudill, Ford and Gropper (1995), and Wang
(2002) to measure technical efficiency and create frontier production functions. The idea
of stochastic frontier models was then also picked up by the finance literature. Papers by
Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996) and Habib and Ljungqvist (2005) use these models
in order to estimate firm efficiency.
However, in more recent years there has been a shift to using Data Envelopment Anal-
ysis (DEA) in order to measure efficiency. Initially introduced to the economics literature
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by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), papers by Nyman and Bricker (1989), Hjalmarsson
and Veiderpass (1992), Kooreman (1994), and Alam and Sickles (1998), use DEA to measure
technical efficiency with the finance literature later adopting DEA to measure firm efficiency
with papers by Cummins and Weiss (2000), Kirkwood and Nahm (2006), Margaritis and
Psillaki (2007), and Feroz, Goel and Raab (2008).
In terms of the consequences of firm efficiency Nguyen and Swanson (2009) exam-
ine the relation between firm efficiency and stock returns. After constructing a stochastic
frontier to measure firm efficiency, the authors find that inefficient firms tend to have higher
subsequent stock returns compared to efficient firms and that the average efficiency level of
the most inefficient (efficient) firms is rising (falling). Specifically, the authors find that firms
in the most inefficient group earn monthly returns that are 0.76% higher than firms in the
most efficient group and that a five year buy and hold strategy yields 44% higher returns for
inefficient firms. In terms of firm efficiency characteristics, the authors find that the market
risk factor (market-to-book factor) is positively (negatively) related to firm efficiency while
the size factor is generally negatively related to firm efficiency for equal weighted portfolios.
The results are found to be less clear for value weighted portfolios.
Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) explore the relation between firm efficiency and capital
structure. The authors measure firm efficiency as a firm’s distance from their respective in-
dustries ”best practice” frontier using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and capital structure
(ratio of debt to total assets). The authors find that leverage has a positive and significant
effect on firm efficiency and through reverse casuality tests, find that firm efficiency has a
positive and significant effect on leverage. In terms of firm efficiency characteristics, the
authors find that profitability is positively related to firm efficiency.
Frijins, Margaritis and Psillaki (2012) investigate the role of firm efficiency in asset
pricing. Specifically, the authors examine if there is a difference in performance between
inefficient versus efficient firms. To accomplish this, the authors first use DEA where weights
are chosen on input variables in order to maximize output (sales and market value) which
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allows calculation of a firm efficiency score. Based on this firm efficiency score, portfolios
are formed and tracked over time and cross-sectional and panel regressions of firm efficiency
score on stock returns are performed. The authors find that a portfolio strategy long in
efficient firms and short in inefficient firms generates significant positive returns even after
controlling for other risk factors. The cross-sectional and panel regressions also show that
firm efficiency has significant explanatory power in explaining stock returns.
Sun, Wei and Huang (2013) examine the relation between CEO compensation and
firm performance (where firm performance is proxied for using firm efficiency). The authors
find that total CEO compensation (cash and incentive compensation), is positively related
to firm efficiency. The authors also find that CEO cash compensation is associated with
revenue efficiency while CEO incentive compensation is associated with cost efficiency.
I examine firm efficiency as a prelude to managerial ability for several reasons. First,
the Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) measure of managerial ability used in this paper first
calculates firm efficiency before extracting managerial ability from it. Second, to provide
an overview of measures of firm efficiency. Third, to demonstrate the importance of firm
efficiency due to the significant effects that it has on firm performance, capital structure, asset
pricing, and executive compensation. Fourth, to examine characteristics of firm efficiency
found in the literature.
1.2.2 Managerial Ability
Early research into managerial ability by May (1943) and Patrick and Eisgruber
(1968) focused on the farming industry. Specifically, the papers measured managerial ability
as productive work units per person taking into account the productivity of the soil and as
technical transformation rates respectively.
Further research into managerial ability such as papers by Hayes and Schaefer (1999),
Fee and Hadlock (2003), Milbourn (2003), and Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006) at-
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tempted to use firm performance (i.e. previous industry adjusted stock returns or return on
assets), as a proxy for managerial ability due to the positive relation the authors observed
between managerial ability and firm performance.
Following this research, papers by Arya and Mittendorf (2005) and Tervio (2008) have
attempted to measure managerial ability based on executive compensation. Specifically, the
idea behind it as mentioned in Arya and Mittendorf (2005), is that ”Since both the likelihood
of option exercise and firm value in the event of exercise are tied to managerial ability, only
a gifted manager takes such a gamble”.
In recent years however there have been two main approaches to estimating manage-
rial ability. The first approach involves manager fixed effects as in papers by Bamber, Jiang,
and Wang (2010) and Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang (2011). The second approach involves
data envelopment analysis (DEA) estimation as in papers by Barr and Siems (1997), Murthi,
Choi and Desai (1997), and Leverty and Grace (2012). However, these papers perform this
DEA estimation for specific industries (banking and insurance, mutual fund, and property
liability insurance industries respectively).
Based on this DEA estimation technique a recent, widely cited and most applicable
measure of managerial ability is constructed by Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012). The
authors propose a measure of managerial ability based on a manager’s ability to maximize
revenue. First, the authors calculate firm efficiency by using data envelopment analysis
(DEA) to solve for optimal weights on a series of input variables (firm level variables that
the manager has influence over), in order to maximize the output variable (revenue). Second,
the authors extract managerial ability from firm efficiency by running a Tobit specification
of firm efficiency on firm characteristics, year effects and industry effects and extracting the
intercept and residuals which becomes the measure of managerial ability.
To test the validity of their managerial ability measure, the authors examine CEO’s
that switch firms during their sample period. They find that 60.5% of manager fixed effects
and 29.1% of firm fixed effects are statistically significant in explaining managerial ability
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(compared to a range of -3.6% to 7.5% of manager fixed effects explaining other measures
of managerial ability). For these switching CEO’s the authors also examine changes in firm
performance (industry-adjusted stock returns and return on assets), for the firm that the
CEO switched to. The authors find that when a CEO with relatively higher managerial abil-
ity is brought in there is an increase in firm performance over the following three years. In
addition, the authors also examine managerial ability and stock returns surrounding CEO
turnover announcements. They find that CEO turnover announcements for outgoing low
(high) managerial ability CEO’s results in positive (negative) stock returns post announce-
ment, a result that is not found for alternative managerial ability measures.
1.2.3 Managerial Ability And Corporate Strategies
In terms of managerial ability and its consequences on corporate strategies, Gan
(2012) examines the difference between high and low ability CEO’s in terms of investment
decisions as well as the effect on firm under-investment and over-investment. To accomplish
this, the author performs regressions of total investments (sum of capital expenditures,
R&D, and acquisition expenditures less cash receipts all scaled by total assets), on lagged
managerial ability controlling for firm characteristics, industry effects and year effects. In
addition, using firm cash and leverage, the author also divides the sample into two groups:
firms most likely to under-invest and firms most likely to over-invest and again tests the
effect of total investments on managerial ability. The author finds that managerial ability
has a positive, significant effect on capital expenditures, acquisition expenditures, and total
investment however this is not the case for R&D. In addition, high ability CEO’s increase
(decrease) this investment when their firm is more likely to under-invest (over-invest). The
author also finds that while these results hold across different levels of monitoring, they
become weaker if the CEO is exposed to high levels of equity risk.
Jiraporn, Leelalai and Tong (2016) examine the relation between managerial ability
and dividend policy. The authors find that there is a positive and significant relation between
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managerial ability and the likelihood of dividend payout as well as the dividend amount.
Specifically, the authors find that a one standard deviation increase in managerial ability
increases the likelihood of the firm paying dividends by 27% and increases the dividend
amount by 29%.
Yung and Chen (2017) examine the effect of managerial ability on firm risk-taking
behavior and firm value. To accomplish this, the authors measure managerial ability fol-
lowing the methodology of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), firm risk-taking behavior as
the standard deviation of return on assets, standard deviation of return on equity, capital
expenditures to total assets, research and development to total assets, acquisitions value to
total assets, sales-based Herfindahl Index and book leverage and firm value as Tobin’s Q. The
authors find that managerial ability has a positive and significant effect on firm risk-taking
behavior, a negative and significant effect on book leverage and a positive and significant
effect on firm value. In addition, the authors find that low ability managers decrease cap-
ital expenditures and R&D while high ability managers decrease capital expenditures but
increase R&D while the authors also find that low (high) ability managers have a significant,
negative (positive) effect on firm value.
Andreou, Karasamani, Louca and Ehrlich (2017) examine the effect of managerial
ability on crisis-period corporate investment. Using the Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012)
measure of managerial ability, the authors find a positive and significant relation between
pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis-period corporate investment. In addition, the authors
find that this relation is only present for CEO’s with general managerial skills as opposed
to firm-specific skills and that crisis-period corporate investment is viewed positively by the
market but only for CEO’s with high managerial ability pre-crisis.
Petkevich and Prevost (2017) investigate the effect that managerial ability has on
contracting with lenders. High ability managers are found to have the effect of decreasing
information-sensitive covenants demanded by lenders, increasing the issuance of longer matu-
rity bonds, and decreasing the issuance of senior secured debt. In addition, the authors find
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that there is a decrease in the risk premium demanded by lenders of information-sensitive
debt for high ability managers.
Lin, Hu and Li (2018) examine the effect that managerial ability has on a firm’s capital
structure. Using both book and market leverage, the authors find that firms with high ability
CEO’s maintain low levels of leverage. In addition, the authors find a negative relation
between managerial ability and firm risk (stock return volatility and cash flow volatility),
as well as a negative relation between managerial ability and information asymmetry (the
natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm, the median monthly ratio
of bid-ask spread to the share price, the ratio of the absolute value of difference between
the mean of the estimated earnings per share (EPS) and the actual EPS to the share price
and the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts forecasts to share price). In terms of
characteristics, the authors find that high ability managers (managerial ability in the highest
quartile), have lower market leverage, book leverage, depreciation, firm size, and higher
profitability, market-to-book, and R&D expenses then low ability managers (managerial
ability in the lowest quartile).
1.2.4 Managerial Ability And Firm Performance
In terms of managerial ability and its consequences on firm performance, Leverty
and Grace (2012) examine the relation between managerial ability and firm performance
(pure technical efficiency, scale efficiency, allocative efficiency, cost efficiency, and revenue
efficiency) as well as whether or not this relation exists during firm distress (insurers most
likely subject to regulatory scrutiny). Using data on property-liability insurance firms, the
authors find that managerial ability has a negative relation with the length of firm distress,
likelihood of firm failure, and the cost of firm failure. The authors also find that within failed
firms there is still significant variation in managerial ability.
Demerjian, Lev, Lewis and McVay (2013) investigate the relation between managerial
ability and earnings quality. The authors find that for firms with high managerial ability
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there are fewer earnings restatements and fewer errors in the bad debt provision. In addition,
the authors find that high managerial ability has a positive relation with earnings and accru-
als persistence and the quality of accrual estimations. In terms of characteristics, the authors
find that high ability managers (managerial ability in the highest quintile), have higher his-
torical returns and total earnings quality and lower media citations and restatements then
low ability managers (managerial ability in the lowest quintile).
Francis, Hasan, Mani and Ye (2016) propose a measure for a CEO’s relative peer
quality and examine the effect this measure has on firm performance as well as the channel
through which this relation operates. To construct the CEO relative peer quality (RPQ)
measure for a given firm, the authors take one minus the ratio of the firm’s Demerjian, Lev,
and McVay (2012) managerial ability rank (rank value of the firm’s managerial ability score
compared to its peers in ascending order), to the number of peer firms which results in an
RPQ value between 0 and 1. Firm performance is then measured as financial performance
(adjusted stock returns) as well as operating performance (one year change in industry
adjusted return on assets). Using data for S&P 1500 firms over the period 20062010, the
authors find that high RPQ firms have higher financial performance and higher operating
performance compared to low RPQ firms. The authors also find that peer averages for firm
financial policy and firm investment policy have a positive and significant effect on the firm’s
own policy decisions which lends support to the learning/following hypothesis. In terms of
characteristics, the authors find that high RPQ firms have significantly higher board size,
number of independent directors and industry concentration, and significantly lower Tobin’s
Q and adjusted return on assets compared to low RPQ firms.
1.2.5 Managerial Ability And Executive Compensation
In terms of managerial ability and its consequences on executive compensation, Brook-
man and Thistle (2013) examine the effect that luck (measured as the predictable component
of firm performance), managerial skill (measured as managerial fixed effects), and labor mar-
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ket opportunities (measured as the compensation of executives at matched firms), has on
executive compensation. The authors find that the most important determinants of execu-
tive compensation are managerial skill, firm size, and labor market opportunities and that
luck plays only a minor role.
Ning and Li (2017) investigate the relation between managerial ability (using the
Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) measure of managerial ability) and executive compen-
sation. The authors find that while managerial ability has a positive effect on executive
compensation, it only explains a negligible amount of it and that firm and executive level
characteristics are the dominant determinants of executive compensation.
Song and Wan (2019) examine the relation between managerial power (measured as
a power index ranging from 0 to 3 based on whether or not the CEO is also chairman of
the board, whether or not the CEO is a founder, and whether or not the CEO is chairman
of the board and holds at least one additional title: president, chief operating officer, or
chief finance officer), and executive compensation. The authors find that more-powerful
CEOs have higher executive compensation than less-powerful CEOs. The authors argue
that this result is consistent with the managerial ability view (higher ability CEOs receive
higher compensation) instead of the managerial power view (more powerful CEOs are able
to extract higher compensation). In terms of characteristics, the authors find that more-
powerful CEOs (CEOs in the top tercile), have higher tenure, stock ownership and options
holdings and lower R&D expenditures and are less likely to be outside CEOs compared to
less-powerful CEOs (CEOs in the bottom tercile).
The literature on managerial ability provides evidence about the important effect
that managerial ability can have on a firm’s corporate strategies, firm performance and
executive compensation. In addition, there are also conflicting results found in the literature
which motivates further investigation. On the one hand, Brookman and Thistle (2013) find
that managerial ability has a positive and significant effect on CEO compensation while on
the other hand Ning and Li (2017) find that managerial ability has a positive but mostly
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nonsignificant effect on CEO compensation.
1.2.6 Relation Between Firm Efficiency And Managerial Ability
While the papers above demonstrate the importance of both firm efficiency and man-
agerial ability, they do so by examining their effects rather than their attributes. More
specifically, the papers above examine the effect that firm efficiency and managerial ability
have on corporate strategies, firm performance, and executive compensation with only lim-
ited research into the attributes of low/high efficiency firms and low/high ability managers.
This is important to examine as it can provide new insights into what it means to be a
low/high efficiency firm, a low/high ability manager and the relation between the two.
In terms of the relation between firm efficiency and managerial ability, similar findings
for firm efficiency and managerial ability in the papers above indicate that it is likely that
a strong, positive relation exists between the two. Despite this potential relation, past
research has focused on examining either firm efficiency or managerial ability in isolation.
While Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) compute firm efficiency and extract managerial
ability from it in their paper, the authors focus was to create a new measure of managerial
ability and thus firm efficiency was largely ignored. Shi and Zhang (2019) examine the
relation between managerial ability, corporate layoffs, and unemployment. The authors find
that managerial ability is negatively related to layoffs and negatively related to a county’s
unemployment rate. However, this papers only tie in to firm efficiency is from a story
standpoint that the above results are related to high ability managers not using layoffs to
increase firm efficiency.
Given the importance of both firm efficiency and managerial ability (as shown in the
papers above), it is also imperative that both be examined together in order to disentangle
results found in the literature. More specifically, disentangling managerial ability and firm
efficiency as well as examining managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency can help
address a limitation raised by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012): The measure of managerial
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ability, although an improvement over current measures, has limitations. In addition, our
second stage dampens variation in ability, for example, by controlling for firm size, because
better managers are more likely to be hired by larger firms (Rosen 1982).
In addition to this, disentangling managerial ability and firm efficiency as well as
examining managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency is also important in the context
of subsequent firm outcomes. In terms of corporate strategies, Margaritis and Psillaki (2007)
find that firm efficiency has a positive relation with leverage however Lin, Hi, and Li (2018)
find that managerial ability has a negative relation with leverage. These different effects
make it difficult to understand the net effect on a firm’s leverage because of the potentially
large, positive relation between managerial ability and firm efficiency. This disentanglement
of firm efficiency and managerial ability is also important when examining firm performance.
On the one hand, Nguyen and Swanson (2009) find that firm efficiency has a negative relation
to stock returns while on the other hand Frijns, Margaritis, and Psillaki (2012) find that firm
efficiency has a positive relation to stock returns. Given the potentially close relation between
firm efficiency and managerial ability, disentangling the two can help provide insights into
this disagreement in the literature. In addition to corporate strategies and firm performance
it is also crucial to disentangle managerial ability and firm efficiency in the context of CEO
compensation as well. In terms of firm efficiency, Sun, Wei and Huang (2013) find that firm
efficiency is positively related to CEO compensation while in terms of managerial ability
Brookman and Thistle (2013), Ning and Li (2017), and Song and Wan (2019) all find that
managerial ability is also positively related to CEO compensation. However, while Brookman
and Thistle (2013) find that managerial ability is one of the main determinants of CEO
compensation, Ning and Li (2017) find that managerial ability only explains a negligible
amount of CEO compensation. Given the significant effect that both firm efficiency and
managerial ability can have on CEO compensation, disentangling the two may provide new




The data for this paper is obtained from three different sources which cover publicly
traded firms on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX markets. Returns and firm initial public
offering (IPO) date data is obtained from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),
accounting data is obtained from COMPUSTAT and CEO attribute and compensation data
is obtained from EXECUCOMP. CRSP and COMPUSTAT data covers the period 1980
through 2017 while EXECUCOMP data covers the period 1992 through 2017.
To be included in the sample, a firm must meet the following criteria. First, firms
must have at least one full calendar year of data available in both CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
Second, CRSP share code must be equal to 10 or 11 (ordinary shares). Third, total assets
data from COMPUSTAT must be non-missing and non-negative. This results in a final
sample of 186,953 yearly observations for 18,920 firms.
1.3.2 Variables Needed For Initial Estimation Of Firm Efficiency
And Managerial Ability
In order to be able to estimate firm efficiency the following variables are obtained
from COMPUSTAT: revenue (sales/turnover net (SALES)), netppe (net property, plant and
equipment (PPENT)), netopleases (discounted present value of the next five years of net
operating leases (MRC1-MRC5)), netrd (net research and development expenses (XRD)
capitalized over five years), goodwill, (goodwill (GDWL)), otherintangibles, (total intangible
assets less goodwill (INTAN-GDWL)), cogs (cost of goods sold (COGS)), and sgaexpenses
(selling, general & administrative expenses (XSGA) less current year operating lease expense
and less research and development expense).
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Similarly, in order to be able to estimate managerial ability the following variables
are obtained from COMPUSTAT: ta (natural logarithm of total assets (AT)), ms (market
share based on sales and expressed as a percentage), freecashdummy (equal to one if free cash
flow is non-negative and equal to zero otherwise), firmage (natural logarithm of firm age),
bussegmentconc (individual business segment sales as a fraction of total firm sales summed
across all business segments), and forcurrencydummy (equal to one if a firm has a nonzero
value for foreign currency adjustment (FCA) and equal to zero otherwise). All variables are
defined in detail in Appendix 1.
1.3.3 Firm Characteristics And CEO Attributes
Managerial ability is likely to be influenced by characteristics of the firm that the
CEO works for and is also likely to be influenced by a CEO’s own personal attributes. To
account for this, all my regressions include firm characteristics and CEO attributes as control
variables. In terms of firm characteristics the following variables are constructed based on
data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT: firmage (the natural logarithm of firm age), size (the
natural logarithm of total sales), bm (the ratio of book value of equity to market value of
equity), nopayout (equal to one if the firm has no dividends and no share repurchases and
equal to zero otherwise), and finance (equal to one if the firm is in the finance industry and
equal to zero otherwise).
In addition, the following CEO attributes are also obtained from EXECUCUMP:
ceoage (the natural logarithm of CEO age), gender (equal to one if the CEO is female and
equal to zero if the CEO is male), tenure (the natural logarithm of CEO tenure), and founder
(equal to one if the CEO is a founder and equal to zero otherwise), and outsider (equal to
one if the CEO is originally from outside the firm and equal to zero otherwise). All variables
are defined in detail in Appendix 1.
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1.3.4 Corporate Strategies
Corporate strategy variables are constructed following Bliss, Denis and Cheng (2015).
These variables consist of capex lagta (capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets),
cash ta (cash holdings scaled by total assets), rd ta (research and development scaled by
total assets), mlev (market leverage calculated as the ratio of debt and current liabilities to
equity), repurchase (total dollar amount of stock repurchases), dividend (total dollar amount
of dividends), and payout ta (total payout scaled by total assets). All variables are defined
in detail in Appendix 1.
1.3.5 Firm Performance
Firm performance measures consist of a financial performance measure returns (an-
nualized stock return expressed as a percentage), as well as operating performance measures
ebitda ta (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization scaled by total as-
sets), ni sales (net income scaled by total sales), roa (return on assets), and roe (return on
equity). All performance measures are expressed as a percentage and are defined in detail
in Appendix 1.
1.3.6 CEO Compensation
CEO compensation variables consist of ceo fixedpay (CEO salary and bonus), ceo options
(total value of options held by the CEO), ceo shares (total value of shares held by the CEO)
and ceo totalpay (sum of ceo fixedpay, ceo options and ceo shares). All CEO compensation
measures are expressed in thousands of US dollars and are defined in detail in Appendix 1.
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1.3.7 Exogenous Control Variables
To control for market effects I also include the following exogenous variables: tbill30
(annualized return on the 30 day US Treasury Bill), sp500 (annualized return on the S&P
500 index), and nber recession (equal to 1 if the year is a National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) recession year and equal to 0 otherwise). All variables are defined in
detail in Appendix 1.
1.4 Development Of Managerial Performance And Cat-
egorization Measures
In this section I describe the initial development of firm efficiency and managerial
ability following the approach of Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) (DLM) before discussing
why the industry-adjusted approach is preferred to the original-DLM approach. Based on
this managerial performance measure, I then describe my construction of a disentangled firm
performance measure (innate firm efficiency) as well as disentangled managerial performance
measures (innate managerial ability, relative managerial ability, excess managerial score and
managerial strategy score).
Based on relative managerial ability, excess managerial score and peer adjusted rel-
ative managerial ability I then categorize managers as underrated (higher ability managers
at lower efficiency firms), typical (managers with similar levels of managerial ability and
firm efficiency) and overrated (lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms). In ad-
dition, based on managerial strategy score I further subcategorize managers as proactive
(significant increases in corporate strategies), status quo (no significant change in corporate
strategies) and apprehensive (significant decreases in corporate strategies).
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1.4.1 Development Of Firm Efficiency And Managerial Ability
To develop original firm efficiency and managerial ability along the lines of Demerjian,
Lev and McVay (2012), I first setup an optimization model by industry and year. I compute
firm efficiency (of each firm per year) by solving this optimization problem of maximizing
output (revenue) subject to the input variables (firm decision variables: net property, plant
and equipment, net operating leases, net R&D, goodwill, other intangibles, cost of goods
sold and selling, general and administrative expenses). To compute managerial ability (of
each firm per year), I perform a tobit of firm efficiency on firm characteristics (total assets,
market share, non-negative free cash flow indicator, business segment sales and nonzero
foreign currency adjustment indicator); managerial ability is computed as the intercept plus
residual from this tobit.
Under the industry-adjusted approach, firm efficiency and managerial ability (firm eff
and mngr abil), are estimated following the orginal DLM approach except that the es-
timation procedure is performed by 12 Fama-French industry as well as by year. This
industry-adjusted approach is computed for several reasons. First, since this paper ex-
amines firm efficiency alongside managerial ability, it is imperative that firm efficiency be
comparable for firms in different industries. Second, it is important to capture variation
in firm efficiency across industries (i.e. given that the computation of firm efficiency in-
volves input variables such as netproperty, plantandequipment, netoperatingleases, and
netresearchanddevelopment the resulting firm efficiency based on these inputs is funda-
mentally different for a manufacturing firm versus a technology firm). Appendix 1 describes
the estimation procedure of firm effDLM, mngr abilDLM, firm eff , and mngr abil in more
detail as well as provides further analysis of original versus industry-adjusted approaches.
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1.4.2 Creation Of Additional Firm And Managerial Performance
Measures
Given a potentially large, positive relation between firm efficiency and managerial
ability and that higher efficiency firms are more likely to hire higher ability managers, in
order to disentangle managerial ability and firm efficiency as well as examine managerial
ability conditional on firm efficiency I create additional firm and managerial performance
measures. Based on these measures for original firm efficiency and managerial ability, I
compute new measures for innate firm efficiency (predicted value from the previous tobit
of firm efficiency on firm characteristics), innate managerial ability (firm efficiency minus
innate firm efficiency), relative managerial ability (innate managerial ability as a ratio of firm
efficiency), excess managerial score (innate managerial ability minus innate firm efficiency)
and managerial strategy score (divergence of a manager’s corporate strategies, i.e., capital
expenditures, cash, R&D, leverage and total dividends and share repurchases relative to all
other managers). All new measures are computed by firm per year and all data is firm-specific
annual time-series.
I first construct innate firm efficiency (inn firm eff) in order to capture firm efficiency
independent of managerial ability. To compute innate firm efficiency I use a Tobit speci-
fication of firm efficiency on firm characteristics (total assets, market share, free cashflow
indicator, firm age, business segment concentration and foreign currency indicator, see Ap-
pendix 1 for a more detailed description). Innate firm efficiency is then computed each firm
year as the predicted value of firm efficiency which is then standardized over the interval
(0,1].
Similarly, I construct innate managerial ability (inn mngr abil) to capture managerial
ability independent of firm efficiency. To compute innate managerial ability, I standardize
both managerial ability (mngr abil), and innate firm efficiency (inn firm eff), over the interval
(0,1] to ensure both measures have the same scale. Each firm year inn mngr abil is then
computed as the difference between standardized mngr abil and standardized inn firm eff.
24
In addition to innate firm efficiency and innate managerial ability, I also construct
three additional managerial performance measures. First, I construct relative manage-
rial ability (rel mngr abil), to capture managerial ability conditional on the firm’s under-
lying firm efficiency. It is computed each firm year as the ratio of innate managerial
ability (inn mngr abil) to firm efficiency (firm eff). Relative managerial ability is win-
sorized at the 0.5% level and then standardized over the interval (0,1]. Second, I also
construct excess managerial score (exc mngr scor) to capture managerial ability in excess
of the firm’s underlying firm efficiency. Each firm year I compute it as innate managerial
ability (inn mngr abil) minus innate firm efficiency (inn firm eff). Third, I create manage-
rial strategy score (mngr strat scor) in order to capture whether managers have a significant
increase, no significant change or a significant decrease in corporate strategies. Specifically,
based on changes in each of the five corporate strategy variable (capex lagta, rd ta, cash ta,
mlev and payout ta) a manager in the top 30% is assigned a value of 1, a manager in the
middle 40% is assigned a value of 0 while a manager in the bottom 30% is assigned a value of
−1. Summing up these assigned values across the five corporate strategy variables provides
the managerial strategy score which takes on an integer value on the [−5, 5] scale. Appendix
2 describes the construction of all measures in further detail.
1.4.3 Time-Series Trends And Distributions Of Firm And Manage-
rial Performance Measures
In terms of time series trends in Figure 1 I examine mean firm efficiency (Panel A),
and mean managerial ability (Panel B), over the period 1980 through 2017 using both the
original DLM approach as well as the industry-adjusted approach. I find that in terms of
firm efficiency, firm effDLM and firm eff show a similar increasing trend over time with
firm eff lying above firm effDLM. The managerial ability variables, mngr abilDLM and
mngr abil, are also very similar to each other and trend close to zero on average.
Similarly in Figure 2 I examine mean firm efficiency and innate firm efficiency (Panel
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A), and mean managerial ability and innate managerial ability (Panel B) over the period
1980 through 2017. Both firm efficiency and innate firm efficiency are found to have a similar
upward trend over time with a sharp drop in both between 2009 and 2011. In addition, innate
firm efficiency is found to generally lie above firm efficiency. I also find that both managerial
ability and innate managerial ability trend similarly with managerial ability generally lying
above innate managerial ability.
For mean innate managerial ability, relative managerial ability and excess managerial
score over the period 1980 through 2017 in Figure 3 I find that innate managerial ability
and excess managerial score are similar to each other with excess managerial score showing a
slightly larger decreasing trend over time compared to innate managerial ability. In contrast,
relative managerial ability is found to have a very steep decreasing trend over time.
In Figure 4 I examine histograms of innate firm efficiency (Panel A), innate managerial
ability (Panel B), relative managerial ability (Panel C) and excess managerial score (Panel
D). Innate firm efficiency is found to have a fairly smooth distribution with a longer right,
positive tail while innate managerial ability has a thick middle with smaller left, negative and
right, positive tails. In addition, for relative managerial ability there are a large number of
observations clustered around zero with a very long left, negative tail while excess managerial
score is approximately normal except with it’s distribution shifted slightly to the right. In
Figure 5 I examine a histogram of managerial strategy score. I find that managerial strategy
score follows a normal distribution as it has a large, central peak, a moderate middle and
both tails are small and symmetric.
1.4.4 Underrated, Typical And Overrated Categorization Of Man-
agers
After creating new measures which disentangle managerial ability and firm efficiency
in the previous section, I now use these disentangled measures to examine managerial ability
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conditional on firm efficiency. Specifically, using these disentangled measures I categorize
managers as underrated (higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms), typical (man-
agers with similar levels of managerial ability and firm efficiency) and overrated (lower ability
managers at higher efficiency firms). In order to accomplish this, I use three different catego-
rization approaches: excess managerial score, relative managerial ability and peer adjusted
relative managerial ability.
Using excess managerial score each year I create low (bottom 30%), normal (middle
40%) and high (top 30%), portfolios. I categorize managers as underrated if they are in the
high excess managerial score portfolio (i.e. managers with high innate managerial ability and
low innate firm efficiency), typical if they are in the normal excess managerial score portfolio
(i.e. managers with similar levels of innate managerial ability and innate firm efficiency) and
overrated if they are in the low excess managerial score portfolio (i.e. managers with low
innate managerial ability and high innate firm efficiency). The typical group that I construct
consists of three sub-groups of managers: (1) managers with low innate managerial ability
working at firms with low innate firm efficiency, (2) managers with normal innate managerial
ability working at firms with normal innate firm efficiency, and (3) managers with high innate
managerial ability working at firms with high innate firm efficiency. I classify firms and
managers based on 30%/40%/30% ranked portfolios. There can be potential non-linearity or
a U-shape relation between underrated/typical/overrated managers and corporate strategies,
firm performance and CEO compensation. To address this possibility, I use typical managers
as the benchmark; I compare underrated managers and overrated managers to this typical
benchmark.
I then use a similar approach to construct low, normal and high portfolios based
on relative managerial ability. I categorize managers as underrated if they are in the high
relative managerial ability portfolio (i.e. managers with high innate managerial ability and
low firm efficiency), typical if they are in the normal relative managerial ability portfolio (i.e.
managers with similar levels of innate managerial ability and firm efficiency) and overrated
if they are in the low relative managerial ability portfolio (i.e. managers with low innate
27
managerial ability and high firm efficiency).
For the last categorization approach (peer adjusted relative managerial ability), each
year I construct peer manager groups based on both firm industry peers (12 Fama-French
industry classification) and firm size peers (small, medium and large firms in terms of total
assets classified as the bottom 30% of firms, middle 40% of firms and the top 30% of firms
respectively). I then calculate peer adjusted relative managerial ability (peer rel mngr abil)
each year as the fraction of peer managers with a lower relative managerial ability then the
given manager (similar to the concept of percentiles). For example, a peer adjusted relative
managerial ability value of 0.80 indicates that 80% of a manager’s peers have a lower relative
managerial ability value. I then categorize managers each year as underrated if they have a
peer adjusted relative managerial ability greater than or equal to 0.70, typical if they have
a peer adjusted relative managerial ability between 0.30 and 0.70 and overrated if they have
a peer adjusted relative managerial ability less than or equal to 0.30. Appendix 3 describes
all categorization processes in greater detail.
In Figure 6 I examine mean relative managerial ability and excess managerial score
for underrated managers (higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms) versus overrated
managers (lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms) over the period 1980 through
2017 based on excess managerial score categorization (Panel A), relative managerial ability
categorization (Panel B) and peer adjusted relative managerial ability categorization (Panel
C). Based on excess managerial score categorization underrated managers have a similar,
slight downward trend in both excess managerial score and relative managerial ability while
overrated managers have a similar, more pronounced downward trend in both excess man-
agerial score and relative managerial ability. In addition, relative managerial ability and
excess managerial score for overrated managers also correctly lies below relative managerial
ability and excess managerial score for underrated managers. The results for relative man-
agerial ability and peer adjusted relative managerial ability categorizations are also found to
be similar to the results for excess managerial score categorization. Specifically, both relative
managerial ability and excess managerial score are declining over time for both underrated
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and overrated managers (with a steeper decline for overrated managers), and for overrated
managers relative managerial ability and excess managerial score values correctly lie below
the values for underrated managers.
1.4.5 Proactive, Status Quo And Apprehensive Categorization Of
Managers
Following underrated, typical and overrated categorization of managers I further sub-
categorize managers as proactive (managers that significantly increase corporate strategies),
status quo (managers that have no significant change in corporate strategies) and apprehen-
sive (managers that significantly decrease corporate strategies) based on managerial strategy
score.
Specifically, I categorize managers as proactive if their managerial strategy score is
from 2 through 5 (increase in corporate strategies), status quo if their managerial strategy
score is from −1 through 1 (no significant change in corporate strategies) and apprehensive
if their managerial strategy score is from −5 through −2 (significant decrease in corporate
strategies).
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Analysis Of Firm And Managerial Performance Measures
In Table 1 I provide details about the construction of initial firm efficiency and man-
agerial ability measures and about my construction of new additional firm and managerial
performance measures (innate firm efficiency, innate managerial ability, relative manage-
rial ability, excess managerial score and managerial strategy score) in Panel A. Panel B
describes my categorization of managers as underrated (higher ability managers at lower
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efficiency firms), typical (managers with similar levels of managerial ability and firm effi-
ciency), and overrated (lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms). In Panel C I then
describe my further subcategorization of managers as proactive (significantly increase corpo-
rate strategies), status quo (no significant change in corporate strategies), and apprehensive
(significantly decrease corporate strategies).
For these firm and managerial performance measures in Table 2 I examine correla-
tions in Panel A, summary statistics in Panel B, and tests for orthogonality (i.e. whether or
not measures are independent of each other) in Panel C. Panel A demonstrates that there is
a large, positive correlation of 0.5724 between firm efficiency and managerial ability. In con-
trast, my disentangled measures of innate firm efficiency and innate managerial ability have
an almost zero correlation (0.0118) with each other. In addition, innate firm efficiency still
maintains a large, positive correlation of 0.5640 with firm efficiency while innate managerial
ability still maintains a large, positive correlation of 0.6592 with managerial ability. The
managerial performance measures I create (innate managerial ability, relative managerial
ability and excess managerial score) all have a large, positive correlation with each other as
well ranging from 0.3576 to 0.7148. Summary statistics in Panel B indicate the similarities
between firm efficiency and innate firm efficiency, between managerial ability and innate
managerial ability and between innate managerial ability, relative managerial ability and
excess managerial score. In Panel C based on orthogonality tests I find that firm efficiency
and managerial ability are not orthogonal to each other (i.e. variance inflation factor of
1.49 and tolerance of 1.22 versus 1.00 required for orthogonality and covariance of 0.0214
versus 0 required for orthogonality). In contrast, innate firm efficiency and innate manage-
rial ability are found to be orthogonal to each other with a variance inflation factor of 1.00,
tolerance of 1.00 and covariance of 0.0003. In addition, this orthogonality is accomplished
while maintaining a strong relation between firm efficiency and innate firm efficiency as well
as maintaining a strong relation between managerial ability and innate managerial ability.
Overall, the results indicate that there is a large, positive relation between firm effi-
ciency and managerial ability. However, by creating innate firm efficiency and innate man-
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agerial ability I am able to successfully disentangle firm efficiency and managerial ability
while still maintaining a close relation between innate firm efficiency and firm efficiency and
between innate managerial ability and managerial ability.
1.5.2 Underrated, Typical And Overrated Managerial Categoriza-
tion Measures
1.5.2.1 Attributes And Characteristics
After successfully disentangling firm efficiency and managerial ability I can now exam-
ine managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency. I accomplish this by examining mean val-
ues of innate firm efficiency, innate managerial ability, relative managerial ability and excess
managerial score for underrated mangers (higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms),
typical managers (managers with similar levels of managerial ability and firm efficiency)
and overrated managers (lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms) in Table 3. The
typical group that I construct consists of three sub-groups of managers: (1) managers with
low innate managerial ability working at firms with low innate firm efficiency, (2) managers
with normal innate managerial ability working at firms with normal innate firm efficiency,
and (3) managers with high innate managerial ability working at firms with high innate firm
efficiency. I classify firms and managers based on 30%/40%/30% ranked portfolios. There
can be potential non-linearity or a U-shape relation between underrated/typical/overrated
managers and corporate strategies, firm performance and CEO compensation. To address
this possibility, I use typical managers as the benchmark; I compare underrated managers
and overrated managers to this typical benchmark.
I find that there is generally an increasing trend in innate firm efficiency moving
from underrated to typical to overrated managers (0.2642 to 0.3304 to 0.4673 respectively
based on excess managerial score categorization approach) as well as a decreasing trend in
managerial performance measures (innate managerial ability, relative managerial ability and
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excess managerial score) moving from underrated to typical to overrated managers (0.6525
to 0.5064 to 0.3942 respectively for innate managerial ability based on excess managerial
score categorization approach). Similar results are also found for all three categorization
approaches (excess managerial score, relative managerial ability and peer adjusted relative
managerial ability). Overall, the results in this table provide evidence that underrated
categorization is able to capture higher ability managers at lower efficiency and that overrated
categorization is able to capture lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms. In addition,
this table adds further support to the findings from Table 2 that the managerial performance
measures (innate managerial ability, relative managerial ability and excess managerial score)
are similar to each other as well as demonstrating that all three categorization approaches
(excess managerial score, relative managerial ability and peer adjusted relative managerial
ability) are also similar to each other as well.
After categorizing managers as underrated mangers (higher ability managers at lower
efficiency firms), typical managers (managers with similar levels of managerial ability and
firm efficiency) and overrated managers (lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms) I
then examine the attributes (CEO attributes and firm characteristics) of these managers.
Specifically, I examine mean values of CEO attributes (Panel A) and mean values of
firm characteristics (Panel B) across underrated, typical and overrated managerial catego-
rizations. I also perform univariate probits (Panel C) and multivariate probits which include
market and industry controls (Panel D) of CEO attributes and firm characteristics on the
probability that a manager is categorized as underrated or not as well as on the probability
that a manager is categorized as overrated or not. Similar tests are carried out in Panels
E and F except underrated versus typical managerial categorizations and overrated verus
typical managerial categorizations are used. Panel G consists of multivariate ordered probits
which examine underrated, typical as well as overrated managers. I also use standard errors
robust to heteroskedasticity in all probits.
In terms of CEO attributes, younger CEO’s are found to be more likely to be un-
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derrated while older CEO’s are more likely to be overrated. I also find that female CEO’s
are more likely to be underrated, longer tenured CEO’s are more likely to be underrated,
shorter tenured CEO’s are more likely to be overrated, founder CEO’s are more likely to
be underrated, outsider CEO’s (CEO’s hired from outside the firm) are more likely to be
underrated and that insider CEO’s are more likely to be overrated. Since managerial ability
is very likely to be related to CEO tenure (i.e., whether the CEO is new in the job or is a
veteran), I also examine four CEO tenure groups based on (1) CEOs in their first year of
tenure, (2) CEOs in their last year of tenure, (3) CEOs with short tenure, and (4) CEOs
with long tenure. I examine mean and median values of underrated and overrated indicator
(based on all three categorization approaches: excess managerial ability, relative managerial
ability and peer adjusted relative managerial ability), innate firm efficiency, innate manage-
rial ability, relative managerial ability, excess managerial score and managerial strategy score
separately for these four CEO tenure groups. I find that CEOs in their first year are more
likely to be underrated based on only the excess managerial score categorization approach,
compared to CEOs in their last year. Otherwise I find no significant difference in underrated
and overrated indicator, innate firm efficiency, innate managerial ability, relative managerial
ability, excess managerial score and managerial strategy score between CEOs in their first
year versus CEOs in their last year. I also find that short-tenured CEOs are less likely to
be underrated and more likely to be overrated compared to long-tenured CEOs; this holds
across all managerial categorization approaches. Short-tenured CEOs also have larger innate
firm efficiency as well as smaller innate managerial ability, relative managerial ability and
excess managerial score compared to long-tenure CEOs. I find no significant difference in
managerial strategy score between short- versus long-tenured CEOs.
In addition, younger as well as smaller firms are more likely to have an underrated
CEO while older as well as larger firms are more likely to have an overrated CEO. I also
find that firms that have no payout (i.e. no dividends and share repurchases) are more likely
to have an underrated CEO while firms with payout are more likely to have an overrated
CEO. In addition, there is some evidence that firms not in the finance industry are more
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likely to have an underrated CEO while firms in the finance industry are more likely to
have an overrated CEO. All results are found to hold across univariate and multivariate
specifications as well as hold regardless of whether I examine underrated/overrated versus
not or underrated/overrated versus typical.
Overall, the results for both CEO attributes and firm characteristics indicate the
important relation between CEO attributes/firm characteristics and managerial ability con-
ditional on firm efficiency (i.e. underrated, typical and overrated managerial categorization).
In addition, the results in this table provide some additional insights into CEO’s. Specifi-
cally, female as well as founder CEO’s are more likely to be higher ability CEO’s working
at lower efficiency firms. Outsider CEO’s are also more likely to be higher ability CEO’s
at lower efficiency firms while in contrast insider CEO’s are more likely to be lower ability
CEO’s at higher efficiency firms.
1.5.2.2 Corporate Strategies Adopted
Based on whether a manager is categorized as underrated (higher ability manager at
a lower efficiency firm), typical (manager with similar level of managerial ability and firm
efficiency) or overrated (lower ability manager at a higher efficiency firm) in year t in Table
1.5 I examine the levels of corporate strategies in year t+1 (capital expenditures, cash, R&D,
leverage, repurchases, dividends and total payout) as well as changes in corporate strategies
from year t to t+1. In Panel A I examine mean levels of corporate strategies in year t+1
and in Panel B I examine changes in corporate strategies from year t to t+1. In Panel C I
perform univariate (underrated or overrated indicator), bivariate (underrated and overrated
indicator) as well as multivariate (including firm, market and industry controls) regressions
of changes in corporate strategies on underrated/overrated status. All regressions I carry
out include standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.
For levels of corporate strategies, I find that underrated managers are associated
with less risky or conservative firms: these firms have the lowest levels of capital expendi-
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tures, R&D, leverage, share repurchases and dividends. In contrast, I find that overrated
managers are associated with more risky or aggressive firms: these firms have the highest
levels of capital expenditures, R&D, leverage, share repurchases and dividends. For annual
changes in corporate strategies, I find that underrated managers (even though working in
conservative firms) adopt more aggressive strategies: these managers demonstrate significant
increases in cash, R&D, share repurchases and dividends. In contrast, overrated managers
(even though working in aggressive firms) adopt more conservative strategies: these man-
agers depict significant decreases in cash, R&D, share repurchases and dividends. In short,
underrated managers are associated with low levels of corporate strategies but adopt signif-
icant increases in corporate strategies. This is likely because these managers are employed
at lower efficiency firms, but adopt more aggressive (increase) strategies to try and turn the
fortunes of their firm around. In contrast, overrated managers are likely employed at higher
efficiency firms but adopt more conservative (decrease) strategies to potentially free-ride off
of the firms’ high efficiency and/or not wanting to rock the boat. These results hold in
univariate, bivariate as well as multivariate settings. I also implement Petersen (2009) cor-
rection by clustering standard errors at the firm dimension for all regressions in Table 1.5.
While a few results for share repurchases and dividends have a decrease in significance from
1% level to 5% level, in terms of inference, there is no material impact of Petersen (2009)
correction.
Overall, these results indicate that there is an important relation between managerial
ability conditional on firm efficiency and corporate strategies. Underrated managers are
associated with less risky/aggresive firms (i.e. firms with the lowest levels of corporate
strategies) while in contrast overrated managers are associated with more risky/aggresive
firms (i.e. firms with the highest levels of corporate strategies). However, in contrast to these
findings I also find that underrated managers adopt more aggressive strategies (i.e. increase
corporate strategies) compared to overrated managers (i.e. decrease corporate strategies).
Taken together these results indicate the significant difference in the levels and changes of
corporate strategies adopted by higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms versus lower
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ability managers at higher efficiency firms.
1.5.3 Proactive, Status Quo And Apprehensive Managerial Cate-
gorization Measures
1.5.3.1 Attributes And Characteristics
Based on changes in these corporate strategies from year t to t+1, I construct man-
agerial strategy score to further subcategorize managers as proactive (significant increase in
corporate strategies), status quo (no significant change in corporate strategies) and appre-
hensive (significant decrease in corporate strategies) in year t+1. For these proactive, status
quo and apprehensive managers in Table 6 I then examine mean innate firm efficiency, in-
nate managerial ability, relative managerial ability, excess managerial score and managerial
strategy score in Panel A and the relation between underrated (higher ability managers
at lower efficiency firms), typical (managers with similar levels of managerial ability and
firm efficiency) and overrated (lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms) managerial
categorization and proactive, status quo and apprehensive categorization in Panel B.
I find that proactive managers (managers that significantly increase corporate strate-
gies), have the highest levels of innate firm efficiency, innate managerial ability and relative
managerial ability while apprehensive managers (managers that significantly decrease cor-
porate strategies), have the lowest levels of innate managerial ability, relative managerial
ability and excess managerial score. In addition, the categorization of proactive, status quo
and apprehensive managers is also found to have a nice symmetric distribution with mean
managerial strategy scores of 2.3725 for proactive managers, 0.027 for status quo managers
and −2.3686 for apprehensive managers. Based on Panel B I find that underrated, typical
and overrated managers tend to all have mean managerial strategy scores close to zero which
indicates that all three managerial categorizations are on average related to no significant
changes in corporate strategies. Underrated, typical and overrated managers all also found
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to have decent representation amongst proactive, status quo and apprehensive managers.
Roughly 16 to 19% of underrated/typical/overrated managers are further subcategorized
as proactive, 63-66% of underrated/typical/overrated managers are further subcategorized
as status quo and 17 to 18% of underrated/typical/overrated managers are further subcat-
egorized as apprehensive. These results are also similar regardless of whether underrated,
typical and overrated categorization of managers is based on excess managerial score, relative
managerial ability or peer adjusted relative managerial ability.
Overall, the results in this table indicate that lower ability managers in lower efficiency
firms are more likely to be apprehensive (i.e. have significant decreases in corporate strategies
which can be considered as a more conservative approach), and that higher ability managers
in higher efficiency firms are more likely to be proactive (i.e. have significant increases in
corporate strategies which can be considered as a more aggressive approach).
After further subcategorizing managers as proactive (significant increases in corpo-
rate strategies), status quo (no significant changes in corporate strategies), and apprehensive
(significant decreases in corporate strategies), I then examine the attributes (CEO attributes
and firm characteristics) of these managers in Table 7. Mean values in CEO attributes (Panel
A) and mean values in firm characteristics (Panel B) across proactive, status quo and ap-
prehensive managerial subcategorizations are examined. I also perform univariate probits
(Panel C) and multivariate probits which include market and industry controls (Panel D)
of CEO attributes and firm characteristics on the probability that a manager is categorized
as proactive or not as well as on the probability that a manager is categorized as apprehen-
sive or not. Similar tests are carried out in Panels E and F except proactive versus status
quo managerial subcategorizations and apprehensive verus status quo managerial subcate-
gorizations are used. In Panel G I carry out multivariate ordered probits which examine
proactive, status quo and apprehensive managers. In addition, standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity are used in all probits.
I find that in terms of CEO attributes there is no significant relation between CEO age,
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gender, tenure, founder status, outsider status and whether a CEO is proactive (significantly
increases corporate strategies), status quo (no significant changes in corporate strategies)
or apprehensive (significantly decreases corporate strategies). In contrast, older as well as
larger firms are more likely to have a proactive CEO while younger as well as smaller firms
are more likely to have an apprehensive CEO. In addition, I find that firms with no payout
(i.e. no dividends and share repurchases) are more likely to be proactive and less likely to be
apprehensive. Book-to-market value of equity and whether a firm is in the finance industry
is found to have no significant relation as to whether a CEO is likely to be proactive, status
quo or apprehensive. There is also some evidence that underrated CEO’s (higher ability
CEO’s at lower efficiency firms) are less likely to be apprehensive (significantly decrease
corporate strategies). All results hold across univariate and multivariate specifications as
well as generally hold regardless of whether I examine underrated/overrated versus not or
underrated/overrated versus typical.
Overall, these results indicate that whether a CEO has a significant increase, no
significant change or a significant decrease in corporate strategies is not significantly related
to CEO attributes but is significantly related to the firm characteristics of firm age, firm size
and whether or not the firm pays dividends or repurchases.
1.5.4 Explanatory Power Of Firm And Managerial Categorization
Measures
1.5.4.1 Innate Firm Efficiency
Based on underrated, typical and overrated categorization in year t and further cat-
egorization as proactive, status quo and apprehensive in year t+1 I now examine changes
in innate firm efficiency from year t+1 to t+2. Table 8 presents mean changes in innate
firm efficiency (Panel A) based on 1-way managerial categorization (underrated, typical and
overrated) as well as based on 2-way managerial categorization (underrated, typical and over-
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rated as well as proactive, status quo and apprehensive). In Panel B I perform univariate,
bivariate and multivariate regressions (which includes firm, industry and market controls) of
changes in innate firm efficiency on managerial categorization.
I find that underrated as well as apprehensive managers have a significant increase in
innate firm efficiency while in contrast both overrated as well as proactive managers have a
significant decrease in innate firm efficiency. These results are found to hold in univariate,
bivariate as well as multivariate settings. Overall, these results provide further support to
the importance of examining managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency as underrated
managers (higher ability managers at lower efficiencies) can see an improvement in firm
efficiency while in contrast overrated managers (low ability managers at higher efficiency
firms) can see a deterioration in firm efficiency.
1.5.4.2 Financial And Operating Performance
In addition to changes in innate firm efficiency, in Table 9 I also examine levels of
financial and operating performance measures in year t+1 expressed as a percentage based
on underrated, typical and overrated managerial categorization in year t. Panel A presents
mean financial performance (returns) as well as mean operating performance (earnings before
interest, depreciation and amortization scaled by total assets, net income scaled by total sales,
return on assets and return on equity) based on underrated, typical and overrated managerial
categorization as well as by high versus low (above versus below median) innate firm efficiency
and innate managerial ability. I extend this analysis in Panel B by performing univariate
(underrated or overrated categorization), bivariate (underrated and overrated categorization)
and multivariate (including firm, industry and market controls) regressions of financial and
operating performance on managerial categorization.
I find that high innate efficiency firms have better subsequent performance than low
innate efficiency firms (3.56% return on assets and 5.09% return on equity versus −7.41%
return on assets and −11.10% return on equity respectively). Similarly, high innate ability
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managers are also found to have better subsequent performance than low innate ability
managers (3.08% return on assets and 10.16% return on equity versus −6.89% return on
assets and −16.27% return on equity respectively). In addition, I find that underrated CEO’s
with high innate ability have better firm performance than underrated CEO’s with low innate
ability and that overrated CEO’s with high innate ability have better firm performance than
overrated CEO’s with low innate ability (except for returns). Based on univariate, bivariate
and multivariate regressions underrated managers are generally found to be positively related
to subsequent firm performance (i.e. based on multivariate regressions that include firm,
industry and market controls underrated managerial categorization is related to 7.4% higher
ebitda to total assets and 8.3% higher return on assets based on excess managerial score
categorization of managers). In contrast, overrated managers are generally found to be
negatively related to subsequent firm performance (i.e. based on multivariate regressions
that include firm, industry and market controls overrated managerial categorization is related
to −8.9% lower ebitda to total assets and −9.6% lower return on assets based on excess
managerial score categorization of managers). These results are comparable to the results
found for changes in innate firm efficiency for underrated and overrated managers in the
previous table. I also implement Petersen (2009) correction by clustering standard errors at
the firm dimension for all regressions in Table 1.9. While a few results for net income to
sales and return on assets have a decrease in significance from 1% level to 5% level, in terms
of inference, there is no material impact of Petersen (2009) correction.
Overall, the results indicate that there is a momentum effect in both firm efficiency
and managerial ability as high (low) firm efficiency and managerial ability is related to
higher (lower) subsequent firm performance. In addition, innate managerial ability is found
to matter more than innate firm efficiency for subsequent firm performance as higher ability
managers at lower efficiency firms can greatly improve the fortunes of their firm while con-




I also examine the importance of both innate firm efficiency and innate managerial
ability in the context of CEO compensation by examining levels of CEO compensation (fixed
pay which consists of salary plus bonus, options based compensation, shares based compen-
sation and total compensation) in year t+1 based on underrated, typical and overrated
managerial categorization in year t. Panel A of Table 10 presents mean values of CEO com-
pensation measures based on underrated, typical and overrated managerial categorization
as well as by high versus low (above versus below median) innate firm efficiency and innate
managerial ability. I extend this analysis in Panel B by performing univariate (underrated
or overrated categorization), bivariate (underrated and overrated categorization) and mul-
tivariate (including firm, industry and market controls) regressions of CEO compensation
measures on managerial categorization.
I find that high innate efficiency firms command higher CEO compensation than low
innate efficiency firms ($1.25 million fixed pay versus $0.523 million fixed pay, $2.29 million
options based compensation versus $1.09 million options based compensation, $3.14 million
shares based compensation versus $1.10 million shares based compensation and $6.56 mil-
lion total compensation versus $2.68 million total compensation). In contrast to the results
for firm performance, there is similar CEO compensation between CEO’s with high innate
managerial ability versus CEO’s with low innate managerial ability ($1.13 million fixed pay
versus $1.13 million fixed pay, $1.97 million options based compensation versus $2.37 million
options based compensation, $2.92 million shares based compensation versus $2.66 million
shares based compensation and $6.23 million total compensation versus $5.83 million to-
tal compensation). In addition, regardless of high or low innate managerial ability, CEO’s
at firms with high innate firm efficiency earn more than CEO’s at firms with low innate
firm efficiency. Based on univariate, bivariate and multivariate regressions I observe that
underrated CEO’s (higher ability CEO’s at lower efficiency firms) receive less CEO com-
pensation than overrated CEO’s (lower ability CEO’s at higher efficiency firms). Based on
41
multivariate regressions after including firm, industry and market controls I find that based
on excess managerial score categorization approach underrated managerial status versus
overrated managerial status is related to: −108.36 thousand CEO fixed pay versus $291.99
thousand CEO fixed pay, $99.06 thousand options based compensation versus $963.44 thou-
sand options based compensation, $144.38 thousand shares based compensation versus $2.52
million shares based compensation and −$73.53 thousand total compensation versus $3.38
million total compensation. These results are found to hold for all forms of CEO compen-
sation with stronger results for underrated, typical and overrated managerial categorization
based on excess managerial score and weaker results for underrated, typical and overrated
managerial categorization based on relative managerial ability and peer adjusted relative
managerial ability. I also implement Petersen (2009) correction by clustering standard er-
rors at the firm dimension for all regressions in Table 1.10. While a few results for shares
based compensation and total compensation have a decrease in significance from 1% level
to 5% level, in terms of inference, there is no material impact of Petersen (2009) correction.
In addition, I also examine CEO compensation in terms of unexercised stock options (unex-
ercised unexercisable stock options, OPT UNEX UNEXER NUM + unexercised exercisable
stock options, OPT UNEX EXER NUM) in thousands of dollars. Specifically, in Panel A I
find that firms with high innate firm efficiency have, on average, significantly higher unexer-
cised stock options than firms with low innate firm efficiency. In contrast to this, managers
with low innate managerial ability have, on average, significantly higher unexercised stock
options than managers with high innate managerial ability. In Panels A and B, I also find
that underrated managers hold significantly less unexercised stock options while overrated
managers possess significantly more unexercised stock options. Given that the results for
unexercised stock options are similar to the results for value of stock options held, I do not
report results for unexercised stock options in this table.
Overall, the results indicate that firm efficiency matters than managerial ability for
CEO compensation which is in contrast to the findings of managerial ability mattering
more than firm efficiency for firm performance. This provides some indication that the
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hype around CEO’s matters more than their ability when determining CEO compensation.
These results also provide further evidence regarding the importance of examining managerial
ability conditional on firm efficiency and can potentially reconcile the findings of Brookman
and Thistle (2013) who finds that managerial ability is one of the main determinants of
CEO compensation while in contrast Ning and Li (2017) who finds that managerial ability
only explains a negligible amount of CEO compensation through the disentanglement of
managerial ability and firm efficiency.
1.6 Conclusion
Prior research has found that managerial ability and firm efficiency have a significant
effect on the decisions made by firms as well as on subsequent outcomes in terms of firm
performance and CEO compensation. However, prior research has largely focused on man-
agerial ability with less attention paid to firm efficiency. In addition, existing literature has
examined each one in isolation despite some indications from the findings that managerial
ability and firm efficiency might have a large, positive relation.
However, prior research has not recognized that managerial ability and firm efficiency
are highly correlated. For example, for my data sample I find that there is a large, positive
correlation of 0.5724 between managerial ability and firm efficiency. In addition, based on
orthogonality tests I also find that managerial ability and firm efficiency are not orthogonal to
each other (i.e. variance inflation factor of 1.49 and tolerance of 1.22 versus 1.00 required for
orthogonality and covariance of 0.0214 versus 0 required for orthogonality). The high degree
of overlap between managerial ability and firm efficiency is not surprising given separating
equilibrium arguments that high quality firms tend to attract better quality managers, and
low quality firms are likely compelled to accommodate low quality managers. High quality
firms are able to pay high compensation and also have a good reputation which tends to
attract better quality managers. In contrast, low quality firms are not able to pay as high
compensation and also have a poor reputation which tends to make these firms compelled
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to accommodate lower quality managers.
While it is important to examine managerial ability and firm efficiency together, by
itself that is not enough. Specifically, it is also important to disentangle managerial ability
and firm efficiency. This is because it is likely that managers at lower efficiency firms face
more constraints (e.g. cash and cash flow constraints, financing constraints, etc.) than
managers at higher efficiency firms which also impacts how effectively managers are able to
apply their ability. In addition to this it is also important to examine managerial ability
conditional on firm efficiency as it is possible that lower ability managers at higher efficiency
firms as well as higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms can have a significant effect
on their firm’s outcomes.
In order to address these concerns in this paper I disentangle managerial ability and
firm efficiency and examine managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency in the context
of consequences (corporate strategies, firm performance and CEO compensation). In order
to disentangle managerial ability and firm efficiency, I create new disentangled measures for
firm efficiency (innate firm efficiency) as well as for managerial ability (innate managerial
ability, relative managerial ability, excess managerial score and managerial strategy score).
Based on these disentangled measures in order to examine managerial ability conditional on
firm efficiency I then categorize managers as underrated (higher ability managers at lower
efficiency firms), typical (managers with similar levels of managerial ability and firm effi-
ciency) and overrated (lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms). Following this
categorization of managers, I further subcategorize managers as proactive (significant in-
crease in corporate strategies which consist of capital expenditures, R&D, cash, leverage and
total payout), status quo (no significant change in corporate strategies) and apprehensive
(significant decrease in corporate strategies). Based on these managerial categorizations,
I then examine the subsequent effect on corporate strategies, firm performance and CEO
compensation.
In terms of corporate strategies, I find that overrated managers are in charge of firms
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with the highest levels of corporate strategies while underrated managers are in charge of
firms with the lowest levels of corporate strategies. However, overrated managers are also
found to adopt much more conservative strategies (i.e. decreasing versus increasing corpo-
rate strategies) compared to underrated managers. After further subcategorizing managers
as proactive, status quo and complacent I find that low ability managers working at low
efficiency firms are more likely to be apprehensive (have significant decreases in corporate
strategies) while high ability managers working at high efficiency firms are more likely to be
proactive (have significant increases in corporate strategies).
I also find momentum in both firm efficiency and managerial ability for firm per-
formance. Specifically, high efficiency firms have higher subsequent performance than low
efficiency firms and high ability managers have higher subsequent performance than low abil-
ity managers. In addition, managerial ability is found to matter more than firm efficiency
in subsequent firm performance as underrated managers (higher ability managers at lower
efficiency firms) are related to positive firm performance while overrated managers (lower
ability managers at higher efficiency firms) are related to negative firm performance. This
provides evidence that higher ability managers at lower efficiency firms can turn around the
fortunes of their firm while lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms can stifle their
firms performance.
In contrast to the results for firm performance, I find that while high efficiency firms
have higher CEO compensation than low efficiency firms, high ability and low ability man-
agers receive similar CEO compensation. I also find that firm efficiency matters more than
managerial ability in subsequent CEO compensation as underrated managers (higher ability
managers at lower efficiency firms) are related to lower CEO compensation while overrated
managers (lower ability managers at higher efficiency firms) are related to higher CEO com-
pensation. This provides some indication that the hype around CEO’s matters more than
their ability when determining CEO compensation.
Taken together these results contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the
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importance of examining both managerial ability and firm efficiency together. I contribute
to firm performance literature by finding that managerial ability matters more than firm
efficiency. In contrast, I contribute to CEO compensation literature by finding that firm
efficiency matters more than managerial ability. Overall, the findings in this paper demon-
strate the importance of disentangling managerial ability and firm efficiency and examining
managerial ability conditional on firm efficiency as both firm efficiency and managerial abil-
ity are shown to be jointly relevant to corporate strategies, firm performance and CEO
compensation. It may also be inferred that managerial ability, per se, is likely a hype.
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Chapter 2
Effects Of Non-Compete Clauses On
Firm Performance And Employees: Un-
der Versus Overperforming Firms
2.1 Introduction
Non-compete clauses (further referred to as NCCs) are contractual agreements where
one party (usually an employee) agrees not to work in competition against another party
(usually an employer). NCCs are an important component in many CEO contracts. For
example, Bishara, Martin and Thomas (2015) show that 80% of the CEOs were covered by
NCCs in their sample of CEO employment contracts. Existing research on NCCs focuses on
their effects on CEO compensation and CEO labor mobility (Garmaise, 2011; Kini, Williams
and Yin, 2019).
While research into NCCs and their effect on CEOs is important, it is also imperative
to examine the effect that NCCs have on employees overall. In addition to CEOs, NCCs also
affect a substantial number of employees including some of the most vulnerable employees:
low-wage workers. As described by Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan: 58 percent of
major franchisors have no-poach provisions in their franchise agreements, and the number
is even higher, at 80 percent, for fast food franchisors.1 Not only do NCCs cover a large
1Office of the Attorney General, State of Illinois (2018)
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number of employees but as Kini, Williams and Yin (2019) point out: Most rank-and-file
employees sign NCAs [non-compete agreements] soon after accepting their job offers, when
they have little leverage over the firm. This is in sharp contrast to CEOs who are not
only more informed about the NCCs they sign but have significantly more leverage over the
firm when negotiating these NCCs. Taken together this indicates that NCCs can have a
potentially negative impact on these employees as shown by a recent lawsuit filed on behalf
of all Burger King employees that alleges that NCCs have kept employee wages and working
conditions down and has led to a decrease in advancement opportunities.2 Because of the
large coverage of NCCs of not only CEOs but even low-wage employees who are much more
vulnerable, it is imperative to examine the effect that NCC enforcement has on employees
overall.
In addition, although previous studies have examined different effects of NCCs on
various firm policies, such as innovation (Samila and Sorenson, 2011), R&D (Conti, 2014),
and business dynamism (Kang and Fleming, 2018), the research on the effect of NCCs on firm
performance is scarce. This is because of a common argument in favor of NCC enforcement
made by firms: NCCs are necessary to hold onto their employees for the survivability and
prosperity of a firm. The extent to which firms will go in order to hold onto their employees
is shown in the case of Apple, Google, Intel and Adobe. In 2015 these firms agreed to pay
a combined $415 million to settle a lawsuit whereby these firms were accused of suppressing
engineers wages through a scheme where the firms agreed not to hire each others employees.3
In order to provide insights into this matter, it is important to examine the overall bottom-
line effect on the firm and hence why it is crucial to examine performance (both financial
and operating).
While it is important to examine the effect of NCCs on employees and firms overall,
in this paper I focus on a new, important distinction between underperforming firms (i.e.
firms with low performance and low employee metrics) vs. overperforming firms and between
2South Florida Business Journal (2018)
3Fortune (2015)
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low corporate governance firms (i.e. firms with low institutional ownership, high fraction of
inside directors and high market concentration) vs. firms with high corporate governance.
This distinction is crucial to examine as it is a common occurrence that policies (in this case
whether or not to enforce NCCs), can have different effects (whether beneficial, detrimental
or minimal), on different firms. Specifically, prior literature finds that NCCs restrict labor
mobility for employees overall (e.g. Marx, Strumsky and Fleming (2009) and Balasubrama-
nian et al. (2018)). This indicates that NCC enforcement is likely to have different effects
based on whether a firm is an under-performer vs. over-performer and whether a firm has
low vs. high corporate governance. Underperforming firms have difficulty keeping and at-
tracting employees. As a result, NCCs may benefit these underperforming firms by allowing
them to lock-in their employees by restricting their labor mobility and hence potentially
benefit through cost savings from lower employee wages, poorer working conditions, reduced
advancement opportunities, etc. (due to most rank-and-file employees having little leverage
in the NCC agreements they sign as mentioned above). In contrast, overperforming firms
have no difficulty in keeping and attracting employees and are likely growing firms. As a
result, NCCs may be detrimental to these overperforming firms due to NCCs restricting
labor mobility and hence limiting the overperforming firms ability to attract new employees.
This in turn leads to higher costs (e.g. higher search costs, etc.) for the overperforming
firm in attracting new employees. Similarly, in firms with high corporate governance NCCs
limit the employees outside options. This results in disincentivizing employees from working
hard and hence could have a detrimental effect on the firm through lower performance. In
contrast, in firms with low corporate governance employees likely do not work as hard and
care more about personal benefits. As a result, outside options are relatively less important
and hence NCCs have a potentially minimal effect. Therefore, examining under-performing
vs. over-performing firms and low corporate governance vs. high corporate governance firms
allows me to tease out the specific effect on each group of firms which would likely be lost if
firms were only examined as an overall group.
Specifically, in this paper I examine the effect of NCC enforcement on employees
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(based on total employees, total employee expense and average wage) and firm performance
(both financial as well operating performance) overall. I then focus on subsample analy-
sis by examining the effect of NCC enforcement on under-performing firms (firms with low
employee metrics or low firm performance) versus over-performing firms (firms with high
employee metrics or high firm performance). In addition, I also examine the effect of NCC
enforcement on firms with low corporate governance (firms with low institutional ownership,
high fraction of inside directors or high market concentration) versus firms with high corpo-
rate governance (firms with high institutional ownership, low fraction of inside directors or
low market concentration).
In terms of employees overall, I find that NCC enforcement has a positive (negative),
significant relation to the total number of employees (total employee expense and average
wage) while in terms of firm performance overall I find that NCC enforcement has a non-
significant relation to firm financial performance and a positive, significant relation to firm
operating performance (in terms of EBITDA and return on assets). These results indicate
that NCC enforcement has a negative, significant effect on employees overall and a minimal
effect on firm performance overall.
However, the results change once subsample analysis is performed based on under-
performing vs. over-performing firms and based on low corporate governance vs. high corpo-
rate governance firms. For under-performing firms, I find that NCC enforcement has a pos-
itive, significant relation to firm financial performance while in contrast for over-performing
firms I find that NCC enforcement has a negative, significant relation to firm financial per-
formance. For firms with low corporate governance, I find that NCC enforcement has a
nonsignificant relation to firm financial performance while in contrast for firms with high
corporate governance I find that NCC enforcement has a negative, significant relation to
firm financial performance. These results indicate that NCC enforcement has a beneficial
relation to financial performance for the worst firms (i.e. under-performing firms or firms
with low corporate governance) and a detrimental relation to financial performance for the
best firms (i.e. over-performing firms or firms with high corporate governance).
50
This paper contributes to the literature on NCCs by contributing to the debate over
NCC enforcement vs. non-enforcement. On the one hand, in February 2017 a bill passed
in the US House of Representatives which would have voided agreements signed by workers
who earn less than $15 an hour while on the other hand the bill died in the US Senate
after facing fierce opposition such as by the Maryland Chamber of Commerce: Non-compete
agreements are essential to the growth and viability of businesses by protecting trade secrets
and promoting business development.4 I contribute to this debate by not only performing a
thorough examination of the effect of NCC enforcement on employees and firms overall but
by also creating the important distinction between under-performing vs. over-performing
firms and between low vs. high corporate governance firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the literature on
NCCs. Specifically, the section discusses the NCC enforceability index by Garmaise (2011)
and its extension by Kini, Williams, and Yin (2019) and focuses on the effect that NCCs
have on firms and employees. Section 3 describes the data used in this paper as well as the
construction of all variables. Section 4 discusses the full sample results. Section 5 describes
the subsample results by low, normal, and high performance and employee measures. Section
6 explores alternative explanations using robustness tests. Section 7 performs additional
subsample analysis based on corporate governance measures while Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
I begin this section by discussing a main measure of non-compete clause (NCC)
enforcement: the enforceability index following Garmaise (2011) and its extended version
following Kini, Williams, and Yin (2019). I also discuss the important effects that NCC
enforcement is found to have in the literature with a focus on the effect of NCC enforcement
on firm performance and employees.
4Pew Charitable Trusts (2017)
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2.2.1 Non-Compete Clause Enforcement Measures
Garmaise (2011) develops a model of NCC enforcement and examines the effect that
NCC enforcement has on CEO mobility, compensation, and firm investment. To develop
the model of NCC enforcement, the author considers 12 questions from Malsberger (2004)
and for each state each question is assigned a value of 0 or 1 if a threshold is met. For
example, the first question is Is there a state statue of general application that governs the
enforceability of covenants not to compete? with the threshold response needed to get a
score of 1 being States that enforce noncompetition agreements outside a sale-of-business
context. The results for these 12 questions are then summed together to give a state score
from 0 to 12. The author finds that NCC enforcement significantly reduces CEO mobility, in
particular within industry mobility, and significantly reduces CEO compensation and shifts
this compensation more towards salary-based compensation. In addition, the author finds
that these results are consistent with NCC enforcement encouraging firms to invest in their
managers human capital but that this effect is dominated by NCC enforcement discouraging
managers from investing in their own human capital.
Kini, Williams, and Yin (2019) examine the effect that NCC enforcement has on CEO
performance-turnover sensitivity and CEO compensation by exploiting changes in state level
enforceability of NCCs. The authors obtain these changes in state level enforceability by
updating the NCC enforceability index of Garmaise (2011) from 2004 to 2014 to include new
changes in state level enforcement following the methodology of Garmaise (2011). Specif-
ically, they find that 10 states experienced significant changes in NCC enforcement over
the updated period: Kentucky, Texas (3 times), Idaho, Oregon, Wisconsin, South Carolina,
Colorado (2 times), Georgia, Illinois (2 times), and Virginia. Using this updated NCC en-
forceability index, the authors find that when CEOs have NCCs, the firm is more likely to
fire the CEO for poor performance and that NCC enforcement has a positive effect on total
compensation and incentive pay.
While Garmaise (2011) finds that NCC enforcement has a negative effect on CEO
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compensation, Kini, Williams, and Yin (2019) in contrast finds that NCC enforcement has
a positive effect on CEO compensation. The authors attribute this difference in findings to
the interaction between firm-level non-compete status (which was not examined in Garmaise
(2011)), and state-level enforceability. This provides further motivation to examine subsam-
ples of low, normal, and high performance and employee metric firms in the current paper:
the effects of NCC enforcement can vary greatly between firms.
2.2.2 Effects of Non-Compete Clause Enforcement
Samila and Sorenson (2011) examine the effect of NCCs on innovation, entrepreneur-
ship, and employment. The authors use data on all 328 metropolitan statistical areas (i.e.
MSAs, the smallest geographic areas that can be considered to have independent economic
activity), and weakness of non-compete enforcement following Garmaise (2009). They find
that an increase in venture capital in MSAs in states with reduced NCC enforcement has
a positive effect on innovation (number of patents), entrepreneurship (the number of firm
startups), and employment compared to states with increased NCC enforcement.
Conti (2014) examines the effect that NCC enforcement has on the riskiness of a
firms research and development (R&D) activity (where an invention falls in the inventions
value distribution). Using the Garmaise (2011) NCC enforceability index the author finds
that increased NCC enforceability increases the likelihood of a firm choosing riskier R&D
projects (i.e. inventions are more likely to be tail events in the inventions value distribution
as either breakthroughs or failures).
Younge, Tong and Fleming (2015) examine and empirically test a theory that whether
or not a firm decides to acquire another firm depends on the acquiring firms expectations
regarding employee departure from the target firm after the acquisition. To test this, the au-
thors use a natural experiment: the passing of the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA)
in 1985, which appeared to inadvertently repeal the non-enforcement of NCCs in Michigan.
The authors find that an increase in NCC enforceability (which decreases labor mobility),
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increases the likelihood that a firm will become a target for acquisition and that this in-
crease is: larger for firms with more knowledge workers, larger for firms with more in-state
competition, and smaller for firms that have stronger intellectual property protection.
Kang and Fleming (2018) examine the effect of NCC enforcement on business dy-
namism (process by which jobs are created and destroyed by firms which expand, contract,
fail, or are newly created). Using the natural experiment of an increase of NCC enforcement
in Florida in 1996, the authors find that following the change, smaller firms Ire less likely
to relocate to Florida. In addition, after the change, smaller firms Ire found to employ feIr
employees and create a smaller share of jobs.
These papers not only demonstrate the significant effects that NCC enforcement can
have on a firm (i.e. on innovation, entrepreneurship, R&D, mergers and acquisitions decisions
and employment), but also provide further motivation for the current paper. Specifically,
NCC enforcement can potentially have different effects on low versus high performance firms.
Conti (2014) finds that NCC enforcement increases the likelihood of a firm investing in risky
R&D projects. For a low performance firm these risky R&D projects could be beneficial:
since the firm is performing poorly, the risk of these projects is relatively low while the
potential payoff is relatively high. In contrast, for high performance firms these projects could
be detrimental: since the firm is performing strongly, the risk of these projects is relatively
high while the potential payoff is relatively low. The findings by Younge, Tong and Fleming
(2015) that NCC enforcement increases the likelihood of a firm being acquired can again
potentially benefit low performance firms (benefit from being acquired) and can potentially
hurt high performance firms (hurt from being acquired). Similarly, NCC enforcement can
potentially have different effects on firms with low versus high employee metrics as well. The
findings by Kang and Fleming (2018) demonstrate that NCC enforcement has different effects
on small versus large firms and hence the need to examine the effects of NCC enforcement
on firms with low versus high employee metrics.
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2.2.3 Non-Compete Clause Enforcement and Firm Performance
A previous study that is closely related to my research is Anand et al. (2017). Anand
et al. (2017) examines the effect that NCCs have on firm productivity using firms in the
manufacturing sector from 1991 to 2004. NCC enforcement is measured using the NCC
enforceability index following Garmaise (2011) while firm productivity is measured as total
factor productivity (i.e. the residual difference between predicted and actual firm output in
a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function). In this function firm output is measured as
total sales and firm inputs consist of capital (property, plant, and equipment net of depre-
ciation), labor (number of employees), and material (total expenses net of labor expenses).
The authors find that NCC enforcement has a negative relation with firm productivity and
that this negative relation becomes stronger when relative job opportunities increase in a
state and weaker when more long-term oriented employee compensation is used.
My paper differs from Anand et al. (2017) in several, important ways. First, I use an
extended time period from 1992 through 2017 that considers all publicly listed firms instead
of focusing on the manufacturing sector. Second, I examine financial and operating perfor-
mance instead of total factor productivity as they are more generally applicable measures of
firm performance and can potentially be of greater importance for the firms managers and
investors as well as regulators. Third, I create an important distinction between firms with
low, normal, and high performance as it is very likely that each group of firms is affected
differently by NCC enforcement. In addition, I also consider year, industry, as well as firm
effects.
2.2.4 Non-Compete Clause Enforcement and Employees
In terms of the effect of NCC enforcement on employees Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming
(2009) examine the effect that NCC enforcement has on employee mobility. Specifically,
the authors examine the case of Michigan which Int from non-enforcement of NCCs to
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inadvertent enforcement of NCCs in 1985 after the passage of the Michigan Antitrust Reform
Act (MARA) with a focus on the auto industry and inventors (measured as the number of
patents). Using a difference-in-differences framework the authors find that NCC enforcement
decreases employee mobility and that this decrease is most pronounced for inventors in
narrow technical fields and those with firm-specific skills.
Balasubramanian et al (2018) examine the effect of NCC enforcement on employee
mobility and wages for employees in the technology industry. The authors examine the inter-
state variation in 2009 in NCC enforceability (using the Starr (2018) enforceability index) and
estimate the difference betIen employees in the technology industry versus other employees
using matched firm-employee data. The authors find that for a technology employee an
increase in NCC enforceability has a positive effect on job length, a negative effect on wages,
and increases the likelihood of the employee leaving the state.
Starr (2019) examines the effect of NCC enforcement on employee training and wages.
The author uses factor analysis to create an improved version of Bishara (2011) NCC en-
forceability index and obtains training and wage data from Wave 2 of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) from the 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2008 panels. In terms of
employee training, the author finds that an increase from no enforcement of NCCs to mean
enforceability is associated with a 14% increase in training and that this training is likely
to be firm-sponsored. In terms of employee wages, the author finds that an increase from
non-enforcement of NCCs to mean enforceability is associated with a 4% decrease in hourly
wages and that this decrease is larger for less-educated workers compared to more-educated
workers.
The important findings of these papers that NCC enforcement has a significant, neg-
ative relation to employee mobility and employee wages motivates further research into the
effect of NCCs on employees. Specifically, I attempt to contribute to this research by exam-
ining the effects of NCC enforcement on a broad section of employees, firms, and measures.
This is especially important as even low-wage workers in the service industry are affected by
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NCCs (as shown above) and not just knowledge workers in the technology industry. In ad-
dition, the reduction in labor mobility and wages provides further motivation for examining
subsamples of low, normal, and high employee metrics firms. This is because the effects of
NCCs may be quite different for firms that have low versus high number of employees and
that already have low average wages versus high average wages.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Sample
The data for this paper is obtained from two main sources which cover publicly traded
firms on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX markets. Returns and initial public offering (IPO)
date data is obtained from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and accounting
data is obtained from COMPUSTAT. CRSP and COMPUSTAT data covers the period 1992
through 2017 as the measure for non-compete clause (NCC) enforcement begins in 1992.
To be included in the sample, a firm must meet the following criteria. First, firms
must have at least one full calendar year of data available in both CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
Second, CRSP share code must be equal to 10 or 11 (ordinary shares). Third, total assets
data from COMPUSTAT must be non-missing and non-negative. This results in a final
sample of 108,477 yearly observations for 14,561 firms. All variables are defined in detail in
Appendix 1.
2.3.2 Measuring Non-Compete Clause Enforcement
NCC enforcement is measured in two different ways. The first measure (enforce index),
uses the NCC enforceability index from Garmaise (2011). Garmaise (2011) computes a state-
level NCC enforceability index with values ranging from 0-12 for the period 1992-2004. This
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index is formed based on if a state has a 0 or 1 threshold response to 12 questions with the
responses for all 12 questions being summed together. Following Kini, Williams, and Yin
(2018) I update this NCC enforceability index through 2017.
The second measure (ncc dummy), uses data from the 50 State Noncompete Chart
which is constructed by Beck, Reed, and Riden LLP and is also used by the White House
and United States Department of the Treasury. The measure is a binary variable equal to 1
if the state has some level of NCC enforcement and equal to 0 if the state does not enforce
NCCs (this consists of California, North Dakota, and Oklahoma). Since the states of Utah
and New Mexico are listed as undecided, they are not included in this measure.
For both measures of NCC enforcement I use a firms historical headquarters state. I
obtain this data based on the HSTATE Historic State variable from the Company Header
History file from the merged CRSP & COMPUSTAT database.
2.3.3 Firm Performance and Employees
Firm performance is measured using both financial and operating performance. Fi-
nancial performance variables consist of: return (annualized stock return), carvw (annualized
stock return adjusted by the CRSP VW index return), and carind (annualized stock return
adjusted by the 48 Fama-French industry return). Operating performance variables consist
of: ebitda ta (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by total
assets), ni sales (net income divided by total sales), roa (return on assets), and roe (return
on equity).
Employee measures consist of: employees (total number of employees), staffexpense
(total staff expense scaled by the Consumer Price Index (CPI)), and averagewage (total staff
expense divided by the total number of employees scaled by the CPI).
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2.3.4 Subsample Variables
Variables for forming subsamples consist of: hp index (HP index created by Had-
lock and Pierce (2010) where high index values indicate that firms face higher financial
constraints), ins directors (fraction of inside directors to total directors, data from Li),
inst ownership (total institutional ownership expressed as a percentage of shares outstand-
ing), and market conc (measure of market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index from Hoberg and Philips (2016), data available from the Hoberg-Philips Data Li-
brary).
2.3.5 Control Variables
Firm level control variables consist of: blev (book value of debt to equity), bm (book
value of equity divided by market value of equity), firmage (the natural logarithm of a firms
age based on CRSP initial public offering (IPO) date), size (the natural logarithm of total
assets), and zeropayout (equal to 1 if the firm has no dividends and shares repurchase and
equal to 0 otherwise).
2.4 Effect of NCCs On Firm Performance and Employ-
ees
2.4.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 1 presents the correlations and summary statistics of all financial performance, oper-
ating performance, employee, non-compete clause (NCC) enforcement and firm level control
variables used in the regression analysis. Overall, most correlations are low except be-
tween financial performance measures, ebitda ta and roa (correlation of 0.6797), employees
and staffexpense (correlation of 0.6839), and enforce index and ncc dummy (correlation of
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0.7692). There are also slightly more observations for enforce index compared to ncc dummy
as for ncc dummy the states of Utah and New Mexico are excluded as they are labelled as un-
decided in terms of NCC enforcement. Table 2 presents univariate regression results with the
main dependent variable being either a financial performance, operating performance or em-
ployee variable and the main independent variable being either enforce index or ncc dummy.
In terms of firm performance measures, the results indicate that NCC enforcement is neg-
atively related to a firms financial performance and positively related to a firms operating
performance (EBITDA and return on assets). In terms of employee measures, the results
indicate that NCC enforcement is negatively related to average wage and positively related
to total employees. These results are mostly similar regardless of whether enforce index or
ncc dummy is used.
2.4.2 Multivariate Analysis
In this section, I run multivariate regressions with the main dependent variable being
either a financial performance, operating performance or employee variable and the main
independent variable being either NCC enforceability index or NCC dummy. All regressions
include firm level control variables as well as industry and year fixed effects and examine the
full sample of firms. Table 3 presents the results for financial performance measures (Panel
A), operating performance measures (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C).
In terms of firm financial performance, there is a non-significant relation between
NCC enforcement and financial performance using enforce index however there is a negative,
significant relation using ncc dummy where NCC enforcement is related to 0.9-1.0% lower
returns. In terms of firm operating performance, both NCC enforcement measures are found
to have a positive, significant relation to operating performance (EBITDA and return on
assets). Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in NCC enforceability is related to
a 0.7% increase in EBITDA and a 0.7% increase in return on assets while the existence of
NCC enforcement is related to 3.8% higher EBITDA and 4% higher return on assets.
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In terms of employee measures, NCC enforcement is found to have a negative, sig-
nificant relation to average wage. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in NCC
enforceability is related to a $5,617 decrease in yearly average wage while the existence of
NCC enforcement is related to a $39,002 decrease in average wage. This significant, negative
relation between NCC enforcement and average wage lends further support to the findings
of Starr (2019) who, using a different data set, finds that NCC enforcement is negatively
related to hourly wages (as opposed to yearly average wage).
Interestingly, NCC enforceability index is also found to have a positive, significant
relation to total employees (a one standard deviation increase in NCC enforcement is related
to an increase of 1,000 employees while the existence of NCC enforcement is related to an
increase of 2,000 employees) and a negative, significant relation to total employee expense
(a one standard deviation increase in NCC enforcement is related to an decrease of $28.882
million in total employee expense while the existence of NCC enforcement is related to a
decrease of $272.641 million in total employee expense). This could potentially indicate that
under NCC enforcement, firms are more able/willing to lock-in new employees into NCCs
and can potentially realize cost savings by paying these new employees less and not holding
on to employees who are not locked-in to an NCC.
Overall, I find that generally there is a non-significant relation between NCC enforce-
ment and firm financial performance while there is a positive, significant relation between
NCC enforcement and firm operating performance. In addition, I also find a negative, sig-
nificant relation between NCC enforcement and employee measures. However, for employee
measures my employee data comes from COMPUSTAT which groups together all employees
and does not allow me to distinguish between low wage vs. high wage workers as well as
between other types of labor heterogeneity. In addition, employee related variables are also
rather limited in COMPUSTAT (e.g. total number of employees, total staff expense, etc.).
This is a potential caveat of my data sample.
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2.5 Subsample Analysis by Low, Normal, and High Port-
folios
In this section I examine regressions similar to the last section (i.e. with the main
dependent variable being either a financial performance, operating performance or employee
variable and the main independent variable being either NCC enforceability index or NCC
dummy respectively). However, for each dependent variable low, normal, and high portfolios
are formed. Specifically, each year a firm is considered to be in the low category if they are
in the bottom 30%, normal category if they are in the middle 40%, and high category if they
are in the top 30% for the respective dependent variable.
This subsample analysis is performed for several reasons. First, it is likely that NCCs
affect firms in different ways given previous research that has found that NCCs restrict labor
mobility. Specifically, for firms with low performance, NCCs restricting labor mobility may
have a beneficial effect by allowing these firms to lock-in their employees which may benefit
the firm through lower wages, not having to incur costs in finding new employees, etc. In the
case of firms with high performance, NCCs restricting labor mobility may have a detrimental
effect. These firms are successful and growing; However, their ability to attract new, talented
employees from other firms is limited by these NCCs which could lead to limited employee
pool to choose from, increased search costs, etc. Second, performing subsample analysis in
this manner can potentially provide new insights. For example, I find that NCC enforcement
is positively (negatively) related to total employees (average wage). Performing subsample
analysis can potentially help provide new insights as to whether firms with low, normal, and
high number of employees all experience this effect or if this effect is being driven by high
employee firms. It can also potentially shed light on the contrasting positive vs. negative
relation. Third, performing this subsample analysis can potentially provide useful insights
into NCC policy. There is already a large debate on whether NCCs should be enforced or not
(firms in favor of enforcement vs. employees in favor of non-enforcement), and if they should
be enforced for specific jobs (e.g. knowledge-related jobs), and not for other jobs (e.g. low-
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wage jobs). Performing subsample analysis in this case can potentially provide new insights
into this debate based on how firms can be affected differently by NCC enforcement.
2.5.1 Univariate Analysis
Table 4 presents univariate regressions of financial performance, operating perfor-
mance, and employee variables on NCC enforcement where the dependent variables are
separated into low, normal, and high portfolios.
In terms of firm performance, I find that NCC enforcement has a different effect
on financial performance depending on whether the firm has low, normal, or high financial
performance. Specifically, I find that NCC enforcement has a positive, significant relation
to financial performance for firms with low financial performance while NCC enforcement
has a negative, significant relation to financial performance for firms with high financial
performance. In terms of operating performance, the results for EBITDA and return on
assets are similar to the results found for the financial performance measures: a positive,
significant relation between NCC enforcement and operating performance for firms with
low operating performance. However, I find that the results for firms with high operating
performance are quite different. Specifically, NCC enforcement is found to have a positive,
significant relation with operating performance for firms with high operating performance.
In terms of employee measures, NCC enforcement is found to have a positive, signif-
icant relation to total employees as well as a negative, significant relation to total employee
expense for firms with a high number of employees. The results for average wage are less
clear. Specifically, NCC enforcement has a positive, significant relation to average wage for
firms with low and normal average wage and a nonsignificant relation to average wage for
firms with high average wage.
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2.5.2 Multivariate Analysis
In this section, I run multivariate regressions with the main dependent variable being
either a financial performance, operating performance or employee variable (separated into
low, normal, and high portfolios), and the main independent variable being either NCC
enforceability index or NCC dummy. All regressions include firm level control variables as
well as control for industry and year fixed effects. In addition, I also include the lagged
dependent variable as an addition control to account for any potential mean reversion in
performance measures (especially for firm financial performance measures).
Table 5 presents the results for financial performance measures (Panel A), operating
performance measures (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C) where the first panel in
each section uses NCC enforceability index as the main independent variable and the second
panel in each section uses NCC dummy as the main independent variable.
In terms of firm performance, in contrast to the previous full sample multivariate
findings that there is no significant relation between NCC enforcement and financial per-
formance, I now find significant relations in opposing directions. Specifically, in Table 5
regardless of how financial performance is measured, NCC enforcement is found to have a
positive, significant relation to financial performance for firms with low financial performance
(a one standard deviation increase in NCC enforceability is related to a 0.2-0.3% increase
in returns while the existence of NCC enforcement is related to 1.4-1.9% higher returns).
In contrast, I find that NCC enforcement has a negative, significant relation to financial
performance for firms with high financial performance (a one standard deviation increase
in NCC enforceability is related to a 0.4% decrease in returns while the existence of NCC
enforcement is related to 2.9-3.2% lower returns).
In terms of operating performance, significant (nonsignificant) results are found for
EBITDA and return on assets (net income and return on equity). Specifically, NCC enforce-
ment is found to have a positive, significant relation to EBITDA and return on assets for
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firms with low operating performance (a one standard deviation increase in NCC enforce-
ment is related to a 0.3-0.7% increase in operating performance while the existence of NCC
enforcement is related to a 2.1-2.7% increase in operating performance) which is similar to
the results found for firms with low financial performance. However, NCC enforcement is
also found to have a positive, significant relation to EBITDA and return on assets for the
group of firms with high operating performance (a one standard deviation increase in NCC
enforcement is related to a 0.9-1.3% increase in operating performance while the existence of
NCC enforcement is related to a 2.3-5.2% increase in operating performance). This differs
from the negative, significant relation found for financial performance measures.
In terms of employee measures, the positive, significant relation found previously
between NCC enforcement and total employees seems to be driven by firms with normal and
high total employees (especially firms with high total employees). Similarly, the negative,
significant relation found previously between NCC enforcement and total employee expense
seems to be driven by firms with low total employee expense. In addition, NCC enforcement
is found to have a negative, significant relation to average wage for only firms with normal
average wage.
Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that for firms NCC enforcement has a po-
tentially beneficial effect on the financial as well as operating performance of the worst
performing firms and a potentially detrimental effect on the financial performance of the
best performing firms. In terms of employees, the results suggest that NCC enforcement can
have a potentially beneficial effect on the total number of employees for high total employee
firms (which suggests that it is these high total employee firms that are best able/willing to
lock-in new employees into NCCs). However, NCCs can also have a potentially detrimental
effect on total employee expense and average wage for low and normal firms respectively
(which suggests that the employees who work at low and normal firms are the ones most
negatively affected by NCC enforcement).
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2.6 Alternative Explanations and Robustness
As a robustness test, multivariate regressions are also performed using firm and year
effects instead of industry and year effects. Table 6 presents the results for financial per-
formance measures (Panel A), operating performance measures (Panel B), and employee
measures (Panel C)
While the results under firm and year effects are similar in sign and magnitude to
the results under industry and year effects, the significance levels are reduced. This is likely
because there is limited time variation in NCC enforcement and hence using firm fixed (which
also has no time variation), captures information contained in NCC enforcement measures.
To address a potential concern that the results are dependent upon how the low,
normal, and high portfolios are formed, I also examine a different formation of the low,
normal, and high portfolios. Specifically, instead of constructing low, normal, and high
portfolios based on 30%/40%/30% I now construct the portfolios based on 20%/60%/20%.
Table 7 presents the results for financial performance measures (Panel A), operating
performance measures (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C) where the first panel in
each section uses NCC enforceability index as the main independent variable and the second
panel in each section uses NCC dummy as the main independent variable. The results
when using these 20%/60%/20% portfolios are found to be similar in sign, magnitude, and
significance to the results when using 30%/40%/30% portfolios.
2.7 Additional Subsample Tests: Corporate Governance
Measures
In this section I further explore the results for NCC enforcement and financial perfor-
mance: 1. the nonsignificant relation between NCC enforcement and financial performance
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for the full sample and 2. the positive (negative) significant relation between NCC enforce-
ment and financial performance for firms with low (high) financial performance.
I accomplish this by examining a specific channel for these results: corporate gov-
ernance. Specifically, I examine if the relation between NCC enforcement and financial
performance depends on whether a firm is considered to have low vs. high corporate gov-
ernance. My corporate governance measures consist of institutional ownership, fraction of
inside directors to total directors, market concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), and
financial constraints (Hadlock and Pierce (2010) HP index). All measures are defined in
detail in Appendix 1.
In order to test the effect of low versus high corporate governance, I run multivariate
regressions with the main dependent variable being financial performance measures and the
main independent variable being either NCC enforceability index or NCC dummy for firms
with low corporate governance (bottom 30%) versus firms with high corporate governance
(top 30%). All regressions include firm level control variables as well as control for industry
and year fixed effects. In addition, I also include the lagged dependent variable as an addition
control to account for any potential mean reversion in financial performance.
2.7.1 Institutional Ownership
Table 8 presents the results where multivariate regressions of financial performance on
NCC enforceability and NCC dummy are performed separately for firms with low (bottom
30%) versus high (top 30%) institutional ownership
I find that NCC enforcement has a negative, significant relation to financial perfor-
mance for firms with high institutional ownership. Specifically, a one standard deviation
increase in NCC enforceability is related to a 0.3% decrease in returns while the existence of
NCC enforcement is related to a 2.5-2.9% decrease in returns. I also find that NCC enforce-
ment has a non-significant relation to financial performance for firms with low institutional
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ownership.
Intuitively the results are reasonable. Firms with high (low) institutional ownership
are considered to have stronger (weaker) corporate governance. As such in firms with stronger
corporate governance, NCCs limit managers outside options and hence incentivize hard
working managers to work less hard which negatively impacts firm financial performance.
On the other hand, in firms with weaker corporate governance managers are already likely
not too concerned about working hard and hence whether or not NCCs are enforced has
little impact on firm financial performance.
2.7.2 Fraction Of Inside Directors
Table 9 presents the results where multivariate regressions of financial performance on
NCC enforceability and NCC dummy are performed separately for firms with low (bottom
30%) versus high (top 30%) fraction of inside directors to total directors.
I find that NCC enforcement has a negative, significant relation to financial perfor-
mance for firms with a low fraction of inside directors. Specifically, a one standard deviation
increase in NCC enforceability is related to a 0.3-0.4% decrease in returns while the exis-
tence of NCC enforcement is related to a 2.3-3.3% decrease in returns. I also find that NCC
enforcement has a non-significant relation to financial performance for firms with a high
fraction of inside directors.
Intuitively the results are reasonable. Firms with low (high) fraction of inside direc-
tors are considered to have stronger (weaker) corporate governance. As such the rational
for fraction of inside directors is similar to the rational for institutional ownership above.
Firms with a low fraction of inside directors have stronger corporate governance and hence
the firms managers are negatively affected by NCCs which results in a negative effect on
firm financial performance while firms with a high fraction of inside directors have weaker
corporate governance and hence NCCs have a minimal impact on the firms managers which
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results in a non-significant effect on firm financial performance.
2.7.3 Market Concentration
Table 10 presents the results where multivariate regressions of financial performance
on NCC enforceability and NCC dummy are performed separately for firms with low (bottom
30%) versus high (top 30%) market concentration.
I find that NCC enforcement has a negative, significant relation to financial per-
formance for firms with low market concentration. Specifically, a one standard deviation
increase in NCC enforceability is related to a 0.2% decrease in returns. I also find that
NCC enforcement has a non-significant relation to financial performance for firms with high
market concentration.
Intuitively the results are reasonable. Firms with low (high) market concentration
are considered to have stronger (weaker) corporate governance (this is due to lower market
concentration implying more competition which can be thought of as more governance from
a firms product market). As such the rational for market concentration is similar to the
rational for institutional ownership and fraction of inside directors above. Low market con-
centration pushes managers to work harder so NCCs negative effect of fewer outside options
for managers incentivizes these managers to work not as hard and hence negatively impacts
firm financial performance. On the other hand, under high market concentration managers
already have little incentive to work hard and as such NCC enforcement will have a minimal
impact on these managers and hence a minimal impact on the firms financial performance.
2.7.4 Financial Constraints
Table 11 presents the results where multivariate regressions of financial performance
on NCC enforceability and NCC dummy are performed separately for firms with low (bottom
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30%) versus high (top 30%) financial constraints based on the HP index.
I find that NCC enforcement has a negative, significant relation to financial perfor-
mance for firms with low financial constraints. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase
in NCC enforceability is related to a 0.2-0.3% decrease in returns and the existence of NCC
enforcement is related to a 1.5-2.0% decrease in returns. I also find that NCC enforce-
ment has a non-significant relation to financial performance for firms with high financial
constraints.
Intuitively the results are reasonable. If a firm has low financial constraints, managers
will have more options/flexibility and because of this likely work harder as they have more
decisions to make, etc. and hence the negative impact of NCCs on these managers will
lead to a negative effect on firm financial performance as well. In contrast, if a firm has
high financial constraints managers will have limited options and limited decisions to make
and because of this likely not work as hard. Because of this the impact of NCCs on these
managers is minimal and hence the impact on firm financial performance is also minimal.
Overall, the results in this section indicate that firms with strong corporate gover-
nance (i.e. high institutional ownership, low fraction of inside directors and low market
concentration) as well as low financial constraints are negatively affected by NCC enforce-
ment (in terms of financial performance) while firms with weak corporate governance (i.e.
low institutional ownership, high fraction of inside directors and high market concentration)
as well as high financial constraints are non-significantly affected by NCC enforcement (in
terms of financial performance). This relates to the results found for the subsamples formed
by firm performance and employee measures: NCC enforcement is beneficial to the worst
firms and detrimental to the best firms.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this paper I examine the effect that NCC enforcement has on firm performance
(financial and operating performance) and on employees (total employees, total employee
expense and average wage). In terms of firm performance, I find that for the full sample NCC
enforcement has a nonsignificant relation to financial performance and a positive, significant
relation to operating performance (EBITDA and return on assets). In terms of employees,
I find that for the full sample NCC enforcement has a positive, significant relation to the
total number of employees and a negative, significant relation to the total employee expense
and average wage.
However, after performing subsample analysis based on firms with low, normal and
high financial performance I find that the results tell a much clearer story. Specifically, I
find that NCC enforcement has a positive, significant relation to firms with low financial
performance and a negative, significant relation to firms with high financial performance. In
addition, I also explore a potential channel for these subsample results: corporate governance.
Specifically, I examine if the relation between NCC enforcement and financial performance
depends on whether a firm is considered to have low vs. high corporate governance. In
terms of corporate governance measures I find that NCC enforcement has a negative, sig-
nificant relation to financial performance for firms with high corporate governance and a
non-significant relation to financial performance for firms with low corporate governance.
Taken together my findings suggest that for NCC enforcement has a potentially bene-
ficial effect on the financial as well as operating performance of the worst performing firms and
a potentially detrimental effect on the financial performance of the best performing firms. In
addition, I find that firms with high corporate governance are negatively affected by NCC en-
forcement (in terms of financial performance) while firms with low corporate governance are
non-significantly affected by NCC enforcement (in terms of financial performance). Overall,
my findings contribute to the debate over NCC enforcement vs non-enforcement by providing
evidence that NCC enforcement is detrimental to the best firms (firms with high financial
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performance and high corporate governance), beneficial to the worst firms (firms with low
financial performance), and detrimental to employees overall.
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Chapter 3
Managerial Corporate Strategy Responses
To Firm-Specific Success And Distress:
Examination Of Prospect Theory
3.1 Introduction
Classical expected utility theory in economics (and finance) examines decision making
under risk: the expected utility of a decision depends on the utility provided by each of its
possible outcomes weighted by the probability that each outcome occurs; individuals then
choose the decision that maximizes expected utility. However, this theory does not separate
out upside gains and downside losses by assuming that decisions makers react similarly to
gains and losses.
The landmark paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposes prospect theory
as an alternative to expected utility theory. Unlike expected utility theory under which
individuals make decisions to maximize utility, prospect theory allows for individuals to
make decisions that do not necessarily maximize their utility because these individuals may
place other considerations above utility. More specifically, prospect theory assigns values
to gains and losses (as opposed to final outcomes under expected utility theory) and uses
decision weights which measure the desirability of prospects (as opposed to probabilities of
outcomes occurring under expected utility theory).
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Under prospect theory, individuals value gains and losses differently. Specifically,
individuals have a concave utility value function for gains and a convex utility value function
for losses. This is in contrast to expected utility theory under which there is an overall
concave utility value function. In addition, under prospect theory the value function is
generally steeper for losses compared to gains and individuals segregate gains and losses. The
certainty effect (i.e. individuals prefer certain outcomes as opposed to probable outcomes)
and the isolation effect (i.e. when presented with two options with the same outcome but
different routes to the outcome individuals focus on differences rather than similarities) while
consist with prospect theory is inconsistent with expected utility theory.
The following example further highlights the difference between the contrasting theo-
ries. Suppose investors are reacting to a 5% upswing or 5% downswing in the broad market
index. Under classical expected utility theory, the investors utility values following the 5%
gains and 5% losses are often modelled as equal (in magnitude) and opposite (in sign or
direction). More specifically, an investor’s utility value is a linear function of outcome. How-
ever, under prospect theory, the investors utility value functions are a non-linear function
of outcome. Investors might experience far greater affliction for a 5% market downswing
compared to the satisfaction they receive for a 5% market upswing. The reverse may also
be true. Consequently, investor’s realized utility values condition investors risk-taking or
risk-avoiding behaviors.
Prospect theory implies that individuals and decision makers react differently to (un-
expected) losses or gains. Subsequent literature such as Thaler and Johnson (1990), etc.
enable decision makers to be classified into six behavioral categorizations based on their
risk-behavior and associated reaction following losses or gains. Based on reaction to gains
(or success), the decision maker might manifest either house money effect (risk-taking behav-
ior), status quo effect (risk-neutral behavior) or conservatism effect (risk-avoiding behavior).
House money or easy money effect arises when an individual realizes unexpected gains or
profits (e.g., hitting the jackpot in the slot machine of a casino), rationalizes that these
profits are unentitled gains, and hence is willing to take greater risk. Status quo effect or
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bias arises when an individual realizes gains but is resistant to change (e.g., sticking with an
established soft drink brand like Coca Cola rather than trying a free sample of a new soft
drink brand). Specifically, the current baseline is taken as a reference point and any change
from that baseline is perceived as a loss and hence the individual is not willing to take greater
risks as well as not willing to reduce risks. Conservatism or conservative effect arises when
an individual realizes unexpected gains, under-reacts to these gains (e.g., if a firm’s earnings
announcement beats market expectations, the individual is resistant to buying more of the
firm’s shares) and hence is unwilling to undertake even reasonable risks.
Similarly, based on reaction to losses (or distress), the decision maker might manifest
either trying-to-break-even effect (risk-taking behavior), status quo effect (risk-neutral be-
havior) or snake bite effect (risk-avoiding behavior). Trying-to-break-even effect arises when
an individual realizes losses and is willing to take extreme gambles in order to recoup the
losses (e.g., after losing a bet the individual might decide to go ”double-or-nothing”), and
hence is willing to take greater risk. Status quo effect or bias arises when an individual
realizes losses but is resistant to change (e.g., choosing the default option on an insurance
plan even if it is more expensive). Specifically, the current baseline is taken as a reference
point and any change from that baseline is perceived as a loss and hence the individual is
not willing to take greater risks as well as not willing to reduce risks. Snake bite effect arises
when an individual realizes unexpected losses, attributes these losses to ”being unlucky” or
”incurring a snake-bite” and hence is unwilling to undertake even reasonable risks out of
fear this bad luck will continue (e.g., following significant declines in market indices, there is
more pronounced liquidation of mutual funds).
Literature on these behavioral dispositions (particularly in finance) mostly focus on
investment/portfolio decisions or asset pricing setups. In terms of investment/portfolio deci-
sions, Kartasova, Gaspareniene and Remeikiene (2014) find that investors that experienced
negative stock returns are less likely to make risky subsequent investments and Otuteye and
Siddiquee (2020) who find that investors use of active portfolio managers who continue to
deliver poor performance is partially attributable to the status quo effect. Similarly, in terms
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of asset pricing Lopatta, Canitz and Fieberg (2016) find that it is the conservatism char-
acteristic rather than the factor loading that can explain average stock returns. However,
very little literature exists of behavioral dispositions in a corporate finance setup. More
specifically, there is limited research into behavioral dispositions of corporate decision mak-
ers after facing the consequences of their previous decisions. In addition, the literature on
behavioral dispositions frequently utilizes lab experimental setups as opposed to utilizing a
comprehensive sample.
When examining behavioral dispositions, prior literature has also focused on exam-
ining these behavioral dispositions in isolation. However, what is the relative empirical
validity of these effects? Most prior research has focused on examining the house money and
trying-to-break-even effects - either standalone or in contrast with each other. Frino, Grant
and Johnstone (2008) find that following monetary gains traders on the Sydney Futures Ex-
change exhibited increased risk-taking behavior while Kumar, Dixit and Francis (2015) find
that firms acquire riskier firms following gains from previous acquisitions. On the one hand
Suhonen and Saastamoinen (2018) find that horse-race bettors place riskier bets after gains
as well as place riskier bets after losses (i.e. evidence for both house money and trying-to-
break-even effects) while in contrast Verma and Verma (2018) find that for pension funds
high previous returns are related to lower investment in risky assets (i.e. evidence against
house money effect). Since prior papers into behavioral dispositions have focused on the
house money effect or the trying-to-break-even effect, either in isolation or as a contrast
of the two effects, they are not comprehensive. Specifically, these papers do not take into
account status quo or risk-neutral managers as a benchmark and they do not examine the
consequences of adopted risk behaviors.
In contrast to prior finance literature which has focused on behavioral dispositions
in investment/portfolio decisions or asset pricing setups, in this paper I examine these be-
havioral dispositions in a corporate finance setup. Specifically, I perform a comprehensive
examination of all six behavioral dispositions (as opposed to focusing on house money effect
and trying-to-break-even effect either individually or as a contrast to each other as in prior
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literature), in the context of corporate decision makers after facing the consequences of their
previous decisions, an area that is not examined in the literature. Rather than using a lab
experimental setup, in this paper I use a comprehensive sample of US firms.
Specifically, I use CRSP, COMPUSTAT and EXECUCOMP data to construct my
sample of 17,844 firms and 177,891 firm-year observations over the period 1980 through
2017. I then classify firm-specific success and distress as well as their diagnostic attributes in
year t; corporate strategies adopted by firm’s experiencing success and distress are classified
in year t+1; behavioral disposition of managers into house money effect, conservatism effect,
trying-to-break-even effect, snake bite effect and status quo effect as well as their analytics is
carried out in year t+1; subsequent consequences of this behavioral disposition of managers
is examined in year t+2.
In order to classify firm-specific success or distress, I use a novel approach to classify
firm year observations as firm-specific success or firm-specific distress in year t based on
financial performance measures (returns) as well as operating performance measures (Altman
(2000) Z-score, gross profitability and cash flow). This approach allows me to not only
categorize both firm-specific success and distress but it also allows me to do so using the
same methodological approach for both. In addition, I also create two diagnostic measures
for firm-specific success and distress. Intensity score measures the intensity of firm-specific
success and distress while chronicity score measures the duration of firm-specific success and
distress.
Following firm-specific success and distress classification in year t, I then examine cor-
porate strategies (which consist of capital expenditures, research and development (R&D),
cash holdings, leverage and total payout), adopted in year t+1 as well as changes in corporate
strategies from year t to t+1. Based on changes in corporate strategies, I categorize man-
agers as risk-taking (significant increases in corporate strategies), risk-neutral (no significant
change in corporate strategies), and risk-avoiding (significant decreases in corporate strate-
gies). I find that following both firm-specific success and distress there are managers that
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have significant increases, no significant changes as well as significant decreases in corporate
strategies. Specifically, following firm-specific success I find that 29.73-47.13% of managers
have a significant increase in strategies, 24.21-54.13% of managers have no significant change
in strategies and 16.14-28.66% of managers have a significant decrease strategies. Similarly,
following firm-specific distress I find that 29.27-42.48% of managers increase strategies, 28.30-
52.10% of managers have no significant change in strategies and 18.63-29.22% of managers
decrease strategies.In terms of the intensity and duration of firm-specific success and distress,
I find that following firm-specific success managers are more risk-avoiding the greater the
intensity and the longer the duration of success. In contrast, following firm-specific distress
managers are more risk-taking the greater the intensity and the longer the duration of dis-
tress. This provides support for the findings of prospect theory in a corporate finance setting
that individuals react differently to gains (success) and losses (distress).
Based on these significant increases, no significant change and significant decreases in
corporate strategies over year t to t+1, I categorize managers into six behavioral dispositions
in year t+1. Following firm-specific success, managers are categorized as house money effect
(risk-taking behavior), status quo effect (risk-neutral behavior) and conservatism effect (risk-
avoiding behavior). Similarly, following firm-specific distress managers are categorized as
trying-to-break-even effect (risk-taking behavior), status quo effect (risk-neutral behavior)
and snake bite effect (risk-avoiding behavior).
I find that following firm-specific success approximately 26% of managers are catego-
rized as house money effect, 62% of managers are categorized as status quo effect and 12%
of managers are categorized as conservatism effect. Similarly following firm-specific distress,
I find that approximately 29% of managers are categorized as trying-to-break-even effect,
57% of managers as status quo effect and 14% of managers as snake bite effect. In terms of
the intensity of firm-specific success and distress, I find that following firm-specific success
higher intensity of success is related to lower risk-taking behavior for house money effect
and status quo effect managers as well as greater risk-avoiding behavior for conservatism ef-
fect managers. In contrast, following firm-specific distress higher intensity distress is related
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to greater risk-taking behavior for trying-to-break-even effect managers and greater risk-
avoiding behavior for snake bite effect managers. In terms of the duration of firm-specific
success and distress, I find that following firm-specific success longer duration of success is
related to lower risk-taking behavior for house money effect and status quo effect managers
and greater risk-avoiding behavior for conservatism effect managers. In contrast, following
firm-specific distress longer duration distress is related to greater risk-taking behavior for
trying-to-break-even effect managers and greater risk-avoiding behavior for status quo effect
managers.
Following the categorization of managers into six behavioral dispositions in year t+1,
I also examine the firm and CEO attributes of these managers in year t+1. In terms of firm
attributes, I find that younger as well as smaller firms are more likely to be house money
effect following success and trying-to-break-even effect following distress; older firms are more
likely to be conservatism effect following success and snake bite effect following distress. In
addition, I find that low book-to-market ratio firms are more likely to be trying-to-break-even
effect following distress while firms that have dividends and/or share repurchases are more
likely to be conservatism effect after success and snake bite effect after distress.In terms of
CEO attributes, I find that shorter tenured CEO’s are more likely to be house money effect
following success and trying-to-break-even effect following distress; longer tenured CEO’s are
more likely to be conservatism effect following success. Younger CEO’s as well as to some
extent female CEO’s are also more likely to be trying-to-break-even effect following distress.
In addition to examining the attributes of these six behavioral groups of managers,
I also examine each groups change in firm performance from year t+1 to t+2. I find that
following firm-specific success house money effect managers have the smallest decrease in
financial and operating performance as well as the largest decrease in cash flow performance
while conservative managers have the largest decrease in financial and operating performance
as well as the largest increase in cash flow performance. Following firm-specific distress, I
find that trying-to-break-even managers have the largest increase in financial and operating
performance as well as the largest decrease in cash flow performance while snake bite effect
79
managers have the largest decrease in financial and operating performance as well as the
largest increase in cash flow performance. These results indicate that risk-taking managers
are rewarded with higher subsequent firm performance while risk-avoiding managers are
punished with lower subsequent firm performance.
Overall, this paper provide supports for prospect theory in a corporate finance decision-
making setting: firm managers have very different risk behaviors following gains (success)
and distress (losses); and the risk attitude depends on the intensity and duration of suc-
cess/distress. In terms of firm and CEO attributes, there is significant variation across the
six behavioral dispositions of managers in terms of firm age, firm size, CEO age, CEO tenure
and gender. In addition, following either success or distress, risk-taking managers are re-
warded with higher subsequent firm performance while risk-avoiding managers are punished
with lower subsequent firm performance.
In this paper I contribute to the literature in several ways. First, I examine prospect
theory in a corporate finance setting (as opposed to an investment or asset pricing setting).
Second, I examine prospect theory by performing a comprehensive examination of both gains
(through firm-specific success), as well as losses (through firm-specific distress), for a large
set of US firms over an extended time period whereas prior literature frequently examines
prospect theory in a lab experimental setting. Third, I examine how a firm’s managers re-
spond to these gains and losses overall (based on changes in corporate strategies) compared
to past literature which examines responses by investors, portfolio managers, venture capital
firms, etc. Fourth, I perform a comprehensive behavioral categorization of managers fol-
lowing both gains as well as losses (risk-taking, risk-neutral and risk-avoiding). This differs
from the literature which frequently examines individual behavioral categorizations with rel-
atively more attention paid to risk-taking behavior categorizations. Fifth, by performing a
comprehensive examination of not only gains and losses but also behavioral categorizations
of managers I am able to compare firm attributes, CEO attributes and subsequent firm per-
formance across all behavioral groups of managers. One possible extension of this essay in
future is to include corporate governance variables, including dual class dummy, in order to
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examine if these variables have a moderating effect on managerial risk-behavior following
firm-specific success and distress. Moderating effects are likely because whether a manager
is at a firm with strong versus weak corporate governance may effect how managers change
corporate strategies and, by extensive, affect the behavioral categorization of managers.
Given the variation in attributes and firm performance across manager behavioral groups, I
leave the door open for further research into the behavioral categorization of managers and
additional impacts of each behavioral group in a corporate finance setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; In Section 2, I review the literature
on prospect theory, firm responses to success, firm responses to distress and the behavioral
categorization of decision makers examined in this paper (conservatism, snake bite, house
money, trying-to-break-even and status quo effects). In Section 3, I describe my data sample
as well as the construction of all variables. Section 4 provides details about the development
and diagnostics of firm-specific success and distress measures as well as additional attributes
such as the intensity and duration of success and distress. In Section 5, I provide the empirical
behavioral categorization of managers (following firm-specific success and distress and based
on changes in corporate strategies) as well as the diagnostics of each behavioral group.
Section 6 examines the outcome this behavioral categorization of managers on subsequent
firm performance. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
I categorize discussions on all relevant literature into the following sub-sections:
prospect theory, responses to success, responses to distress, and behavioral categorizations
of managers (conservatism effect, snake bite effect, house money effect, trying-to-break-even
effect and status quo effect).
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3.2.1 Prospect Theory
Prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is developed as an alternative to
expected utility theory. While expected utility theory assumes that individuals make deci-
sions to maximize utility, prospect theory allows for individuals to make decisions that do
not necessarily maximize their utility because these individuals may place other consider-
ations above utility. More specifically, the authors construct prospect theory by assigning
values to gains and losses (as opposed to final outcomes under expected utility theory) and
use decision weights which measure the desirability of prospects (as opposed to probabilities
of outcomes occurring under expected utility theory).
The authors find that under prospect theory the utility function is concave for gains,
convex for losses and generally steeper for losses compared to gains (this is in contrast to
excepted utility theory which assumes that individuals are risk-avoiding and hence an overall
concave utility function). The authors also find events that are inconsistent with expected
utility theory. Individuals are found to underweight probable outcomes compared to certain
outcomes (certainty effect) as well as discard components that are shared by all prospects
under consideration (isolation effect).
Doukas and Zhang (2013) examine the relation between cumulative prospect the-
ory (allows different weighting functions for gains and losses) and US bank acquisitions.
Specifically, the authors examine if US bank takeovers are effected by gambling attitudes
(probability weighting from prospect theory where there is an overweighting of low probabil-
ity gains). Using data on US bank takeover bids from Thomson ONE Banker Database and
returns data from the Center for Research in Security Prices over the period 1985-2006 the
authors construct a lottery index which captures the gambling attitude of firms: low price,
high idiosyncratic volatility and expected idiosyncratic skewness of the acquisition targets
stock. The authors find that gambling attitudes do have a significant influence on US bank
acquisitions. Specifically, the authors find that for acquisition targets with gambling features
(low price, high idiosyncratic volatility and high idiosyncratic skewness) offer price premiums
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and target announcement returns are much higher.
Ferris, Noronha and Unlu (2010) examine an implication of prospect theory and
mental accounting (process by which financial outcomes are categorized) that more frequent
dividend payment results in a higher level of utility for shareholders. Using financial and
accounting data from Compustat Global Industrial database and market return data from
Compustat Global Issues database for the period 1995 through 2007 across 32 countries the
authors estimate dividend frequency by counting the number of dividends paid to sharehold-
ers during a year. The authors find that higher dividend frequency is significantly related
to higher firm value (mean and median market-to-book value) however there is significant
cross-sectional variation across countries. The authors find that this cross-sectional variation
is influenced by non behavioral factors such as a countrie’s legal regime and variation in a
firm’s operating income.
Chang (2019) examines the relation between a firm’s financial constraints and a firm’s
risk-taking decisions. Using data on firms in the US insurance industry from the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners for the period 2006 through 2013 the author exam-
ines the financial constraints (based on dividend payouts and credit ratings) faced by these
firms. The author finds that insurers with higher financial constraints (higher dividend pay-
outs and higher credit ratings) are significantly and negatively related to higher risk-taking
decisions.
In addition, Chiu (2017) finds support for prospect theory by demonstrating that
decision makers of Taiwanese business groups are risk-avoiding above the reference point
and risk-taking below the reference point. Agarwal and Zeephongsekul (2013) examine a
two-person merger and acquisition theoretical model and find that it is not always necessary
for acquiring firms to increase the offer price in order to acquire the target firm. Specifi-
cally, depending on the behavioral type of the acquiring and target firms it is possible for
the acquiring firm to lower the offer price and still have it be accepted by the target firm.
Spalt (2013) finds that riskier firms (i.e. firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility) grant
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more stock options to nonexecutive employees. The author finds that probability weight-
ing (overweighting of low probability gains) from prospect theory can explain these results.
Desmoulins-Lebeault, Meunier and Ohadi (2020) examine the relation between changes in
implied volatility indices and changes in the corresponding equity market indices with divi-
dends reinvestment. The authors find support for prospect theory based on a concave gain
area, a convex loss area and that market losses have more of an impact than market gains
in the pricing of implied volatility indices.
Taken together these papers demonstrate that under prospect theory individuals dis-
play different risk behaviors when facing gains versus losses. Furthermore in addition to
providing support for prospect theory, these papers also demonstrate the important effect
that it has on a firm’s decision to engage in bank acquisitions, the offer price in mergers &
acquisitions and the stock options granted to nonexecutive employees.
3.2.2 Responses To Success
Johnson and Soenen (2003) examine the difference in factors between successful firms
and less successful firms using COMPUSTAT data from 1982-1998. The authors do this by
first conducting OLS regressions to see which of the ten different firm specific characteristics
has the most significant impact on firm success (measured as either the Sharpe ratio, Jensens
alpha and Economic Value Added (EVA). The authors find that the most successful firms are:
large, profitable, have efficient working capital management (relatively short cash conversion
cycles) and are in a unique industry (measured as the ratio of advertising expenditures to
sales). The authors find that these factors not only outperform the average of all sample firms
for all three firm success measures but that they also have significant power in predicting
successful firms.
Fabling and Grimes (2007) examine the effect that business practices and external
characteristics have on firm performance. The authors do this by using data on New Zealand
firms obtained from the New Zealand Business Practices survey. The survey contains qualita-
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tive firm responses to questions about: leadership, planning practices, customer and supplier
focus, employee practices, quality and process monitoring, benchmarking, community and
social responsibility, innovation, IT use, business structure and the competitive environment.
For each of the three measures of firm performance (relative profitability, relative productiv-
ity and market share), the authors test the significance of each business practice and each
external characteristic individually while controlling for other business practices and exter-
nal characteristics. The authors find that for business practices: R&D, capital expenditures,
efficiency enhancing employee-related practices and market research (only for the market
share measure of firm performance) are strongly related to firm success. They also find that
for external characteristics: industrial structure has a strong impact on firm success.
3.2.3 Responses To Distress
Denis and Sibilkov (2009) examine the importance of cash holdings for financially
constrained firms versus financially unconstrained firms. To accomplish this, the authors
use data on US firms in COMPUSTATs Industrial Annual P-S-T, Research, and Full Cov-
erage files from 1985 to 2002. Specifically, the authors perform cross-sectional regressions
of firm value (Tobins Q) on cash holding and other control variables differentiating between
constrained and unconstrained firms. The authors find that the effect of cash holdings on
firm value and the relationship between investment and firm value is positive and signifi-
cantly greater for constrained firms compared to unconstrained firms. They also find that
cash holdings is positively correlated with net investment (capital expenditures net of de-
preciation) for both constrained and unconstrained firms.
Skopljak and Luo (2012) examine the relation between firm capital structure (mea-
sured as equity to total assets and loans to total assets) and firm performance (measured
by calculating a profit efficiency measure based on Berger and Mester (1997) and return on
equity). The authors use data on Australian Authorized Deposit-taking Institutions (ADIs)
for the period 2005-2007 obtained from the OSIRIS database. They find that there is a
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significant, quadratic relationship between capital structure and performance. Specifically,
that at low (high) levels of debt an increase in debt leads to increased (decreased) firm
performance.
Santosuosso (2013) examines if a preference order for responses to economic distress
(net income from continuing operations is negative for at least three years between 2007 and
2011) exists for firms. The author accomplishes this by examining the Management Com-
mentary (a voluntary report that is prepared by the management of a firm that describes the
firms performance, and provides forward looking and supplementary information), for Italian
firms from 2007 to 2011. The results of the Management Commentary are then classified
into four main categories: management measures, debt restructuring, equity issuance and
divestment of assets. The author finds that the primary response to economic distress was
management measures which were often accompanied by debt restructuring, equity issuance
and lastly divestment of assets.
Bliss, Cheng and Denis (2015) examine how firms change their corporate payout policy
(dividends, share repurchases, total payout, debt issuance, equity issuance, investment and
cash holdings) for a placebo period (1999-2003), before the global financial crisis (2005-2006)
and during the global financial crisis (2008-2009). To accomplish this, they use data from
COMPUSTAT from 1990 to 2010 excluding financial firms and utilities. The authors find
that payout reductions are larger during the crisis period compared to the other two periods
and that this effect is largest for firms that depend heavily on external funds. The authors
also find that cash savings from payout reductions are positively related to cash reserves and
investment level during the crisis period and that these cash savings are large compared to
pre-crisis period cash reserves and investment levels.
Overall, in terms of responses to firm success the literature finds that the most success-
ful firms are large and profitable and effectively manage working capital, R&D and capital
expenditures. Similarly, in terms of responses to firm distress the literature finds that changes
in cash, capital structure, debt restructuring, equity issuance and payout reduction all have
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a significant effect on the likelihood of a firm recovering from distress. Taken together these
findings in the literature provide motivation for my choice of corporate strategy variables
(i.e. manager responses) to examine following firm success (gains) and firm distress (losses).
3.2.4 Behavioral Categorizations
3.2.4.1 Conservatism Effect
Research into the conservatism effect involves examining the occurrence of risk-
avoiding behavior following gains. Specifically, Wu, Wu and Liu (2009) examine trading
strategies that involve buying past high earnings per share stocks (due to under-reaction
to earnings announcements based on conservatism) and selling past low earnings per share
stocks (due to over-reaction to multiple earnings news based on the representativeness heuris-
tic). The authors form portfolios based on quarterly earnings per share announcements over
the past 4, 8, 12, 16, or 20 quarters and hold these portfolios for 3 to 12 months using
data from the Taiwan Economic Journal for firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange be-
tween 1988 and 2006. The authors find some support of conservatism in the medium term
(based on significant, positive cumulative returns) however they find little support for the
representativeness heuristic.
Lopatta, Canitz and Fieberg (2016) examine if a conservatism related priced risk
factor exists in stock returns. To measure conservatism, the authors use the conservatism
ratio which is the ratio of unexpected current earnings to total earnings news. The authors
then form portfolios each year from 1976 through 2014 based on the conservatism ratio as
well as on firm size. The authors find that while low conservatism firms have higher returns,
this is due to the conservatism characteristic rather than the factor loadings. Based on these
results, the authors suggest that investors and financial analysts are not able to anticipate
conservatism reactions to events following initial forecasts which provides a challenge to the
rational risk explanation of traditional finance.
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3.2.4.2 Snake Bite Effect
Research into the snake bite effect involves examining the occurrence of risk-avoiding
behavior following losses. Specifically, Kartasova, Gaspareniene and Remeikiene (2014) ex-
amine the relation between the snake-bite effect and investor decisions as well as the resulting
investment returns. Specifically, the authors examine the effect of risk-avoiding behavior on
investment returns. Using data on individual Lithuanian investors who conducted trades on
the NASDAQ OMX Stock Exchange during 2013 the authors find that snake-bite investors
are more hesitant to undertake buying and selling transactions which results in a negative
investment return.
3.2.4.3 House Money And Trying-To-Break-Even Effect
Research into the house money effect involves examining the occurrence of risk-taking
behavior following gains. Similarly, research into the trying-to-break-even effect involves
examining the occurrence of risk-taking behavior following losses. Specifically, Thaler and
Johnson (1990) in a landmark paper examine how risk-taking behavior is affected by previous
gains and losses. The authors test this by conducting four experiments where participants
were asked to answer questions which used two types of gambles. The first gamble involved
participants choosing between a 50% chance to win and a 50% chance to lose versus the status
quo while the second gamble involved a sure gain of $x versus a one-third chance to win $3x,
two-third chance to win nothing. Based on these experiments the authors find support for
risk-taking behavior following a previous gain (house-money effect) and risk-taking behavior
following a previous loss (trying-to-break-even effect).
Frino, Grant and Johnstone (2008) examine the relation between the house-money
effect and the net profits for stock market traders. Specifically, using data from the Sydney
Futures Exchange on futures contracts between July 24, 1997 and October 4, 1999 the
authors examine the effect that trader risk (total dollar risk, inventory value multiplied by
expected absolute price change) has on the realised profit computed on each trade for each
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trader scaled by the weighted average cost of the traders inventory at the time of each trade.
In addition, the authors make sure to treat gains and losses for traders separately. The
authors find that traders make trades consistent with the house-money effect by being more
risk-taking when trading with profits rather than with initial capital. The authors also find
no evidence of loss aversion among these traders.
Liu (2010) examines the house-money and trying-to-break-even effects by examining
the effect of prior operating performance on the subsequent risk of the firm. Using data
on firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1984 and 2007 the author measures
operating performance using Tobin’s q (market value of a firm divided by asset replacement
cost) and total asset risks. The author finds support for the house-money effect as firms
with low Tobin’s q have higher subsequent total asset risks while for the trying-to-break-even
effect when previous losses are few and frequent (loss aversion) the higher the subsequent
total asset risk. The author also finds no evidence supporting either the house-money or
trying-to-break-even effects based on firms with high Tobin’s q.
Kumar, Dixit and Francis (2015) examine the relation between how the stock market
reacts to a prior acquisition and the risk associated with a subsequent acquisition. The
authors use mergers and acquisitions data from Thomson SDC database, stock price data
from CRSP and accounting data from COMPUSTAT over the period 1990 through 2006 to
measure prior stock market reaction (dollar value of abnormal returns experienced by the
acquiring at the time of the previous acquisition announcement) and the risk of a subsequent
acquisition (target firm’s stock volatility). The authors find that higher gains as well as higher
losses from previous acquisitions is related to acquiring firms buying increasingly riskier
target firms which is consistent with the house-money and trying-to-break-even effects.
Suhonen and Saastamoinen (2018) conduct experiments based on a horse-race betting
market in order to examine behavioral patterns surrounding decision making under risk.
Based on 5,217 individuals with 167,816 betting records from 10 consecutive horse races the
authors examine the individuals gains and losses expressed as returns following each race
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and at the end comparing these returns to the individuals reference point at the start of
the day. The authors find support for the house-money effect (individuals make riskier bets
following gains and mostly spend the money they have won), playing-safe-effect (risk aversion
after prior losses), and trying-to-break-even effect (not necessarily an increased preference
for riskier bets because individuals may seek to break-even with by placing additional less
risky bets).
Verma and Verma (2018) examine the existence of the disposition effect (tendency to
sell after increases in value and hold after decreases in value) and house-money effect in in-
vestment decisions made by defined benefit pension funds. Specifically, the authors examine
how prior portfolio returns (based on equity, debt, real estate and other assets allocations)
effect the risk-taking behavior of pension plan managers (based on increases/decreases in
investments in risky or safer assets). Using data from Compustat on the defined benefit
pension plans of US firms from January 2009 to June 2015 the authors find support for
the disposition effect but not for the house-money effect. Specifically, the authors find that
following prior positive returns there is increased investment in safer assets and decreased
investment in riskier assets.
3.2.4.4 Status Quo Effect
Research into the status quo effect involves examining the occurrence of risk-neutral
behavior following gains and losses. Specifically, Freiburg and Grichnik (2013) examine the
relation between the status quo bias and institutional investments in private equity funds.
Specifically, the authors examine if the status quo bias effects the investment decisions of
limited partners for general partners and to what extent certain factors affect the magnitude
of the status quo bias. The authors gather survey data in 2009 on 136 institutional investors
and private equity firms in Germany to create the main dependent variable (binary variable
for investment decision) and the main independent variables (binary variable for reinvest-
ment decision, previous performance of a general partner and access restriction of a general
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partner). They find that the status quo bias is present as institutional investors are found
to have a strong preference for private equity firms they have previously invested in. In
addition, the magnitude of the status quo bias is found to depend on investor characteristics
as well as the nature of the investment opportunity.
El Harbi and Toumia (2020) examine the relation between the status quo bias and
venture capital investments. Specifically, the authors examine if the status quo bias has an
effect on the choice of investment sector invested in by venture capital firms. Using data
on venture capital firms from 2007 to 2015 across 24 countries the authors construct probit
and logit models. They find that status quo bias has a significant effect on venture capital
investments and that the choice of investment sector to invest in is positively related to the
previous choice made by the venture capital firm.
Otuteye and Siddiquee (2020) examine two anomalies in investment management:
active portfolio managers underperform market indices (after fees) and clients continuing
to pay for services that they do not receive and try to explain these two anomalies from
a behavioral perspective. The authors make a case for herding, disposition, conservatism,
status quo and overconfidence biases all perpetuating active portfolio management and the
subsequent underperformance. The authors also suggest some methods to reduce the ef-
fects of these biases by reducing fees, regulatory intervention to minimize agency costs and
adopting the value investing approach when making investment decisions.
The results found in the literature demonstrate the significant effect behavioral cat-
egorization has on investor returns, asset pricing, mergers and acquisitions, pension plan
decision making, venture capital investments and institutional investors. In addition, these
results also demonstrate the relatively larger focus on risk-taking behavior (i.e. house-money
and trying-to-break-even behavioral categorizations which are frequently examined together),
compared to risk-avoiding behavior (conservatism and snake-bite).
Overall, the frequent examination of individual behavioral groups, the frequent use
of experimental settings and the large focus on investments and asset pricing found in the
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literature further motivates my alternative approach of a comprehensive examination of
multiple behavioral groups across a large sample of US firms over an extended time period
in a corporate finance setting.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Sample
The data for this paper is obtained from three different sources which cover publicly
traded firms on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX markets. Returns and firm initial public
offering (IPO) date data is obtained from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),
accounting data is obtained from COMPUSTAT and CEO attributes data is obtained from
EXECUCOMP. CRSP and COMPUSTAT data covers the period 1980 through 2017 while
EXECUCOMP data covers the period 1992 through 2017.
To be included in the sample, a firm must meet the following criteria. First, firms
must have at least one full calendar year of data available in both CRSP and COMPUSTAT.
Second, CRSP share code must be equal to 10 or 11 (ordinary shares). Third, total assets
data from COMPUSTAT must be non-missing and non-negative. This results in a sample
of 186,953 yearly observations for 18,920 firms.
In this paper I focus on a broader classification of firm distress as opposed to focusing
exclusively on the extreme case of firm distress which is bankruptcy. This is because following
a broader classification of distress, firms have relatively more flexibility in how they respond
to this distress whereas firms facing bankruptcy are much more limited in their responses
(e.g. forced sale of assets in order to make obligatory debt payments). This is important as I
use these responses to distress to categorize the behavior of managers. To this end, I remove
all bankrupt firms from my sample. I accomplish this by using bankruptcy data obtained
from Sudheer Chava which covers the period 1980 through 2016. For 2017, I manually look
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up bankruptcies in the Wall Street Journal. After removing all bankrupt firms from my
sample, my final sample consists of 177,891 observations for 17,844 firms. More details on
the removal of bankrupt firms from my sample is provided in Appendix 1.
3.3.2 Firm Performance Measures Used In The Classification Of
Firm-Specific Success/Distress
In order to classify firms as firm-specific success or distress, I use both financial and
operating performance measures. For financial performance measures I use car (yearly cumu-
lative abnormal returns computed from monthly returns), while for operating performance
measures I use Altman (2000) Z-score, pc gprof (the first principal component of gross prof-
itability measures computed on a yearly basis) and pc cashflow (the first principal component
of cash flow measures computed on a yearly basis). I use the first principal component of
gross profitability measures and cash flow measures to measure operating performance for
several reasons. First, there are an extremely large number of operating performance mea-
sures in the finance literature as well a similarly large number in the accounting literature.
By using the principal components approach, I am able to combine multiple gross profitabil-
ity/cash flow measures into a single gross profitability/cash flow measure. Second, I use gross
profitability and cash flow as a firm’s managers have less discretion over these gross oper-
ating measures compared to net operating measures. Third, research by Ball et al. (2016)
finds that results for gross profitability are very similar to results for net profitability. All
variables are defined in more detail in Appendix 2.
3.3.3 Corporate Strategies Used In The Behavioral Categorization
Of Managers
In order to perform a behavioral categorization of managers, I examine changes in
corporate strategies. Specifically, I use changes in capex lagta (ratio of capital expenditures
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to lagged total assets), rd ta (the ratio of research & development (R&D) to total assets),
cash ta (the ratio of cash and short term investments to total assets), blev (book leverage,
the ratio of current liabilities plus long term debt to book value of equity) and payout ta (the
ratio of repurchases and dividends to total assets). All variables are defined in more detail
in Appendix 2.
Appendix 3 examines characteristics of changes in each of the five corporate strategy
variables (capex lagta, rd ta, cash ta, blev and payout ta) through summary statistics and
histograms. Based on the summary statistics I find that both the mean and median changes
for all five corporate strategy variables are very close to zero (e.g. −0.0038 and −0.0005
for cash ta respectively) while based on the histograms I find that for all five changes in
corporate strategy variables a large number of observations are clustered around zero and
that both the left and right tails (decrease and increase in strategy respectively) tend to be
long with the right tail being slightly longer than the left tail.
3.3.4 Firm Attributes And CEO Attributes
In terms of firm attributes I utilize firmage (the natural logarithm of firm age), size
(the natural logarithm of total assets), bm (the ratio of book value of equity to market value
of equity), finance (equal to one if the firm is in the finance industry and equal to zero
otherwise) and nopayout (equal to one if the firm has no dividends and no share repurchases
and equal to zero otherwise).
In addition, in terms of CEO attributes I utilize ceoage (the natural logarithm of CEO
age), gender (equal to one if the CEO is female and equal to zero if the CEO is male), tenure
(the natural logarithm of CEO tenure), founder (equal to one if the CEO is a founder and
equal to zero otherwise) and outsider (equal to one if the CEO is originally from outside the
firm and equal to zero otherwise).
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3.3.5 Other Variables
To control for market effects I also include the following exogenous variables: tbill30
(annualized return on the 30 day US Treasury Bill), sp500 (annualized return on the S&P
500 index), and nber recession (equal to 1 if the year is a National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) recession year and equal to 0 otherwise).
3.4 Firm-Specific Success And Distress: Development
And Diagnosis
3.4.1 Development Of Firm-Specific Success And Distress Measures
In order to examine how the managers of firms react to firm gains versus losses, I first
need to define these firm gains and losses. I accomplish this by classifying each firm year as
either firm-specific success, normal or firm-specific distress.
First, based on financial performance (car), and operating performance (Altman
(2000) Z-score, pc gprof and pc cashflow), measures I create a Tier 1 absolute measure and
a Tier 2 industry-relative measure (firm performance measure minus the 48 Fama-French
industry measure, except for Altman (2000) Z-score) which is shown in Table 1 Panel A.
Second, in order to classify a firm year as firm-specific success, normal or firm-specific
distress I borrow a concept from operations management: the X-bar control chart which is
used to monitor the mean of a process at given times (in the case of this paper yearly), define
upper and lower control limits, and is highly customizable. A substantial benefit of using
this approach is that not only can I define firm-specific success and distress simultaneously
using the same procedure but in addition to this, the cutoffs for firm-specific success and
distress are determined by the data and not by my selection of a percentile cutoff (e.g. I
do not have to decide whether the bottom 20% versus bottom 15% versus bottom 10%
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of observations should be classified as distress). Specifically, for both Tier 1 absolute and
Tier 2 industry-relative financial performance each year I compute the mean and standard
deviation across all firms. Each year I then define the upper control limit as one standard
deviation above the mean and the lower control limit as one standard deviation below the
mean. A firm year is then labeled as firm-specific success if the firm’s financial performance
is above the upper control limit, normal if the firm’s financial performance is between the
upper and lower control limits or firm-specific distress if the firm’s financial performance is
below the lower control limit which is shown in Table 1 Panel B.
The standard X-bar control chart approach works well for financial performance mea-
sures as returns are approximately normally distributed. However in contrast, operating per-
formance measures are not normally distributed (i.e. the left, and in particular the right tails
are much larger). Based on the findings of Adekeye and Azubuike (2012) that median charts
work better for non-normally distributed data, I use the median chart approach for operat-
ing performance measures. Specifically, for both Tier 1 absolute and Tier 2 industry-relative
operating performance measures each year I compute the median and median absolute de-
viation (MAD) across all firms where MAD is defined as the median of absolute deviations
from the median. For example, for a data set consisting of the values 1, 1, 3, 4 and 9 the
median is 3. The absolute deviations about 3 are 2, 2, 0, 1 and 6. Sorting these absolute
deviations in order (i.e. 0, 1, 2, 2 and 6) gives a median of 2 which means the MAD is equal
to 2. Each year I then define the upper control limit as one MAD above the median and the
lower control limit as one MAD below the median. A firm year is then labeled as firm-specific
success if the firm’s operating performance is above the upper control limit, normal if the
firm’s financial performance is between the upper and lower control limits or firm-specific
distress if the firm’s financial performance is below the lower control limit which is shown in
Table 1 Panel B.
In the case of the Altman (2000) Z-score, the author already defines three zones called
the ”safety, grey and bankruptcy zones”. Using these three zones, I define firm-specific
success as the ”safety” zone (Z-score > 2.60), normal as the ”grey” zone (Z-score >= 1.10
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and Z-score <= 2.60), and firm-specific distress as the ”bankruptcy” zone (Z-score < 2.60).
The classification of firm year observations as firm-specific success, normal or firm-specific is
described in greater detail in Appendix 4 Panel A.
3.4.1.1 Development Of Diagnostic Measures Of Firm-Specific Success And Dis-
tress
While I have classified each firm-year as firm-specific success, normal or firm-specific
distress, it is also important that I capture the magnitude of this firm-specific success and
distress. To accomplish this for each performance measure I create an intensity score for both
firm-specific success and distress (ISd and ISs respectively), which captures how extreme a
firm’s success or distress is. For financial performance measures it is computed each year
as the firm’s financial performance minus the mean financial performance divided by the
standard deviation of financial performance while for operating performance measures it
is computed as the firm’s operating performance minus the median operating performance
divided by the median absolute deviation of operating performance. Because firm-specific
success and distress events are often long-term and not 1-year, I construct a 3-year as well
as a 5-year chronicity score measure. This score counts the number of years in a 3-year or
5-year period that a firm is categorized as undergoing firm-specific success/distress which is
shown in Table 1 Panel C.
3.4.2 Diagnosis Of Firm-Specific Success And Distress
In Table 2 I examine the total number of firms, the percentage of firms and the average
annual return of firms experiencing firm-specific success, normal or firm-specific distress as
well as report mean values for intensity and chronicity scores. I find that for firm-specific
success and distress measures both the success and distress tails are of significant size and
close to symmetric. In the case of financial performance Tier 1, the success tail consists of
12.12% of observations while the distress tail consists of 11.22% of observations. In the case
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of operating performance measures, both the success and distress tails (especially the success
tail), are larger than under financial performance measures (30.69% and 26.42% respectively
for gross profitability Tier 1). I also find that there is a significant, increasing monotonic
trend in average returns moving from distress to normal to success based on both financial
and operating performance measures. For example, based on financial performance Tier 1
firms labeled as distress have an average return of −70.84%, firms labeled as normal have
an average return of 13.73% and firms labeled as success have an average return of 108.80%.
In terms of intensity scores for firm-specific success and distress, I find that based on
financial performance success has a higher intensity compared to distress. Specifically, for
financial performance Tiers 1 and 2 average intensity scores are 1.80 and 1.74 respectively
for success and 1.63 and 1.59 respectively for distress. In contrast for operating performance
measures, I find that distress has a higher intensity compared to success. Specifically, for
gross profitability Tiers 1 and 2 average intensity scores are 3.80 and 5.24 respectively for
success and 1.96 and 2.61 respectively for distress. These results also indicate that both
firm-specific success and distress have a higher intensity based on operating performance
compared to financial performance.
In terms of chronicity scores for firm-specific success and distress the results for 3-year
chronicity scores are very similar to the results for 5-year chronicity scores. Specifically, I find
that for both financial and operating performance measures success has a longer duration on
average compared to distress. In the case of financial performance Tier 1, on average firms
experiencing success spent 1.41 years in a 3 year period and 1.82 years in a 5 year period in
success compared to firms experiencing distress spending 1.33 years in a 3 year period and
1.60 years in a 5 year period in distress. In addition, the average length of time spent in
both success and distress is longer for operating performance measures compared to financial
performance measures which indicates that success and distress tends to be more ”sticky”
for operating performance compared to financial performance.
Overall, these results indicate that firm-specific success and distress are well defined
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using both financial and operating performance measures and that both the intensity and
duration of success and distress is more pronounced for operating vs. financial performance
measures. Given that (i) the results are similar for 3- and 5-year chronicity scores, (ii) the
two chronicity scores have a large positive correlation of 0.73, and (iii) the 3-year chronicity
score is more inclusive as it only needs a 3-year firm history instead of a 5-year firm history, I
focus exclusively on the 3-year chronicity score in rest of the essay. I have unreported results
for the 5-year chronicity score which do not material alter the inferences arising from 3-year
chronicity score.
3.5 Behavioral Categorization Of Managers: Develop-
ment And Diagnosis
3.5.1 Changes In Corporate Strategies Following Firm-Specific Suc-
cess And Distress
After defining firm year observations as firm-specific success, normal or distress in
year t, I now categorize managers by their risk behavior following this success and distress.
In order to accomplish this, I first examine changes in five corporate strategy variables
(capex lagta, rd ta, cash ta, blev and payout ta) from year t to t+1 which the literature
above has shown to have a significant impact on firm success and distress.
In Table 3 I report mean values for changes in each of the five corporate strategy
variables from year t to t+1 based on whether firms experienced firm-specific success or
distress in year t. In addition, I also create indicator variables for the intensity and chronicity
of firm-specific success and distress; for both firm-specific success and distress I calculate low
and high intensity score (based on below/above the median score), and short and long
chronicity score (based on 1-year or more than 1 year duration of success/distress).
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For capital expenditures I find that on average there is a decrease in capital expen-
ditures following distress and an increase in capital expenditures following success based on
financial performance classification of distress and success. In the case of financial perfor-
mance Tier 1 I find that there is a 2.2% decrease in capital expenditures following distress
and a 0.4% increase in capital expenditures following success. In the case of operating per-
formance measures I find that there is a decrease in capital expenditures following both
distress and success. Specifically, I find that there is a 0.3% decrease in capital expenditures
following distress and a 0.7% decrease in capital expenditures following success based on
gross profitability Tier 1 classification of distress and success. In terms of intensity scores
I find that the decrease in capital expenditures is significantly larger for firms experiencing
high intensity distress (2.6% decrease) compared to firms experiencing low intensity distress
(1.8% decrease). In contrast, I find no significant difference in capital expenditures between
firms experiencing high intensity success versus firms experiencing low intensity success. In
terms of chronicity scores I find that there is a larger decrease in capital expenditures fol-
lowing short term distress compared to long term distress. Specifically, I find that there is
a 1.0% decrease in capital expenditures following short term distress compared to a 0.1%
decrease in capital expenditures following long term distress based on gross profitability Tier
1 classification of distress and success. In contrast, I find no significant difference in capital
expenditures between firms experiencing short duration success versus firms experiencing
long duration success.
For research and development (R&D) I find that on average there is no significant
difference in changes in R&D between firms experiencing distress versus firms experiencing
success. In fact, the change in R&D is generally very small overall as it varies between
0.1% and 0.4% across financial and operating performance measures. In terms of intensity
scores I find no significant difference in R&D between firms experiencing low intensity dis-
tress/success and firms experiencing high intensity distress/success. Similarly, in terms of
chronicity scores I find no significant difference in R&D between firms experiencing short
duration distress/success and firms experiencing long duration distress/success.
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For cash holdings I find that there is a decrease in cash holdings after distress (0.5%
decrease based on financial Tier 1 classification of distress) and an increase in cash holdings
after success (0.1% increase based on financial Tier 1 classification of success). In contrast,
based on operating performance I find a decrease in cash following distress (0.3% decrease
based on gross profitability Tier 1 classification of distress) and also a decrease in cash
following success (0.9% decrease based on gross profitability Tier 1 classification of success).
In terms of intensity score I find that there is an increase in cash following low intensity
distress (0.1% increase based on gross profitability Tier 1 classification of distress), and a
decrease in cash following high intensity distress (0.7% decrease based on gross profitability
Tier 1 classification of distress). In contrast, I find a decrease in cash following low intensity
success (0.1% decrease based on gross profitability Tier 1 classification of success) and a
decrease in cash following high intensity success (0.4% decrease based on gross profitability
Tier 1 classification of success). In terms of chronicity score I find that there is an increase
in cash for short duration distress versus a decrease in cash for long duration distress (0.5%
increase versus 0.4% decrease respectively based on gross profitability Tier 1 classification of
distress). I also find similar results following short versus long duration success. Specifically,
I find a 0.3% increase in cash following short term success versus a 3.0% decrease in cash
following long term success based on gross profitability Tier 1 classification of success.
For book leverage I find that there is no significant difference in changes in book
leverage between distress versus success. In terms of intensity scores I find no significant
difference in book leverage between firms experiencing low intensity distress/success and
firms experiencing high intensity distress/success. Similarly, in terms of chronicity scores
I find no significant difference in book leverage between firms experiencing short duration
distress/success and firms experiencing long duration distress/success.
For total payout I find that on average there is no significant difference in changes in
total payout between distress versus success. In terms of intensity scores I find no signifi-
cant difference in total payout between firms experiencing low intensity distress/success and
firms experiencing high intensity distress/success. Similarly, in terms of chronicity scores
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I find no significant difference in total payout between firms experiencing short duration
distress/success and firms experiencing long duration distress/success.
Overall, the results from Table 3 demonstrate that whether managers increase or de-
crease corporate strategies depends on which corporate strategy is being examined, whether
a firm is experiencing success versus distress, whether this success/distress is based on fi-
nancial versus operating performance measures, whether this distress/success is low versus
high intensity and whether this distress/success is short versus long duration. These results
provide preliminary evidence that managers can increase or decrease strategies after both
distress and success (i.e. in relation to prospect theory, managers can increase or decrease
strategies when facing a loss as well as when facing a gain).
To explore this further in Table 4 I examine the percentage of managers that increase
and decrease each of the five corporate strategies from year t to t+1 following distress/success
in year t. In order to define an increase or decrease in each corporate strategy variable, I
follow the same approach as defining distress and success for operating performance measures.
Specifically, I classify an increase in a corporate strategy variable if the manager has a change
more than one median absolute deviation above the median and a decrease in a corporate
strategy variable if the manager has a change more than one median absolute deviation
below the median.
For capital expenditures I find that managers are more likely to increase capital
expenditures after success compared to distress (47.09% versus 39.30% based on financial Tier
1 classification of distress and success and 52.51% versus 26.71% based on gross profitability
Tier 1 classification of distress and success). Similarly, I also find that managers are also
more likely to decrease capital expenditures after distress compared to success (28.47% versus
20.46% based on financial Tier 2 and 26.23% versus 20.07% based on gross profitability Tier
2).
For R&D I find that managers are more likely to increase R&D after distress compared
to success (37.97% versus 31.40% based on financial Tier 1 classification of distress and
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success and 31.19% versus 28.72% based on gross profitability Tier 1 classification of distress
and success). Based on financial performance I also find that managers are more likely
to decrease R&D following success compared to distress (22.55% versus 19.72% based on
financial Tier 2). In contrast based on operating performance I find that managers are more
likely to decrease R&D following distress compared to success (22.76% versus 17.52% based
on gross profitability Tier 2).
For cash holdings I find that managers are more likely to increase cash after distress
compared to success (38.10% versus 36.73% based on financial Tier 1 classification of distress
and success and 34.95% versus 30.33% based on gross profitability Tier 1 classification of
distress and success). Based on financial performance I also find that managers are more
likely to decrease cash following success compared to distress (28.66% versus 24.82% based
on financial Tier 2). In contrast based on operating performance I find that managers are
more likely to decrease cash following distress compared to success (27.48% versus 26.31%
based on gross profitability Tier 2).
For book leverage I find that managers are more likely to increase book leverage after
distress compared to success (42.48% versus 29.73% based on financial Tier 1 classification of
distress and success and 39.54% versus 27.91% based on gross profitability Tier 1 classifica-
tion of distress and success). Based on financial performance I find that managers are more
likely to decrease book leverage after success compared to distress (27.01% versus 18.63% for
financial Tier 2). In contrast based on operating performance I find that managers are more
likely to decrease book leverage after distress compared to success (19.90% versus 18.71%
based on gross profitability Tier 2).
For total payout I find that there is no significant difference in the percentage of
managers that increase total payout following distress versus success based on financial
performance. However, I also find that managers are more likely to decrease total payout
following distress compared to success (21.89% versus 16.14% based on financial Tier 1
classification of distress and success).
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In terms of operating performance I find that managers are more likely to increase
total payout after success compared to distress (35.64% versus 26.75% based on gross prof-
itability Tier 1). Similarly, I also find that managers are more likely to decrease total payout
after success compared to distress (23.90% versus 18.04% based on gross profitability Tier
1).
Overall, the results indicate that there are a significant proportion of managers that
increase corporate strategy variables following firm-specific success and distress as well a
significant proportion of managers that decrease corporate strategies following firm-specific
success and distress. In relation to prospect theory this means that when managers are faced
with gains (firm-specific success) and losses (firm-specific distress) there is not one general
response: both increases and decreases in corporate strategies can occur. This coincides
with the literature on behavioral effects. Specifically following gains managers can be risk-
taking (house money effect), risk-neutral (status quo effect) or risk-avoiding (conservatism
effect) while following losses managers can also be risk-taking (trying-to-break-even effect),
risk-neutral (status quo effect) or risk-avoiding (snake bite effect).
In order to further examine the relation between changes in corporate strategies and
firm-specific success and distress in Table 5 I perform univariate regressions of the change
in each corporate strategy variable from year t to t+1 on firm-specific distress and success
indicators, intensity and chronicity scores, firm attributes and CEO attributes in year t.
Each reported coefficient in Panel A is from a separate univariate regression. In addition, in
Panel B I perform multivariate regressions controlling for firm attributes, CEO attributes,
market variables as well as for industry fixed effects. I also use standard errors robust to
heteroskedasticity in all univariate and multivariate regressions.
In terms of risk behavior, I consider significant increases in corporate strategy vari-
ables as risk-taking behavior, no significant changes in corporate strategy variables as risk-
neutral behavior, and significant decreases in corporate strategy variables as risk-avoiding
behavior. For firm characteristics, I find that managers in older firms are risk-taking in cap-
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ital expenditures and cash and risk-avoiding in R&D. I find no significant relation between
firm age and leverage, and between firm age and total payout. Managers in larger firms are
more likely to be risk-taking in R&D and cash, and risk-avoiding in capital expenditures.
There is no significant relation between firm size and leverage, and between firm size and
total payout. I also find no significant relation between a firm’s book-to-market value of
equity and corporate strategies. Managers of firms with dividends and/or share repurchases
are risk-taking in R&D, and risk-avoiding in capital expenditures and cash; these managers
have no significant relation to leverage. Managers in the finance industry are risk-taking in
capital expenditures and cash. There is no significant relation between firms in the finance
industry and R&D, leverage and total payout. For CEO attributes, I find that older CEO’s
are risk-taking in capital expenditures and cash; CEO age has no significant relation to R&D,
leverage and total payout. In terms of CEO gender, tenure, whether or not the CEO is a
founder and whether or not the CEO is an outsider I find that there is no significant relation
to corporate strategies.
In terms of the effects of distress and success I find that after controlling for firm
attributes, CEO attributes, market controls and industry fixed effects distress has a negative
effect on total payout (2.1% decrease following financial Tier 1 distress and a 0.9% decrease
following gross profitability Tier 1 distress). In terms of financial performance measures
I find that distress has a negative effect on cash (1.6% decrease based on financial Tier
2). In addition based on operating performance measures I also find that distress has a
positive effect on R&D (0.7% increase following gross profitability Tier 2 distress), and that
success has a positive effect on capital expenditures (0.7% increase following based on gross
profitability Tier 2).
In terms of the intensity of distress and success I find that based on financial Tier 1
classification of distress and success a one unit increase in intensity score for distress firms is
related to a 1.3% decrease in capital expenditures while a one unit increase in intensity score
for success firms is related to a 1.1% increase in capital expenditures. In addition in terms
of cash holdings, I find that a one unit increase in intensity score for distress firms is related
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to a 1.1% increase in cash. Based on the duration of distress and success I find that based
on financial Tier 2 and gross profitability Tier 2 classification of distress and success a one
year increase in chronicity score is related to a 0.2%-0.4% increase in capital expenditures
for distress and a 0.2%-0.3% decrease in capital expenditures for success. In terms of cash
holdings, I find that a one year increase in chronicity score is related to a 0.6% increase in
cash for distress firms and a 0.3% decrease in cash for success firms.
Overall, the mixed results found in Table 5 (in terms of signs and significance levels),
follows from the results from Table 4: that some managers increase corporate strategies while
other managers decrease corporate strategies after firm-specific success/distress. As a result
of this, the net effect of firm-specific success/distress on changes in corporate strategies is
unclear.
3.5.2 Development Of Behavioral Categorization Of Managers
Based on these changes in the five corporate strategy variables from year t to t+1, I
categorize the behavior of managers in year t+1 in Table 6. First, each firm year I compute
whether a firm had a significant increase (+1), no significant change (0) or a significant
decrease (−1) in each change in corporate strategy variable (capex lagta, rd ta, cash ta, blev
and payout ta). Specifically, I categorize significant increase in a corporate strategy as a
change more than one median absolute deviation above the median, no significant change
as a change within one median absolute deviation of the median and significant decrease
as more than one median absolute deviation below the median. Second, each firm year I
sum together all the +1,0 and −1 values for all five change in corporate strategy variables
to create a managerial risk-profile score ranging from −5 through +5. Third, based on this
managerial risk-profile score each year a manager is categorized as risk-avoiding (score from
−5 through −2), risk-neutral (score from −1 through +1) or risk-taking (score from +2
through +5).
The reasoning behind this risk categorization of managers is as follows. I consider
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increasing capital expenditures as risk-taking behavior because typically investment into cap-
ital expenditures require relatively large upfront costs (i.e. to acquire, upgrade or maintain
property, buildings or equipment). Despite these large upfront costs, the benefits from cap-
ital expenditures are typically further into the future as it takes time to implement changes
to property, buildings and equipment. Taken together the large upfront costs and benefits
further into the future for capital expenditures means that increasing capital expenditures is
risk-taking. Increasing R&D is considered risk-taking based on a similar rationale. It gener-
ally involves large upfront costs with benefits typically further into the future. In addition,
in the case of R&D, there is also a large degree of uncertainty about the future payoffs (e.g.
whether or not a newly researched drug will meet regulatory approval or whether or not
consumers would be willing to pay and adopt a new product) as well as whether or not the
R&D spending will yield results. For these reasons, I consider increasing R&D as risk-taking
behavior. Increasing cash is risk-taking because it leads to less financial constraints placed on
firms’ managers. Since lower financial constraints are related to lower corporate governance
(or less stringent enforcement of a firms’ policies), this increases the likelihood that firms’
managers will engage in excess or riskier spending. This follows from Jensen (1986) free cash
flow hypothesis: managers tend to invest free cash flow into negative present value projects
and/or riskier projects. I consider increases in leverage as risk-taking because increasing the
proportion of debt financing in the firm also increases interest payments on the debt. Since
interest payments on debt are legally binding obligations and failure to pay could compel
the firm into bankruptcy, increasing leverage increases the risk of negative firm outcomes.
In terms of payout, Jensen, Lundstrum and Miller (2010) find that a reduction in a firm’s
established dividend coincides with a decrease in the value of the firm’s real options and
is followed by a negative market reaction. So I consider increasing dividends as risk-taking
behavior as there are negative consequences to the firm if it cannot keep up with dividend
payments. Wang, Yin and Yu (2021) find that share repurchases result in lower long-run
Tobin’s Q, profitability, growth, and innovation. So I consider increasing share repurchases
as risk-taking behavior as it has a negative effect on the long run profitability of the firm.
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Based on whether a manager faces firm-specific distress or success in year t and
whether the manager responds in a risk-avoiding, risk-neutral or risk-taking manner in year
+1, I then categorize managers into six behavioral groups used in the literature in year
t+1. Specifically, following firm-specific distress I categorize managers as trying-to-break-
even effect if they are risk-taking, status quo effect (distress) if they are risk-neutral or snake
bite effect if they are risk-avoiding. Similarly, following firm-specific success I categorize
managers as conservatism effect if they are risk-avoiding, status quo (success) effect if they
are risk-neutral or house-money effect if they are risk-taking.
3.5.3 Diagnosis Of Behavioral Categorization Of Managers
After creating these six behavioral groups of managers I next examine the mean firm
attributes, mean CEO attributes, mean managerial risk-profile score and the percentage
of managers for each of the six behavioral groups in Table 7 differentiating between low
versus high intensity score (below versus above median score) and between short versus long
chronicity score (1 year versus more than 1 year duration of distress or success).
I find that for firm attributes in Panel A younger firms are more likely to be trying-
to-break-even effect following distress while older firms are more likely to be snake bite effect
following distress. Similarly, I also find that younger firms are also more likely to be house
money effect following success while older firms are more likely to be conservatism effect
following success. In terms of firm size, I find that smaller firms are more likely to be trying-
to-break-even effect following distress and house money effect following success. In terms
of book-to-market ratio, I find that low book-to-market ratio firms are more likely to be
trying-to-break-even effect following distress while I also find that firms with payout (i.e.
dividends and/or share repurchases) are more likely to be snake bite effect following distress
and conservatism effect following success.
For CEO attributes in Panel B I find that younger CEO’s are more likely to be
trying-to-break-even effect following distress. In addition, I also find some evidence that
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female CEO’s are more likely to be trying-to-break-even effect following distress. In terms
of CEO tenure, I find that shorter tenured CEO’s are more likely to be trying-to-break-even
effect following distress and house money effect following success while longer tenured CEO’s
are more likely to be conservatism effect following success. Since behavioral dispositions
and risk attitudes are very likely to be strongly related to CEO tenure (i.e., whether the
CEO is new in the job or is a veteran), I also examine four CEO tenure groups based on
(1) CEOs in their first year of tenure, (2) CEOs in their last year of tenure, (3) CEOs
with short tenure, and (4) CEOs with long tenure. I examine mean values for the three
behavioral dispositions following firm-specific distress (trying-to-break-even, status quo and
snake bite), the three behavioral dispositions following firm-specific success (house money,
status quo and conservatism), and risk-profile score separately for these four CEO tenure
groups. To address CEO turnovers, I examine CEOs in their first year compared to CEOs in
their last year. I find that following firm-specific distress CEOs in their first year are more
likely to be trying-to-break-even (or risk-taking) than CEOs in their last year. Furthermore
CEOs in their last year are more likely to be status quo (or risk-neutral) than CEOs in
their first year. Following firm-specific success (based on financial performance), I find that
CEOs in their first year are more likely to be house money (or risk-taking) than CEOs in
their last year. Following firm-specific success (based on operating performance), I find that
CEOs in their last year are more likely to be conservatism (or risk-avoiding) than CEOs
in their first year. For short- versus long-tenure CEOs, I find no significant difference in
behavioral dispositions except that long-tenured CEOs are more likely to be conservative (or
risk-avoiding) than short-tenured CEOs after firm-specific success. In terms of risk-profile
score, CEOs in their first year on average have a higher risk-profile score (more risk-taking)
than CEOs in their last year. Short-tenured CEOs on average also have a higher risk-profile
score (more risk-taking) compared to long-tenured CEOs.
In Panels C1 and C2 I examine the mean managerial risk-profile scores and the
percentage of managers classified as firm-specific distress and success respectively in each of
the six behavioral groups. Specifically in Panel C1 I find that following firm-specific distress
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(based on financial performance Tier 1), 28.95% of managers are categorized as trying-to-
break-even effect, 56.67% of managers are categorized as status quo effect and 14.38% of
managers are categorized as snake bite effect. In terms of managerial risk-profile score,
the mean score ranges from 3.422 to 3.728 for trying-to-break-even effect, −0.005 to 0.047
for status quo effect and −2.383 to −2.307 for snake bite effect. In Panel C2 I find that
following firm-specific success (based on financial performance Tier 1) 11.74% of managers
are categorized as conservatism effect, 62.34% of managers are categorized as status quo
effect and 25.92% of managers are categorized as house money effect. In terms of managerial
risk-profile score, the mean score ranges from −2.328 to −2.319 for conservatism effect, 0.049
to 0.106 for status quo effect and 3.055 to 3.239 for house money effect.
For intensity score following distress in Panel D1 I find that higher intensity of distress
is related to greater risk-taking behavior for trying-to-break-even effect managers and is also
related to greater risk-avoiding behavior for snake bite effect managers. For chronicity score
following distress I find that longer duration of distress is related to greater risk-taking
behavior for trying-to-break-even effect managers and is also related to greater risk-avoiding
behavior for status quo effect managers.
For intensity score following success in Panel D2 the results are quite different com-
pared to the results for distress. Specifically, I find that higher intensity of success is related
to greater risk-avoiding behavior for conservatism effect managers and is related to lower
risk-taking behavior for status quo effect managers as well as for house money effect man-
agers. For chronicity score following success I find that longer duration of success is related
to greater risk-avoiding behavior for conservatism effect managers and is related to lower
risk-taking behavior for status quo effect managers as well as for house money effect man-
agers.
Overall, the findings indicate that there is a good representation of all six behavioral
groups following firm-specific distress and success with a wide range of managerial risk-profile
scores. This indicates that there is large variation in how managers respond to firm-specific
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distress and success: they can be risk-taking, risk-neutral or risk-avoiding after both distress
and success. Based on the intensity and duration of distress I find that trying-to-break-even
effect managers are even more risk-taking for higher intensity and longer durations of distress
while snake bite effect managers are even more risk-avoiding for only higher intensity of
distress. In contrast, based on the intensity and duration of success I find that conservatism,
status quo (success) as well as house money effect managers are less risk-taking for higher
intensity and longer duration of success.
Taking the results for distress and success together indicates that following distress
managers get more extreme in their risk-taking or risk-avoiding behavior the more intense
and longer duration distress is (i.e. managers get more desperate and either avoid or take
even more risks) while following success there is more risk-avoiding behavior for all groups
the more intense and longer duration success is (i.e. managers do not want to ”rock the
boat” when things are going well in terms of intensity and duration of success and therefore
they decrease their risk-taking behavior).
3.6 Explanatory Power Of Behavioral Categorization Of
Managers
3.6.1 Firm Performance
After categorizing managers into six behavioral groups in year t+1 and examining the
characteristics of each group in year t+1 I now examine the effect that these six behavioral
groups has on changes in firm performance from year t+1 to t+2. Specifically, in Table
8 I examine mean changes in firm performance measures from year t+1 to t+2 based on
the behavioral categorization of managers in year t+1 differentiating between low versus
high intensity of distress/success (intensity score) and between short versus long duration of
distress/success (chronicity score).
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I find that following firm-specific distress based on financial Tier 1 and 2 behavioral
categorization of managers trying-to-break-even effect managers had an increase in financial
performance of 1.4-1.6%, status quo effect managers had a decrease in financial performance
of 1.1-2.2% while snake bite effect managers had the largest decrease in financial performance
of 5.4-7.1%. Based on gross profitability Tier 1 and 2 behavioral categorization of managers I
find that trying-to-break-even effect managers had a 6.8-8.9% increase in gross profitability,
status quo effect managers had a 4.1-6.9% increase in gross profitability while snake bite
effect managers had a 5.8-8.3% increase in gross profitability. However in terms of cash flow
the results are quite different. Specifically, I find that trying-to-break-even effect managers
had a 2.4-3.8% decrease in cash flow, status quo effect managers had a 6.2-7.0% increase in
cash flow while snake-bite effect managers had 19.4-20.3% increase in cash flow.
In contrast to firm-specific distress, following firm-specific success based on financial
Tier 1 and 2 behavioral categorization of managers I find that house money effect managers
had a 0.7-1.5% decrease in financial performance, status quo effect managers had a 0.0-
0.7% decrease in financial performance while conservatism effect managers had a 2.6-3.6%
decrease in financial performance. Based on gross profitability Tier 1 and 2 behavioral
categorization of managers I find that house money effect managers had a 0.7-2.7% decrease
in gross profitability, status quo effect managers had a 4.3-6.4% decrease in gross profitability
while conservatism effect managers had a 5.5-6.9% decrease in gross profitability. However
similar to the case of firm-specific distress, I also find that the results based on cash flow
performance are quite different. Specifically, I find that house money effect managers had a
8.5-9.8% decrease in cash flow, status quo effect managers had a 2.5-3.4% decrease in cash
flow while conservatism effect managers had a 2.6-4.1% increase in cash flow.
In terms of the effect of the intensity (based on intensity score) of firm-specific distress
and success, I find that following firm-specific distress there is an increase in financial perfor-
mance for firms experiencing low intensity distress and a decrease in financial performance
for firms experiencing high intensity distress. Interestingly, in the case of operating perfor-
mance I find no significant difference in operating performance between firms experiencing
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low intensity distress versus high intensity distress. Following firm-specific success I also find
no significant difference in financial and operating performance between firms experiencing
low intensity success versus high intensity success.
In terms of the effect of the duration (based on chronicity score) of firm-specific
distress and success, I find that following firm-specific distress there is an increase in financial
performance for firms experiencing a short duration of distress and a decrease in financial
performance for firms experiencing a long duration of distress. I also find no significant
difference in operating performance between firms experiencing short duration versus long
duration distress. Following firm-specific success I find that there is a smaller decrease/larger
increase in financial and operating performance for firms experiencing long duration versus
short duration success except for cash flow based performance where the opposite is true.
Overall, the results suggest that following firm-specific distress trying-to-break-even
effect managers had the largest increase in financial and operating performance while snake
bite effect managers had the largest decrease in financial and operating performance. How-
ever, the opposite is true for cash flow based performance: trying-to-break-even effect man-
agers had the largest decrease in cash flow while snake bite effect managers had the largest
increase in cash flow. Similar results are also found following firm-specific success: house
money effect managers had the smallest decrease in financial and operating performance
while conservatism effect managers had the largest decrease in financial and operating perfor-
mance. However as in the case of firm-specific distress, the results for cash flow performance
are also quite different for firm-specific success. Specifically, house money effect managers
had the largest decrease in cash flow performance while conservatism effect managers had
the largest increase in cash flow performance.
To further examine the effect of behavioral categorization of managers on changes in
firm performance in Table 9, I perform univariate regressions (Panel A) and multivariate
regressions (Panel B). For Panel A each reported coefficient is from a separate univari-
ate regression while for Panel B multivariate regressions are performed controlling for firm
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attributes, CEO attributes, market controls and industry fixed effects. In addition, all re-
gressions use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity.
I find that following firm-specific distress based on financial Tier 1 and 2 behavioral
categorization of managers trying-to-break-even effect managers had a significant increase in
financial performance ranging from 21.4-24.5%, status quo effect managers had a significant
increase in financial performance ranging from 15.7-23.4% and snake bite effect managers had
a nonsignificant change in financial performance. Based on gross profitability Tier 1 and 2
behavioral categorization of managers I find that trying-to-break-even effect managers had a
significant increase in gross profitability ranging from 10.5-14.5%, status quo effect managers
had a significant increase in gross profitability ranging from 8.0-10.8% and snake bite effect
managers had a significant increase in gross profitability ranging from 13.3-15.5%. However,
I find quite different results for cash flow based performance. Specifically, I find that trying-
to-break-even effect managers as well as status quo effect managers had a nonsignificant
change in cash flow but snake bite effect managers had a significant increase in cash flow
performance ranging from 16.3-17.7%.
Following firm-specific success based on financial Tier 1 and 2 behavioral catego-
rization of managers I find that house money effect managers had a significant increase in
financial performance ranging from 15.0-18.7%, status quo effect managers had a significant
increase in financial performance ranging from 11.0-14.6% and conservatism effect managers
had a significant increase in financial performance ranging from 12.5-15.6%. Based on gross
profitability Tier 1 and 2 behavioral categorization of managers I find that house money ef-
fect managers had a significant decrease in gross profitability ranging from 2.2-7.3%, status
quo effect managers had a significant decrease in gross profitability ranging from 1.9-7.3%
and conservatism effect managers had a significant decrease in gross profitability ranging
from 2.2-7.2%. In contrast to the results for gross profitability, I find that for cash flow per-
formance house money effect managers had a significant decrease in cash flow ranging from
4.3-4.4%, status quo effect managers had a significant increase in cash flow ranging from
3.3-4.3% and conservatism effect managers had a significant increase in cash flow ranging
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from 6.9-8.7%.
In terms of the intensity of firm-specific distress (based on intensity scores) I find
that high intensity distress is significantly related to a decrease in subsequent firm financial
performance and a nonsignificant change in firm operating performance. In terms of firm-
specific success, I find that high intensity success is significantly related to a decrease in
firm financial and operating performance. Similarly, in terms of the duration of firm-specific
distress (based on chronicity scores) I find longer duration distress is related to a decrease in
firm financial and operating performance. In terms of firm-specific success, I find that longer
duration of success is related to an increase in firm financial and operating performance.
Overall, the results in Table 9 provide further support to the results found in Table 8.
Specifically, that following firm-specific distress trying-to-break-even effect managers had the
largest increase in financial performance while snake bite effect managers had a nonsignificant
change in financial performance. In terms of operating performance while both trying-to-
break-even effect managers and snake bite effect managers had similarly large, significant
increases in gross profitability, trying-to-break-even effect managers had a nonsignificant
change in cash flow performance while snake bite effect managers had a significant increase in
cash flow performance. Similarly, following firm-specific success house money effect managers
had the largest increase in financial performance while status quo effect and conservatism
effect managers had the smallest increases in financial performance. In terms of operating
performance while house money effect, status quo effect and conservatism effect managers
all had similar significant decreases in gross profitability performance, house money effect
managers had the largest decrease in cash flow performance while conservatism managers
had the largest increase in cash flow performance.
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3.6.2 Probability Of Maintaining Success/Leaving Distress Catego-
rization
In addition to examining the effect of behavioral categorization of managers on
changes in firm performance through univariate and multivariate regressions, in this sec-
tion I also examine the effect of behavioral categorization of managers on the probability of
a firm maintaining success/leaving distress categorization. Specifically, based on the behav-
ioral categorization of managers in year t+1 is a firm able to maintain success categorization
or does it decrease in performance enough to be categorized as normal or distress in year
t+2). Similarly for distress is a firm able to leave distress categorization and enter either
normal or success categorization or does it stay categorized as distress in year t+2).
In order to test this, in Table 10 I perform multivariate Probits of the probability
of leaving distress categorization for normal or success (1) or maintaining distress catego-
rization (0) in year t+2 on the behavioral categorization of managers in year t+1 in Panel
A. Similarly in Panel B I perform multivariate Probits of the probability of maintaining
success categorization (1) or leaving success categorization for normal or distress (0) in year
t+2 on the behavioral categorization of managers in year t+1. All regressions control for
firm attributes, CEO attributes, market controls and industry fixed effects and use standard
errors robust to heteroskedasticity.
I find that for firm-specific distress in Panel A trying-to-break-even effect managers
had a 30.8% probability of leaving distress (i.e. moving to normal or success categorization),
status quo effect managers had a 26.4% probability of leaving distress and snake bite effect
managers had a 28.2% probability of leaving distress based on financial Tier 1 behavioral
categorization of managers. In terms of operating performance measures, I find that both
trying-to-break-even effect and snake bite managers had a nonsignificant probability of leav-
ing distress while status quo effect managers had a −11.6% probability of leaving distress
based on gross profitability Tier 1 behavioral categorization of managers. In terms of inten-
sity scores I find that the intensity of distress has a nonsignificant effect on the probability
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of a firm leaving distress while in terms of chronicity scores I find that in some cases the
longer the duration of distress the higher the probability of the firm leaving distress.
In terms of firm-specific success in Panel B I find that house money effect managers,
status quo effect managers and conservatism effect managers all had a nonsignificant effect
on the probability of maintaining success based on financial behavioral categorization of
managers. In contrast, based on operating performance (gross profitability Tier 2 behavioral
categorization of managers) I find that house money effect managers had a 9.8% probability
of maintaining success, status quo effect managers had a 8.0% probability of maintaining
success and conservatism effect managers had a 10.4% probability of maintaining success.
In terms of cash flow Tier 2 behavioral categorization of managers I find that house money
effect managers had a nonsignificant effect on the probability of maintaining success, status
quo effect managers had a 10.9% probability of maintaining success while conservatism effect
managers had a 8.0% probability of maintaining success. For intensity scores, I find that
managers experiencing high intensity success had a lower probability of maintaining cash flow
based success while for chronicity scores I find that managers experiencing longer durations
of success had a lower probability of maintaining cash flow based success.
Overall, the results lend some support to the results found in Tables 8 and 9. Specifi-
cally that following firm-specific distress, trying-to-break-even effect managers had the high-
est probability of leaving distress while snake bite effect managers had the second lowest
probability of leaving distress based on financial and gross profitability performance. The
results slightly differ following firm-specific success as house money effect, status quo effect
as well as conservatism effect managers all had a nonsignificant effect on the probability
of maintaining financial success while house money effect (conservatism) managers had the
second lowest (highest) probability of maintaining gross profitability based success as well
as a nonsignificant (highest) probability of maintaining cash flow based success.
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3.7 Conclusion
Prospect theory finds that individuals have very different risk behaviors following
gains versus losses. When applying prospect theory, prior literature has frequently focused on
individual behavioral dispositions by conducting lab experiments with a focus on investments
and asset pricing. In contrast, in this paper I apply prospect theory to a corporate setting
for a comprehensive set of behavioral dispositions using a large sample of US firms (17,844)
over an extended time horizon (1980-2017).
Using CRSP, COMPUSTAT and EXECUCOMP data I construct my sample of 17,844
firms and 177,891 firm-year observations over the period 1980 through 2017. I then classify
firm-specific success and distress as well as their diagnostic attributes in year t; corporate
strategies adopted by firm’s experiencing success and distress are classified in year t+1;
behavioral disposition of managers into house money effect, conservatism effect, trying-to-
break-even effect, snake bite effect and status quo effect as well as their analytics is carried out
in year t+1; subsequent consequences of this behavioral disposition of managers is examined
in year t+2.
More specifically, I first classify whether firms experience firm-specific success (gains)
or firm-specific distress (losses) in a given year based on financial performance measures (re-
turns) as well as operating performance measures (Altman (2000) Z-score, gross profitability
and cash flow). I then examine how firm managers respond to these firm-specific success and
distress events based on changes in corporate strategies (capital expenditures, R&D, cash,
book leverage and total payout). Managers are then classified as risk-taking (significant
increases in corporate strategies), risk-neutral (no significant changes in corporate strate-
gies) and risk-avoiding (significant decreases in corporate strategies). I find that managers
are more risk-avoiding if the intensity (duration) of success is higher (longer); managers are
more risk-taking if the intensity (duration) of distress is higher (longer).
Based on these significant increases, no significant change and significant decreases
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in corporate strategies following firm-specific success, I categorize managers as house money
(risk-taking), status quo (risk-neutral) and conservatism (risk-avoiding). Similarly, following
firm-specific distress I categorize managers as trying-to-break even (risk-taking), status quo
(risk-neutral) and snake bite (risk-avoiding). Based on this behavioral categorization of
managers I then examine their relation to firm and CEO attributes as well as the effect on
changes in subsequent firm performance.
In terms of firm attributes, I find that younger as well as smaller firms are more likely
to be house money effect following success and trying-to-break-even effect following distress;
older firms are more likely to be conservatism effect following success and snake bite effect
following distress. In addition, I find that low book-to-market ratio firms are more likely
to be trying-to-break-even effect following distress while firms that have dividends and/or
share repurchases are more likely to be conservatism effect after success and snake bite effect
after distress.In terms of CEO attributes, I find that shorter tenured CEO’s are more likely
to be house money effect following success and trying-to-break-even effect following distress;
longer tenured CEO’s are more likely to be conservatism effect following success. Younger
CEO’s as well as to some extent female CEO’s are also more likely to be trying-to-break-even
effect following distress.
In terms of changes in subsequent firm performance, I find that following firm-specific
success house money effect managers have the smallest decrease in financial and operating
performance as well as the largest decrease in cash flow performance while conservative
managers have the largest decrease in financial and operating performance as well as the
largest increase in cash flow performance. Following firm-specific distress, I find that trying-
to-break-even managers have the largest increase in financial and operating performance as
well as the largest decrease in cash flow performance while snake bite effect managers have
the largest decrease in financial and operating performance as well as the largest increase in
cash flow performance.
Overall, this paper provide supports for prospect theory in a corporate finance decision-
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making setting: firm managers have very different risk behaviors following gains (success)
and distress (losses); and the risk attitude depends on the intensity and duration of suc-
cess/distress. In terms of firm and CEO attributes, there is significant variation across the
six behavioral dispositions of managers in terms of firm age, firm size, CEO age, CEO tenure
and gender. In addition, following either success or distress, risk-taking managers are re-
warded with higher subsequent firm performance while risk-avoiding managers are punished
with lower subsequent firm performance. One possible extension of this essay in future is to
include corporate governance variables, including dual class dummy, in order to examine if
these variables have a moderating effect on managerial risk-behavior following firm-specific
success and distress. Moderating effects are likely because whether a manager is at a firm
with strong versus weak corporate governance may effect how managers change corporate
strategies and, by extensive, affect the behavioral categorization of managers.
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Appendix A
Appendix To Essay 1
Appendix A.1: Sample And Data Variables
The sample covers the period 1980 through 2017 except for CEO attributes which cover the period
1992 through 2017. Panel A consists of variables used in the computation of initial firm efficiency
and managerial ability measures respectively. Panel B describes firm characteristics. Panel C
describes CEO attributes. Panel D describes corporate strategy variables. Panel E describes firm
financial and operating performance measures respectively. Panel F describes CEO compensation
measures. Panel G describes variables used as exogenous market controls.
Panel A: Variables Used In Estimation Of Firm Efficiency And Managerial Ability
Variable Description
revenue Sales/Turnover Net (SALES)
netppe Net Property, Plant & Equipment (PPENT)
netopleases Net Operating Leases is the discounted present value (at 10% per year) of
the next five years of required operating lease payments Rental
Commitments Minimum 1st Year − Rental Commitments Minimum 5th year
(MRC1 − MRC5)
netrd Net Research & Development Expenditures following Lev and Sougiannis
(1996) who capitalize these research and development expenses (XRD) over
five years using the equation: RDcap =
∑0
t=−4(1 + 0.2t) ∗RDexp
goodwill Goodwill (GDWL)
otherintangibles Total Intangible Assets (INTAN) − Goodwill (GDWL)
cogs Cost of Goods Sold (COGS)
sgaexpenses Selling, General & Administrative Expenses (XSGA) − current year
operating lease expense − research and development expense
ta The natural logarithm of total assets (AT)
ms Firm Sales (SALE) in year t / Total Fama-French Industry Sales in year t *
100
freecashdummy Equal to 1 if free cash flow (earnings before depreciation and amortization
(OIBDP) − change in working capital (RECT + INVT + ACO − LCO −
AP) − capital expenditures (CAPX)) is non-negative and equal to 0
otherwise
firmage The natural logarithm of firm age (number of years that a firm has been
listed in COMPUSTAT)
bussegmentconc Individual Business Segment Sales / Total Firm Sales summed across all
business segments. If the firm is not in the COMPUSTAT business segment
file then it is assigned a value of 1
forcurrencydummy Equal to 1 if a firm has a nonzero value for foreign currency adjustment
(FCA) and equal to 0 otherwise
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Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Variable Description
firmage natural logarithm of firm age based on CRSP IPO year
size natural logarithm of total sales
bm book value of equity / market value of equity
nopayout equal to 1 if the firm had no dividends and no repurchases, equal to 0
otherwise
finance equal to 1 if firm is in the financial industry (SIC code 6000-6999), equal to 0
otherwise
Panel C: CEO Attributes
Variable Description
ceoage natural logarithm of CEO age
gender equal to 1 if CEO is female, equal to 0 if CEO is male
tenure natural logarithm of CEO tenure
founder equal to 1 if the CEO is a founder, equal to 0 otherwise
outsider equal to 1 if the CEO is an outsider, equal to 0 otherwise
Panel D: Corporate Strategy Variables
Variable Description
capex lagta capital expenditures fiscal year t / lagged total assets fiscal year t-1
cash ta cash and short term investments fiscal year t / total assets fiscal year t
rd ta research and development fiscal year t / total assets fiscal year t
mlev (long term debt + current liabilities fiscal year t) / (common shares
outstanding * price fiscal year t)
repurchase purchase of common and preferred stock fiscal year t − any reduction in the
value of the net number of preferred stocks outstanding fiscal year t (millions
of $)
dividend total amount of dividends paid fiscal year t (in millions of $)
payout ta (dividend + repurchase fiscal year t) / total assets fiscal year t
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Panel E: Firm Performance Variables
Variable Description
returns Annualized stock return based on monthly returns (expressed as a
percentage)
ebitda ta Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization in fiscal year t
divided by total assets in fiscal year t (expressed as a percentage)
ni sales Net income in fiscal year t divided by total sales in fiscal year t (expressed as
a percentage)
roa Return on assets which is calculated as net income in fiscal year t divided by
average total assets (total assets in fiscal year t plus total assets in fiscal year
t-1 divided by two) (expressed as a percentage)
roe Return on equity which is calculated as net income in fiscal year t divided by
average total shareholder equity (total shareholder equity in fiscal year t plus
total shareholder equity in fiscal year t-1 divided by two) (expressed as a
percentage)
Panel F: CEO Compensation
Variable Description
ceo fixedpay total yearly CEO salary plus bonus (in thousands of $)
ceo options total value of options held by the CEO at year end (in thousands of $)
ceo shares total value of shares held by the CEO at year end (in thousands of $)
ceo totalpay sum of yearly CEO salary, bonus, value of held options and value of held
shares (in thousands of $)
Panel G: Exogenous Control Variables
Variable Description
tbill30 30 day US Treasury Bill annualized return
sp500 S&P 500 annualized index return
nber recession equal to 1 if the year is a National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
recession year (at least 5 months in a calendar year are classified as recession
by NBER), equal to 0 otherwise.
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Appendix A.2: Construction Of Pre-Existing Firm Efficiency And Managerial Ability
Measures
To create the initial measure for firm efficiency and managerial ability I follow the procedure
of Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012), (henceforth DLM). Specifically, there are two main steps
involved: 1. Estimating firm efficiency using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and 2. Running a
Tobit specification of firm efficiency on firm characteristics. The intercept and residuals resulting
from this specification then become the measure for managerial ability score. I then create two
versions of firm efficiency and managerial ability: firm effDLM and mngr abilDLM are firm efficiency
and managerial ability where the estimation procedure is done by year (as in the updated data set of
Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012)) while firm eff and mngr abil are firm efficiency and managerial
ability that is industry-adjusted where the estimation procedure is done by 12 Fama-French industry
as well as by year.
A. Measures Based On Original DLM Approach
Estimating firm efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
The DEA framework is used to estimate firm efficiency and is defined as the ratio of outputs over
inputs. For each firm this involves solving an optimization problem where the goal is to maximize
output for a given level of inputs by varying the weights on the inputs.
In this case the DEA estimation consists of one output and seven inputs with the weights on
the output and inputs constrained to be non-negative. Appendix Table 1 below shows a detailed
description of the input and output variables. All data for these variables is obtained from
COMPUSTAT with the COMPUSTAT codes in parentheses. The first five input variables are
measured at the beginning of year t while the last two are during year t.
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Appendix Table 1: Description of Variables Used to Estimate Total Firm Efficiency
Output Variable Construction
revenue Sales/Turnover Net (SALES)
Input Variables Construction
netppe Net Property, Plant & Equipment (PPENT)
netopleases Net Operating Leases is the discounted present value (at 10% per
year) of the next five years of required operating lease payments
Rental Commitments Minimum 1st Year − Rental Commitments
Minimum 5th year (MRC1 − MRC5)
netrd Net Research & Development Expenditures following Lev and
Sougiannis (1996) who capitalize these research and development
expenses (XRD) over five years using the equation:
RDcap =
∑0
t=−4(1 + 0.2t) ∗RDexp
goodwill Goodwill (GDWL)
otherintangibles Total Intangible Assets (INTAN) − Goodwill (GDWL)
cogs Cost of Goods Sold (COGS)
sgaexpenses Selling, General & Administrative Expenses (XSGA) − current year
operating lease expense − research and development expense
To estimate firm efficiency using DEA the following steps are followed:
1. Firms are grouped by year.
2. The optimization problem is then solved whereby revenue is maximized by finding the optimal
weights on the seven input variables (where the weights are constrained to be non-negative for the
output and all inputs). This maximization is then carried out with the resulting weights being
firm-specific.
3. For each firm these optimal weights are then multiplied by the respective quantity of outputs
and inputs. Summing across all outputs (in the numerator) and input (in the denominator) gives
the raw firm efficiency score (total outputs / total inputs).
4. All of these raw firm efficiency scores are then scaled by the firm that has the highest raw firm
efficiency score in each year resulting in the firm efficiency score (firm effDLM). For example, if the
highest raw firm efficiency score in a year is 4.1 then that firm has a firm efficiency score of 1 (4.1 /
4.1).
Extracting Managerial Ability Score from Firm Efficiency Score
To obtain managerial ability, firm efficiency is split into two parts: firm efficiency and managerial
ability. Specifically, this is done by running a Tobit of firm efficiency on firm characteristics.
Appendix Table 2 below shows a detailed description of the firm characteristic variables that are
used. All data for these variables is obtained from COMPUSTAT with the COMPUSTAT codes in
parentheses. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% respectively.
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ta The natural logarithm of total assets (AT)
ms Firm Sales (SALE) in year t / Total Fama-French Industry Sales in
year t * 100
freecashdummy Equal to 1 if free cash flow (earnings before depreciation and
amortization (OIBDP) − change in working capital (RECT + INVT +
ACO − LCO − AP) − capital expenditures (CAPX)) is non-negative
and equal to 0 otherwise
firmage The natural logarithm of firm age (number of years that a firm has
been listed in COMPUSTAT)
bussegmentconc Individual Business Segment Sales / Total Firm Sales summed across
all business segments. If the firm is not in the COMPUSTAT business
segment file then it is assigned a value of 1
forcurrencydummy Equal to 1 if a firm has a nonzero value for foreign currency
adjustment (FCA) and equal to 0 otherwise
Using these firm characteristics, the following Tobit is performed:
firm effDLM,i = β0 + β1tai + β2msi + β3freecashdummyi + β4firmagei + β5bussegmentconci
+ β6forcurrencydummyi + industry fixed effects + εi
(1)
The intercept and residuals from this regression then becomes the measure of managerial ability
score (mngr abilDLM).
B. Measures Based On Industry-Adjusted Approach
In addition to the estimation procedure above, firm efficiency and managerial ability scores are also
estimated by 12 Fama-French industry to obtain industry-adjusted firm efficiency and managerial
ability scores.
Appendix Table 3 below defines each of the twelve industries as well as the proportion of the sample
each industry accounts for.
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Appendix Table 3: Description of 12 Fama-French Industries
Industries # of firms % of
observations
1. Consumer Nondurables (Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel,
Leather, Toys)
996 5.65%
2. Consumer Durables (Cars, TV’s, Furniture, Household
Appliances)
455 2.71%
3. Manufacturing (Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Office Furniture,
Paper, Computer Printing)
1,857 11.73%
4. Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 926 4.50%
5. Chemicals and Allied Products 368 2.58%
6. Business Equipment (Computers, Software, and Electronic
Equipment)
3,344 16.71%
7. Telephone and Television Transmission 552 2.47%
8. Utilities 289 3.09%
9. Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair
Shops)
1,833 9.35%
10. Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 1,993 8.91%
11. Finance 3,775 19.84%
12. Other (Mines, Construction, Building Mat., Transportation,
Hotels, Business Services, Entertainment)
2,581 12.46%
Industry-adjusted firm efficiency and managerial ability scores are examined for several reasons.
First, in the DEA estimation procedure optimal input weights will be affected by industry (i.e. the
input variables netppe and netrd can vary substantially across industries) which will result in firm
efficiency being affected. Second, since managerial ability is derived from firm efficiency it will also
be affected. Third, firm efficiency and managerial ability should vary across industries and needs to
be comparable for firms in different industries (i.e. firm efficiency and managerial ability can be
very different for a manufacturing firm versus a technology firm).
The reason that 12 Fama-French industries are chosen is because both 5 and 10 industry classifications
have 32% of observations classified as other industry which is too large and defeats the purpose
of defining industries. In addition, 5 and 10 industry also includes finance in the other industry
category when given its size, it should be its own industry. Finally, including more than 12 industries
causes some of the industries to be too narrow.
The industry-adjusted approach performs Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) by 12 Fama-French
industry (instead of by year as in DLM), and results in the measure of firm efficiency, firm eff. The
Tobit specification is then carried out without industry fixed effects (which are included in the DLM
approach). Similar to the DLM approach, the intercept and residuals from the Tobit specification
then become the measure of managerial ability, mngr abil.
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C. Comparison Of Original DLM And Industry-Adjusted Measures
Appendix Table 4 below examines firm efficiency and managerial ability based on the original DLM
approach compared to the industry-adjusted approach. This comparison is carried out in order to
demonstrate that the industry-adjusted approach is preferred to the original DLM approach.
Specifically, the table demonstrates that industry-adjusted firm efficiency (firm eff) and managerial
ability (mngr abil) are preferred to the original DLM measures (firm effDLM and mngr abilDLM)
for several reasons. First, the relatively lower correlation between firm eff and mngr abil com-
pared to firm effDLM and mngr abilDLM (0.5724 versus 0.8449 respectively), demonstrates that
firm eff and mngr abil are better able to capture different effects. This indicates that there is
a clearer distinction between firm efficiency and managerial ability under the industry-adjusted
measure compared to the original DLM measure. Second, firm eff correctly has a large varia-
tion across industries (from 0.4099 to 0.7778) while firm effDLM has relatively little variation
across industries (from 0.2765 to 0.3368). This is important as the firm efficiency of a firm in the
manufacturing industry is different from the firm efficiency in the technology industry. However,
despite this difference between the two measures of firm efficiency, the correlation between firm eff
and firm effDLM is still a relatively high 0.4575. Third, despite the differences in firm eff and
firm effDLM, mngr abil and mngr abilDLM are similar across industries (−0.0947 to 0.0082 versus
−0.0545 to 0.0327 respectively). This indicates that managerial ability is computed consistently
regardless of which measure of firm efficiency is used. Fourth, firm eff and mngr abil have a more
symmetric distribution (similar low and high firm efficiency/managerial ability tails), compared to
firm effDLM and mngr abilDLM. Fifth, the univariate regression results demonstrate that while
there is a significant relationship between the original DLM measures and the industry-adjusted

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A.3: Construction Of New Firm And Managerial Performance Evaluation
Measures
This appendix describes the construction of additional firm and managerial performance evaluation
measures based on: innate firm efficiency (inn firm eff), innate managerial ability (inn mngr abil),
relative managerial ability (rel mngr abil), excess managerial score (exc mngr scor), and managerial
strategy score (mngr strat scor).
A. Innate Firm Efficiency
Innate firm efficiency captures firm efficiency independent of managerial ability and is measured as
inn firm eff.
When managerial ability is computed, the following Tobit specification is used:
(2)
firm eff = β0 + β1tai + β2msi + β3freecashdummyi + β4firmagei
+ β5bussegmentconci + β6forcurrencydummyi + εi
Based on this Tobit specification, inn firm eff is calculated for each firm year as the predicted value
of firm eff which is then standardized over the interval (0,1].
I also used an alternate approach where a modified version of the Tobit is used (i.e. includes market
leverage and whether or not a firm has dividends/share repurchases) and I find that it did not
change the statistical properties.
B. Innate Managerial Ability
Innate managerial ability captures managerial ability independent of firm efficiency and is measured
as inn mngr abil.
In order to calculate inn mngr abil), we standardize both firm eff and inn firm eff over the interval
(0,1] to ensure both measures have the same scale. Each firm year inn mngr abil is then computed
as the difference between standardized firm eff and standardized inn firm eff which is itself then
standardized over the interval (0,1].
I prefer innate managerial ability over managerial ability as it allows better orthogonalization
with innate firm efficiency as the correlation between innate managerial ability and innate firm
efficiency is almost zero (0.0118) while in contrast the correlation between managerial ability and
firm efficiency is relatively high (0.5724). In addition, innate managerial ability is also shown to
be orthogonal to innate firm efficiency based on a variance inflation factor (VIF) of one (1.00), a
tolerance of one (1.00) and a covariance of zero (0.0003) while in contrast managerial ability is not
orthogonal to firm efficiency (based on a VIF of 1.49, tolerance of 1.22 and covariance of 0.0214).
Despite these differences between innate managerial ability and managerial ability they are still
similar to each other (based on a correlation of 0.6592), and have similar statistical properties.
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C. Relative Managerial Ability
Relative managerial ability captures managerial ability conditional on the firm’s underlying firm
efficiency and is measured as rel mngr abil.
It is computed each firm year as the ratio of innate managerial ability inn mngr abil, to firm
efficiency firm eff. This value is winsorized at the 0.5% level and then standardized over the interval
(0,1].
D. Excess Managerial Score
Excess managerial score captures managerial ability in excess of the firm’s underlying firm efficiency
and is measured as exc mngr scor.
It is computed each firm year as innate managerial ability minus innate firm efficiency.
E. Managerial Strategy Score
Based on changes in each of the 5 corporate strategy variables (capex lagta, rd ta, cash ta, mlev,
and payout ta)from year t to t+1 a manager is assigned a value of 1 (−1) if they are in the top 30%
(bottom 30%) and 0 if they are in the middle 40%. Summing up these assigned values across the 5
corporate strategy variables provides the managerial strategy score in year t+1 which takes on an
integer value on the [−5, 5] scale.
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Appendix A.4: Categorization Of Managers
This appendix describes the two main approaches used to categorize managers. The first approach
categorizes managers as underrated (high ability managers at less efficient firms) and overrated (low
ability managers at more efficiency firms) based on excess managerial score, relative managerial
ability and peer adjusted relative managerial ability in year t. The second approach categorizes
managers as proactive (large increases in corporate strategies)and apprehensive (large decreases in
corporate strategies) based on managerial strategy score in year t+1.
1. Categorization Of Managers As Underrated, Typical And Overrated
A. Categorization Of Managers Based On Excess Managerial Score
In order to categorize managers, each year I create low, normal, high portfolios (based on
30%/40%/30%) using excess managerial score.
Underrated managers consist of managers in the high excess managerial score portfolio (i.e. managers
with high innate managerial ability at low innate efficiency firms) while overrated managers consist
of managers in the low excess managerial score portfolio (i.e. managers with low innate managerial
ability at high innate efficiency firms). Typical managers (i.e. managers in the normal excess
managerial score portfolio) serve as a control group.
B. Categorization Of Managers Based On Relative Managerial Ability
In order to categorize managers, each year I create low, normal, high portfolios (based on
30%/40%/30%) using relative managerial ability.
Underrated managers consist of managers in the high relative managerial ability portfolio (i.e.
managers with high innate managerial ability at low efficiency firms) while overrated managers
consist of managers in the low relative managerial ability portfolio (i.e. managers with low innate
managerial ability at high efficiency firms). Typical managers (i.e. managers in the normal relative
managerial ability portfolio) serve as a control group.
C. Categorization Of Managers Based On Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
In order to categorize managers, I first create a peer manager group. Specifically, each year I create
a peer group by industry (using 12 Fama-French industry classification), as well as by size (low,
normal, high portfolios based on 30%/40%/30% using total assets).
Peer adjusted relative managerial ability (peer rel mngr abil) is then calculated as the fraction of
peer managers (j), with a lower relative managerial ability then the given manager (i), in a given
year (t):
(3)
peer rel mngr abili,t = Ranki,t(rel mngr abilj,t; j
= 0, 1, ..., N i,t/N i,t
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where Ranki,t is the rank value of manager is relative managerial ability in year t relative to its
peers in ascending order where Ni,t is the number of peer managers that manager i has in year t
This is similar to the concept of percentiles; A peer adjusted relative managerial ability value of
0.80 for a given manager indicates that 80% of managers in the given manager’s peer group have a
lower relative managerial ability value.
Underrated (overrated) managers consist of managers with a peer adjusted relative managerial
ability value greater than or equal to 0.70 (less than or equal to 0.30). Typical managers (i.e.
managers with a peer adjusted relative managerial ability value greater than 0.30 and less than
0.70) serve as a control group.
2. Categorization Of Managers As Proactive, Status Quo And Apprehensive
A. Categorization Of Managers Based On Managerial Strategy Score
Based on managerial strategy score in year t+1, each year t+1 managers are categorized as proactive
if their managerial strategy score is from 2 through 5, status quo if their managerial strategy score
is from −1 through 1 and apprehensive if their managerial strategy score is from −5 through −2.
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Appendix B
Appendix To Essay 2
Appendix B.1: Variable Definitions
Variables Used In Regression Analysis
Variable Variable Type Definition
return Main dependent variable Annualized stock return based on monthly returns
expressed as a decimal.
carvw Main dependent variable Cumulative abnormal return calculated as firm’s monthly
return minus the expected market monthly return based on
CRSP value-weighted index. These monthly cumulative
abnormal returns are annualized and expressed as a
decimal.
carind Main dependent variable Similar to carvw instead of expected market return,
expected industry return is used based on 48 Fama-French
industry classification.
ebitda ta Main dependent variable Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortization in fiscal year t divided by total assets in fiscal
year t.
ni sales Main dependent variable Net income in fiscal year t divided by total sales in fiscal
year t.
roa Main dependent variable Return on assets which is calculated as net income in fiscal
year t divided by average total assets (total assets in fiscal
year t plus total assets in fiscal year t-1 divided by two).
roe Main dependent variable Return on equity which is calculated as net income in fiscal
year t divided by average total shareholder equity (total
shareholder equity in fiscal year t plus total shareholder
equity in fiscal year t-1 divided by two).
employees Main dependent variable Total number of employees at a firm expressed in
thousands.
staffexpense Main dependent variable Total staff expense in millions of US dollars scaled by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI).
averagewage Main dependent variable Total staff expense divided by total number of employees
and scaled by the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
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Variable Variable Type Definition
enforce index Main independent variable From Garmaise (2011) who computes a state non-compete
clause enforceability index from 1992 through 2004 which is
then extended through 2017 following Kini, Williams, and
Yin (2018). For each state, the value ranges from 0-12
based on the author creating a 0 or 1 threshold response to
12 questions.
For example, one of the 12 questions is Is there a state
statute of general application that governs the
enforceability of covenants not to compete? the threshold is
States that enforce noncompetition agreements outside a
sale-of-business context receive a score of 1.
ncc dummy Main independent variable Based on the 50 State Noncompete Chart by Beck, Reed,
and Riden LLP which is also used by the White House and
the United States Department of the Treasury.
Dummy variable equal to one if the state enforces
non-compete clauses in any way (red pencil, blue pencil, or
reformation) and equal to zero if the state does not enforce
non-compete clauses at all.
blev Control variable Book value of leverage. It is the sum of long-term debt and
current liabilities divided by the total book value of equity.
bm Control variable Book-to-market value ratio. It is the total book value of
equity divided by total market value of equity.
firmage Control variable The natural logarithm of a firms age based on Centre for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) initial public offering
(IPO) date.
size Control variable The natural logarithm of a firms total assets.
zeropayout Control variable Dummy variable equal to one if the firm has no dividends
and repurchases and equal to zero otherwise.
Variables Used In Additional Subsample Analysis
Variable Variable Type Definition
hp index Subsample variable Hadlock and Pierce (2010) HP index.
The HP Index for firm i in fiscal year t is computed as
HPi,t = 0.737 x Sizei,t 0.043 x Size
2
i,t 0.040 x Agei,t
where Size is log(inflation-adjusted book assets), and Age is
the current year minus the first year that the firm has a
non-missing stock price on COMPUSTAT.
ins directors Subsample variable Fraction of inside directors out of all directors.
inst -
ownership
Subsample variable Total institutional ownership, percentage of shares
outstanding.
market conc Subsample variable Measure of market concentration using the




Appendix To Essay 3
Appendix C.1: Removing Bankrupt Firms From Sample
I remove all bankrupt firms from my sample before I compute any variables or perform any
performance or behavioral categorization of managers (Appendices 2, 3 and 4). I perform this task
because the focus of this paper is on distress and not the extreme case of distress (bankruptcy). In
order to examine changes in strategies and the behavior of managers following distress, I need a
more general form of distress. The reason for this is that surrounding bankruptcy the strategies
and behavior of managers is constrained (e.g. managers are forced to liquidate assets and decrease
spending in order to make obligatory debt payments). By removing bankruptcies I am able to
examine managers that have relatively more freedom in their strategies and behavior.
To identify these bankrupt firms, I obtain bankruptcy data from Sudheer Chava which covers
bankruptcies from 1980 through 2016. For 2017, I manually looked up bankruptcies in the Wall
Street Journal. Before removing bankrupt firms, my sample consisted of 186,953 observations for
18,920 firms. Using Sudheer Chavas bankruptcy data results in 9,016 observations for 1,069 firms
being removed (4.82% of observations). Based on the bankruptcy data I collected for 2017, 46
observations for 7 firms were additionally removed. After removing all bankrupt firms, my final
sample consists of 177,891 observations for 17,844 firms.
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Appendix C.2: Variable Descriptions
This table describes construction of variables for financial performance (Panel A), operating
performance (Panel B), corporate strategies (Panel C), firm attributes (Panel D), CEO attributes
(Panel E) and exogenous control variables (Panel F).
Panel A: Financial Performance Measures
Variable Description
car cumulative abnormal return calculated as
(1)CARi,t = (Ri,t − E(R)i,t)
where Ri,t is firm i’s return in month t and E(R)i,t is the expected
return for firm i in month t (industry return based on 48 Fama-French
industry classification)
Panel B: Operating Performance Measures
Variable Description
Altman (2000) Z−score Z−score = 6.56*(working capital/total assets)+3.26*(retained
earnings/total assets)+6.72*(ebit/total assets)+1.05*(book value
equity/total liabilities)
pc gprof first principal component of gross profitability measures: ebitda/total
assets, ebitda/sales, (earnings+depreciation+amortization−gains on
sales)/sales, operating income fiscal year t/ [0.5(beginning market
value of total assets + ending market value of total assets fiscal year
t)], operating income fiscal year t / sales fiscal year t, and operating
income fiscal year t/ [0.5(beginning book value of total assets +
ending book value of total assets less cash and marketable securities
fiscal year t)], each component standardized to have zero mean and
unit variance. Pc gprof is also standardized in the same manner.
pc cashflow first principal component of cash flow measures: operating
cashflow/sales, operating cashflow/total assets and operating
cashflow/beginning of year total assets, each component standardized
to have zero mean and unit variance. Pc cashflow is also standardized
in the same manner.
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Panel C: Corporate Strategy Variables
Variable Description
capex lagta capital expenditures fiscal year t / lagged total assets fiscal year t-1
rd ta research and development fiscal year t / total assets fiscal year t
cash ta cash and short term investments fiscal year t / total assets fiscal year t
blev (long term debt + current liabilities fiscal year t) / book value of
equity fiscal year t)
repurchase purchase of common and preferred stock fiscal year t − any reduction
in the value of the net number of preferred stocks outstanding fiscal
year t (millions of $)
dividend total amount of dividends paid fiscal year t (in millions of $)
payout ta (dividend + repurchase fiscal year t) / total assets fiscal year t
Panel D: Firm Attributes
Variable Description
firmage natural logarithm of firm age based on CRSP IPO year
size natural logarithm of total assets
bm book value of equity / market value of equity
nopayout equal to 1 if the firm had no dividends and no repurchases, equal to 0
otherwise
finance equal to 1 if firm is in the financial industry (SIC code 6000-6999),
equal to 0 otherwise
Panel E: CEO Attributes
Variable Description
ceoage natural logarithm of CEO age
gender equal to 1 if CEO is female, equal to 0 if CEO is male
tenure natural logarithm of CEO tenure
founder equal to 1 if the CEO is a founder, equal to 0 otherwise
outsider equal to 1 if the CEO is an outsider, equal to 0 otherwise
Panel F: Exogenous Control Variables
Variable Description
tbill30 30 day US Treasury Bill annualized return
sp500 S&P 500 annualized index return
nber recession equal to 1 if the year is a National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) recession year (at least 5 months in a calendar year are
classified as recession by NBER), equal to 0 otherwise
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Appendix C.3: Unconditional Changes In Corporate Strategies
The results from Table 4: Proportion Of Managers That Increase/Decrease Corporate Strategies
In Response To Firm-Specific Success/Distress indicate that managers can increase or decrease
corporate strategies. More specifically, the table demonstrates that increases in strategies are more
likely than decreases.
In order to examine this further, I examine unconditional changes in corporate strategies (i.e. not
conditional on success or distress). To accomplish this I create Appendix Table 1 which examines
unconditional mean and median changes for each of the five corporate strategy variables (capital
expenditures, R&D, cash, book leverage and total payout) as well as create histograms for each
change in corporate strategy variable.
The results demonstrate that (i)unconditionally there are managers that increase strategies as well
as managers that decrease strategies, (ii) even unconditionally firms are more likely to increase
strategies as opposed to decreasing them, (iii) for each change in corporate strategy variable a large
number of observations are clustered around zero, and (iv) the right, positive tail is generally longer
than the left, negative tail.
Appendix Table 1: Unconditional Changes In Corporate Strategies
Changes in Corporate Strategies
capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
mean change −0.0046 0.0007 −0.0038 0.0665 0.0016
median change 0.0000 0.0000 −0.0005 0.0000 0.0000
percentage increase (mean change) 18.13% 12.14% 15.32% 8.86% 9.86%
percentage decrease (mean change) 2.54% 1.44% 7.80% 0.51% 1.11%
percentage no change (mean change) 79.33% 86.43% 76.88% 90.63% 89.03%
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Appendix C.4: Performance and Behavioral Categorization
This table describes how financial and operating performance measures in year t are used to define
a firm-year as firm-specific distress or success in year t (Panel A) and how changes in corporate
strategy variables from year t to t+1 are used to define managers as trying-to-break even effect,
status quo effect (distress), snake-bite effect, conservatism effect, status quo effect (success) and
house-money effect in year t+1 (Panel B). All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
Panel A: Performance Categorization
Measure Categorization Approach
1. Financial Each calendar year t the mean and standard deviation of CAR (Tier 1
absolute as well as Tier 2 industry relative) across all firms are
calculated. A firm year is then labelled as distress (success) if the
firms stock return is more than one standard deviation below (above)
the mean stock return; otherwise the firm year is labelled as normal.
2. Operating Each calendar year t the median and median absolute deviation
(MAD) of pc gprof and pc cashflow (Tier 1 absolute as well as Tier 2
industry relative) across all firms are calculated. MAD is defined as
the median of absolute deviations from the median. For a data set X
with observations from X1,...,Xn:
(2)MAD = median(|X i −median(X)|)
for i = 1 to n
For example, if we have a data set consisting of the observations: 1, 1,
3, 4, 9 then the median is 3. The absolute deviations about 3 are 2, 2,
0, 1, 6. Sorting these in order (0, 1, 2, 2, 6) gives a median of 2.
Therefore the MAD is equal to 2.
A firm year is then labelled as distress (success) if the firm is more
than one MAD below (above) the median operating measure;
otherwise the firm year is labelled as normal.
3. Altman (2000) Z-score Each calendar year t the firms Z-score is calculated. Altman (2000)
defines three zones that Z-scores fall into: the distress zone, gray zone
and safe zone. Using these three zones, a firm Z-score < 1.10 indicates
distress (distress zone), Z-score > 2.60 indicates success (safe zone)
and 1.10 <= Z-score <= 2.60 indicates normal (gray zone).
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First, for each of the five corporate strategy variables (capex lagta,
rd ta, cash ta, blev and payout ta) the change from year t to t+1 is
computed for each firm. Second, each calendar year t+1 the median
and median absolute deviation (MAD) is computed for each of the five
change in corporate strategy variables. Third, for each change in
corporate strategy variable a firm is classified as having either a
significant decrease (−1) if the firms change is more than one MAD
below the median, significant increase (+1) if the firms change is more
than one MAD above the median or no significant change (0) if the




First, for each firm in calendar year t+1 all −1, +1, 0 value are
summed together to obtain a risk-profile score which ranges from −5
through +5. Second, based on this risk-profile score a manager is
categorized as either risk-avoiding (score from −5 through −2), risk
neutral (score from −1 through +1) or risk-taking (score from +2
through +5) in calendar year t+1.
3. Behavioral
categorization of managers
Following firm-specific distress in calendar year t, a manager is
categorized in calendar year t+1 as either trying-to-break-even
(risk-taking in t+1), status quo (distress) (risk-neutral in t+1) or
snake-bite (risk-avoiding in t+1). Following firm-specific success in
calendar year t, a manager is categorized in calendar year t+1 as
either conservatism (risk-avoiding in t+1), status quo (success)
(risk-neutral in t+1) or house-money (risk-taking in t+1).
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Essay 1 Figures And Tables
Figure 1.1: Time Series Trend Of Firm Efficiency And Managerial Ability
Figure 1 presents time series plots of firm efficiency (Panel A) and managerial ability (Panel B) for
both original Demerjian, Lev and McVay (2012) measures and for the industry-adjusted measures.
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Figure 1.2: Time Series Trend Of Innate Firm Efficiency And Innate Managerial
Ability
Figure 2 presents time series plots of firm efficiency and innate firm efficiency (Panel A) and
managerial ability and innate managerial ability (Panel B). The data covers the period 1980-2017.
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Figure 1.3: Time Series Trend Of Managerial Performance Measures
Figure 3 presents time series plots of innate managerial ability, relative managerial ability and excess

































Figure 1.4: Histograms Of Innate Firm Efficiency And Managerial Performance Mea-
sures
Figure 4 presents histograms of innate firm efficiency (Panel A), innate managerial ability (Panel
B), relative managerial ability (Panel C) and excess managerial score (Panel D). The data covers
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Figure 1.5: Histogram Of Managerial Strategy Score
Figure 5 presents a histogram of managerial strategy score which is used to categorize managers as
proactive, status quo or apprehensive. The data covers the period 1980-2017. Construction and
















Figure 1.6: Time Series Trend Of Attributes Of Underrated Vs. Overrated Managers
Figure 6 presents time series plots of relative managerial ability and excess managerial score for
managers that are considered underrated vs. overrated based on excess managerial score (Panel A),
relative managerial ability (Panel B) and peer adjusted relative managerial ability (Panel C). The
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Table 1.9: Firm Performance Of Underrated/Typical/Overrated Managers
This table reports financial performance (returns) and operating performance (ebita ta, ni sales,
roa and roe) as a percentage in year t+1 based on underrated, typical or overrated managerial
categorization in year t using excess managerial score, relative managerial ability and peer adjusted
relative managerial ability categorization approaches. Panel A reports comparative statistics which
distinguish between high versus low (below or above median) innate managerial ability and high
versus low innate firm efficiency. p-values report differences in firm performance between high
versus low innate managerial ability for underrated managers, high versus low innate managerial
ability for overrated managers, high versus low innate firm efficiency overall and high versus low
innate managerial ability overall. Panel B reports univariate regression results of financial and
operating performance on underrated and overrated indicators, bivariate regression results using
both underrated and overrated indicators and multivariate regression results which include the
addition of firm controls (firm age, size, and book-to-market), industry controls (12 Fama-French
industry) and market controls (30 day US Treasury Bill Yield, S&P 500 return and NBER recession
year indicator). For regressions, standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are used and ***
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level respectively. All firm
and managerial performance measures are defined in Appendix 3 and categorization of managers
are described in Appendix 4.
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Panel A: Comparative Statistics: Firm Performance
Financial Performance Operating Performance
Managerial Type returns ebitda ta ni sales roa roe
Full Sample 16.36 6.65 −22.67 −1.84 −2.87
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated 17.43 7.42 −4.52 −0.50 8.94
High innate managerial ability, underrated 16.16 9.85 −3.46 1.73 12.58
Low innate managerial ability, underrated 28.12 −11.97 −12.92 −18.26 −20.07
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Typical 17.24 5.75 −15.18 −2.68 −11.09
Overrated 14.15 7.07 −50.57 −2.05 −3.74
High innate managerial ability, overrated 14.24 15.27 0.37 5.41 13.83
Low innate managerial ability, overrated 14.13 5.20 −62.79 −3.74 −7.75
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.986] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Underrated vs. overrated: [p-values] [0.000] [0.094] [0.000] [0.069] [0.000]
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated 16.45 8.92 −3.63 0.88 12.21
High innate managerial ability, underrated 15.87 10.27 −3.24 2.01 12.54
Low innate managerial ability, underrated 26.13 −12.21 −9.82 −16.78 7.05
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Typical 16.31 10.39 −1.25 1.23 −1.39
Overrated 16.33 −0.79 −71.39 −8.80 −20.28
High innate managerial ability, overrated 14.16 17.18 0.40 5.52 10.13
Low innate managerial ability, overrated 16.34 −0.87 −71.72 −8.87 −20.41
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Underrated vs. overrated: [p-values] [0.915] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated 16.15 10.48 −3.29 1.91 8.69
High innate managerial ability, underrated 15.64 11.48 −3.09 2.87 8.39
Low innate managerial ability, underrated 20.69 1.87 −5.03 −6.47 11.35
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.053] [0.000] [0.000]
Typical 16.72 8.83 −2.90 −0.07 2.25
Overrated 16.07 −0.55 −71.25 −8.36 −22.55
High innate managerial ability, overrated 14.42 12.03 0.01 2.79 5.01
Low innate managerial ability, overrated 16.34 −2.62 −82.98 −10.19 −27.08
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Underrated vs. overrated: [p-values] [0.981] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
High innate firm efficiency 14.40 13.38 −0.52 3.56 5.09
Low innate firm efficiency 18.42 −0.31 −45.56 −7.41 −11.10
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
High innate managerial ability 15.44 11.92 −1.69 3.08 10.16
Low innate managerial ability 17.30 1.23 −44.23 −6.89 −16.27
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
194
Panel B: Regressions - Univariate, Bivariate And Multivariate
Univariate Regressions
Financial Performance Operating Performance
Managerial Type returns ebitda ta ni sales roa roe
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated 0.015*** 0.011** 2.592*** 0.020*** 0.338
Overrated −0.032*** 0.006* −3.997*** −0.002 −0.878
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated 0.001 0.033*** 2.722*** 0.040*** 0.377
Overrated −0.001 −0.106*** −6.913*** −0.118*** 0.346
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −0.003 0.056*** 2.813*** 0.057*** 0.484
Overrated −0.004 −0.101*** −6.818*** −0.110*** 0.143
Bivariate Regressions
Financial Performance Operating Performance
Managerial Type returns ebitda ta ni sales roa roe
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated 0.002 0.017*** 1.067*** 0.023*** −0.050
Overrated −0.031*** 0.013*** −3.539*** 0.008 −0.899
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated 0.001 −0.015*** −0.238 −0.011*** 0.638
Overrated 0.000 −0.112*** −7.014*** −0.123*** 0.619
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −0.006 0.017*** −0.039 0.014*** 0.664
Overrated −0.007 −0.094*** −6.835*** −0.104*** 0.433
195
Multivariate Regressions
Financial Performance Operating Performance
Managerial Type returns ebitda ta ni sales roa roe
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated −0.006 0.069*** 2.864*** 0.078*** 0.108
Overrated −0.012** −0.079*** −6.727*** −0.086*** −1.064
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −0.013** 0.053*** 1.448*** 0.059*** 0.744
Overrated 0.000 −0.104*** −6.800*** −0.114*** 0.671
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −0.004 0.040*** 0.627** 0.041*** 0.851
Overrated −0.006 −0.098*** −6.927*** −0.109*** 0.424
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No No No No
Market Controls No No No No No
Financial Performance Operating Performance
Managerial Type returns ebitda ta ni sales roa roe
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated 0.001 0.062*** 2.753*** 0.071*** 0.114
Overrated −0.014** −0.072*** −5.893*** −0.079*** −1.105
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −0.007 0.052*** 1.645*** 0.057*** 0.630
Overrated −0.001 −0.101*** −5.954*** −0.112*** 0.777
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −0.003 0.037*** 0.428* 0.038*** 0.845
Overrated −0.006 −0.098*** −6.870*** −0.109*** 0.404
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Controls No No No No No
Financial Performance Operating Performance
Managerial Type returns ebitda ta ni sales roa roe
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated −0.021*** 0.074*** 3.139*** 0.083*** 0.201
Overrated 0.020*** −0.089*** −6.459*** −0.096*** −1.235
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −0.030*** 0.063*** 1.938*** 0.068*** 0.695
Overrated 0.006 −0.105*** −6.059*** −0.116*** 0.758
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −0.008 0.039*** 0.465** 0.040*** 0.865
Overrated −0.004 −0.098*** −6.889*** −0.110*** 0.398
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
196
Table 1.10: CEO Compensation Of Underrated/Typical/Overrated Managers
This table reports CEO compensation measures (ceo fixedpay, ceo options, ceo shares and ceo˙totalpay)
in thousands of US dollars in year t+1 based on underrated, typical or overrated managerial cate-
gorization in year t using excess managerial score, relative managerial ability and peer adjusted
relative managerial ability categorization approaches. Panel A reports comparative statistics which
distinguish between high versus low (below or above median) innate managerial ability and high
versus low innate firm efficiency. p-values report differences in firm performance between high versus
low innate managerial ability for underrated managers, high versus low innate managerial ability
for overrated managers, high versus low innate firm efficiency overall and high versus low innate
managerial ability overall. Panel B reports univariate regression results of CEO compensation
measures on underrated and overrated indicators, bivariate regression results using both underrated
and overrated indicators and multivariate regression results which include the addition of firm
controls (firm age and book-to-market), industry controls (12 Fama-French industry) and market
controls (30 day US Treasury Bill Yield, S&P 500 return and NBER recession year indicator).
Panel C reports multivariate regression results including firm size as an additional control variable.
For regressions, standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity are used and *** indicates significance
at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level respectively. All firm and managerial
performance measures are defined in Appendix 3 and categorization of managers are described in
Appendix 4.
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Panel A: Comparative Statistics: CEO Compensation
Managerial Type ceo fixedpay ceo options ceo shares ceo totalpay
Full Sample 1,133.48 2,137.83 2,809.92 6,062.74
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated 747.50 1,493.67 1,522.60 3,957.87
High innate managerial ability, underrated 750.74 1,492.75 1,529.64 3,963.14
Low innate managerial ability, underrated 377.17 1,765.12 711.47 2,472.91
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.017] [0.000] [0.000]
Typical 933.79 1,531.00 1,701.31 4,251.38
Overrated 1,461.91 2,846.94 4,297.40 8,222.98
High innate managerial ability, overrated 1,806.07 3,183.69 7,290.86 12,213.82
Low innate managerial ability, overrated 1,330.20 2,713.65 3,150.21 6,647.71
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Underrated vs. overrated: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated 817.49 1,803.12 1,603.55 4,436.21
High innate managerial ability, underrated 818.31 1,803.68 1,604.37 4,437.88
Low innate managerial ability, underrated 342.48 981.59 1,089.07 2,138.13
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Typical 1,192.67 1,993.67 3,784.22 7,036.17
Overrated 1,250.74 2,610.00 1,869.19 5,298.56
High innate managerial ability, overrated 342.48 1,428.84 282.05 3,561.52
Low innate managerial ability, overrated 1,249.99 2,612.04 1,871.26 5,301.70
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Underrated vs. overrated: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.084] [0.000]
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated 1,001.74 2,139.06 2,142.61 5,347.56
High innate managerial ability, underrated 1,013.13 2,136.33 2,199.39 5,440.25
Low innate managerial ability, underrated 767.88 2,189.38 978.03 3,681.54
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.970] [0.000] [0.000]
Typical 1,143.38 2,130.04 4,161.20 7,409.49
Overrated 1,250.84 2,147.67 1,504.78 4,845.73
High innate managerial ability, overrated 1,180.95 1,634.75 1,282.31 4,357.91
Low innate managerial ability, overrated 1,272.32 2,305.95 1,573.49 4,996.78
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.567] [0.000] [0.030] [0.000]
Underrated vs. overrated: [p-values] [0.297] [0.971] [0.000] [0.022]
High innate firm efficiency 1,251.40 2,291.92 3,136.99 6,555.75
Low innate firm efficiency 523.13 1,087.10 1,096.28 2,677.69
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
High innate managerial ability 1,129.96 1,965.39 2,916.48 6,234.38
Low innate managerial ability 1,138.32 2,370.20 2,664.48 5,832.85
High vs. low: [p-values] [0.933] [0.000] [0.105] [0.059]
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Panel B: Regressions - Univariate, Bivariate And Multivariate
Univariate Regressions
Managerial Type ceo fixedpay ceo options ceo shares ceo totalpay
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated −462.40*** −755.81*** −1,540.46*** −2,470.16***
Overrated 582.75*** 1,326.25*** 2,648.38*** 4,053.03***
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −395.51*** −408.27* −1,508.93*** −1,984.26***
Overrated 162.78*** 664.66*** −1,307.37*** −1,077.01***
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −185.33*** 1.71 −937.48*** −999.46**
Overrated 165.04*** 14.00 −1,837.43*** −1,730.04***
Bivariate Regressions
Managerial Type ceo fixedpay ceo options ceo shares ceo totalpay
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated −186.29*** −37.33 −178.70 −293.52
Overrated 528.12*** 1,315.93*** 2,596.10*** 3,971.59***
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −375.18*** −190.55 −2180.67*** −2,599.96***
Overrated 58.07** 616.33*** −1,915.03*** −1,737.61***
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −141.67*** 9.02 −2,018.59*** −2,061.93***
Overrated 107.47*** 17.64 −2,656.41*** −2,563.75***
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Multivariate Regressions
Managerial Type ceo fixedpay ceo options ceo shares ceo totalpay
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated −103.86*** −299.70 −481.59*** −897.00***
Overrated 316.66*** 1,153.30*** 2,460.95*** 3,430.45***
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −203.26*** −303.82 −2,280.35*** −2,739.58***
Overrated −39.81 339.37* −2,269.49*** −2,526.74***
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −11.70 −42.52 −2,073.08*** −2,065.01***
Overrated −30.70 −183.26 −3,005.84*** −3,143.83***
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls No No No No
Market Controls No No No No
Managerial Type ceo fixedpay ceo options ceo shares ceo totalpay
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated −102.87*** 77.19 159.15 −33.30
Overrated 282.88*** 998.72*** 2,500.90*** 3,356.14***
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −176.43*** 114.23 −1,444.13*** −1,553.79***
Overrated −82.83*** −182.61 −3,233.16*** −3,950.38***
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −11.50 43.96 −1,955.27*** −1,872.07***
Overrated −16.24 −204.25 −3,058.55*** −3,190.11***
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Controls No No No No
Managerial Type ceo fixedpay ceo options ceo shares ceo totalpay
Excess Managerial Score
Underrated −108.36*** 99.06 144.38 −73.53
Overrated 291.99*** 963.44*** 2,516.49*** 3,381.17***
Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −187.20*** 176.99 −1,420.82*** −1,529.67***
Overrated −86.23*** −187.98 −3,233.52*** −3,915.93***
Peer Adjusted Relative Managerial Ability
Underrated −12.67 55.38 −1,951.68*** −1,866.42***
Overrated −16.09 −210.60 −3,060.06*** −3,172.28***
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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The table reports correlations (Panel A), and summary statistics (Panel B), for all variables used in this 
paper over the period 1980 through 2017 (except for enforceability_index which covers the period 1992 











       
 Return Carvw Carind Ebitda_ta Ni_sales Roa Roe 
Return 1.0000       
Carvw 0.7901 1.0000      
Carind 0.8932 0.7624 1.0000     
Ebitda_ta 0.0207 0.0153 0.0214 1.0000    
Ni_sales 0.0042 0.0048 0.0022 0.0167 1.0000   
Roa 0.0133 0.0084 0.0151 0.6797 0.0138 1.0000  
Roe -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0014 0.1304 0.0022 0.1449 1.0000 
 Employees Staffexpense Averagewage     
Employees 1.0000       
Staffexpense 0.6839 1.0000      





Enforce_index 1.0000  
Ncc_dummy 0.7692 1.0000 




Firmage 1.0000       
Size 0.2730 1.0000      
Bm -0.0022 0.0009 1.0000     
Blev -0.0029 0.0063 -0.0000 1.0000    





Panel B:  
Summary Statistics 
  
     
Variable Type Variable Obs Mean Sd P25 Median P75 
Dependent Variables: Main Return 108477 0.147 0.608 -0.132 0.134 0.397 
 Carvw 108477 0.043 0.572 -0.222 0.017 0.268 
 Carind 108477 0.000 0.543 -0.252 -0.015 0.219 
 Ebitda_ta 108477 0.053 1.503 0.017 0.082 0.148 
 Ni_sales 108477 -3.392 152.089 -0.019 0.043 0.110 
 Roa 108477 -0.003 1.698 -0.014 0.022 0.068 
 Roe 108477 0.051 12.080 -0.032 0.083 0.156 
Dependent Variables: Additional Employees 106231 0.009 0.041 0.000 0.001 0.005 
 Staffexpense 27232 1510.191 5742.615 15.943 64.804 479.220 
 Averagewage 22421 153446.000 416541.700 66576.120 104215.100 164289.600 
Independent Variables: Main Enforce_index 108477 3.981 2.249 3.000 4.000 5.000 
 Ncc_dummy 107450 0.836 0.370 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Control Variables Firmage 108477 2.188 1.090 1.386 2.303 2.996 
 Size 108477 6.054 2.301 4.413 5.996 7.559 
 Bm 108477 0.638 11.395 0.291 0.532 0.863 
 Blev 108477 5.904 567.804 0.491 1.520 3.926 






The table reports the univariate regression results of financial performance (Panel A), operating 
performance (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C), on non-compete clause (NCC) enforcement. 
Variables are defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in 
brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A: Dependent variable = Financial Performance Variables 
Variable Type Variables Return Carvw Carind 
Independent Variables: Main 
Enforce_index -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.001 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
# of Observations  108,477 108,477 108,477 
R2  0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 
Independent Variables: Main Ncc_dummy -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.008* 
  [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] 
# of Observations  107,450 107,450 107,450 
R2  0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable = Operating Performance Variables  
Variable Type Variables Ebitda_ta Ni_sales Roa Roe 
Independent Variables: Main 
Enforce_index 0.012*** -0.010 0.012*** 0.003 
 [0.002] [0.154] [0.002] [0.018] 
# of Observations  108,477 108,477 108,477 108,477 
R2  0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 
Independent Variables: Main Ncc_dummy 0.079*** 0.843 0.079*** 0.299*** 
  [0.007] [0.760] [0.007] [0.058] 
# of Observations  107,450 107,450 107,450 107,450 
R2  0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 0.0001 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable = Employee Variables 
Variable Type Variables Employees Staffexpense Averagewage 
Independent Variables: Main 
Enforce_index 0.001*** -12.785 -9107.458*** 
 [0.000] [13.746] [2224.385] 
# of Observations  108,477 22,274 17,805 
R2  0.0014 0.0000 0.0018 
Independent Variables: Main Ncc_dummy 0.004*** 236.262** -39169.870*** 
  [0.000] [105.538] [14325.330] 
# of Observations  106,231 27,232 22,421 










Baseline Multivariate Regressions 
 The table reports the baseline multivariate regression results of financial performance (Panel A), operating 
performance (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C), on non-compete clause (NCC) enforcement. 
Variables are defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in 
brackets. * **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.  








(4) LHS = 
Return 
(5) LHS = 
Carvw 
(6) LHS = 
Carind 
Enforce_index -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]    
Ncc_dummy    -0.008 -0.009* -0.010** 
    [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] 
firmage 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 
 [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] 
size -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
bm -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
blev -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
zeropayout 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.010** 0.006* 0.009** 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] 
Constant 0.162*** 0.052* -0.030 0.300*** 0.007 -0.036 
 [0.033] [0.030] [0.032] [0.027] [0.025] [0.026] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 108,477 108,477 108,477 107,450 107,450 107,450 

















Panel B: Dependent Variable = Operating Performance Variables 
Variables 
(1) LHS = 
Ebitda_ta 
(2) LHS = 
Ni_sales 
(3) LHS = 
Roa 
(4) LHS = 
Roe 
(5) LHS = 
Ebitda_ta 
(6) LHS = 
Ni_sales 
(7) LHS = 
Roa 




0.007*** -0.245 0.007*** -0.011     
 [0.001] [0.178] [0.002] [0.019]     
Ncc_dummy     0.038*** -1.052 0.040*** 0.205*** 
     [0.006] [0.946] [0.006] [0.064] 
firmage 0.043*** 0.603 0.056*** 0.338*** 0.035*** 0.497 0.047*** 0.278*** 
 [0.008] [0.591] [0.010] [0.059] [0.007] [0.447] [0.008] [0.051] 
size 0.007 1.281*** -0.018 -0.188*** 0.013 0.991*** -0.009 -0.142*** 
 [0.012] [0.230] [0.013] [0.049] [0.009] [0.178] [0.009] [0.037] 
bm 0.000 0.051* 0.008 -0.011** 0.000 -0.134 0.006 -0.013** 
 [0.000] [0.030] [0.007] [0.005] [0.000] [0.181] [0.006] [0.005] 
blev 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
zeropayout -0.053*** -0.178 -0.066*** -0.211** -0.050*** -0.226 -0.060*** -0.140* 
 [0.009] [1.162] [0.011] [0.085] [0.007] [0.847] [0.009] [0.082] 
Constant -0.040 -4.442*** -0.039 0.139 -0.021 -3.249*** -0.041 -0.104 
 [0.044] [1.668] [0.051] [0.185] [0.021] [1.200] [0.026] [0.109] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 108,477 108,477 108,477 108,477 107,450 107,450 107,450 107,450 








Panel C: Dependent Variable = Employee Variables 
Variables 
(1) LHS = 
Employees 
(2) LHS = 
Staffexpense 
(3) LHS = 
Averagewage 
(4) LHS = 
Employees 
(5) LHS = 
Staffexpense 
(6) LHS = 
Averagewage 
Enforce_index 0.001*** -28.882** -5616.880**    
 [0.000] [11.599] [2172.184]    
Ncc_dummy    0.002*** 272.641*** -39002.830*** 
    [0.000] [98.722] [13944.020] 
firmage 0.003*** 30.494 -15040.920** 0.002*** -20.317 -11219.080** 
 [0.000] [24.572] [6372.563] [0.000] [20.340] [5389.464] 
size 0.006*** 974.889*** 8521.664*** 0.006*** 791.025*** 7886.197*** 
 [0.000] [41.372] [3225.747] [0.000] [30.851] [2557.287] 
bm -0.000** 8.662 2290.890 -0.000** -17.925 1346.352 
 [0.000] [26.683] [3873.791] [0.000] [11.236] [1893.685] 
blev -0.000* -0.002 -0.385 -0.000** 0.003 -1.961 
 [0.000] [0.016] [0.910] [0.000] [0.016] [1.751] 
zeropayout -0.000* 171.936*** 24118.180 0.001*** 356.721*** 18717.210 
 [0.000] [50.582] [16290.910] [0.000] [45.064] [12437.250] 
Constant -0.031*** -7087.605*** 85769.150*** -0.025*** -4850.237*** 37764.02*** 
 [0.001] [318.557] [15160.920] [0.001] [521.538] [10045.730] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 106,231 22,242 17,790 103,746 22,085 17,658 




Subsample Univariate Analysis by Low, Normal, and High Portfolios 
The table reports the univariate regression results of financial performance (Panel A), operating performance (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C), on 
non-compete clause (NCC) enforcement. Specifically, the subsample consists of low, normal, and high portfolios formed for each dependent variable based on 
30%/40%/30% respectively. Variables are defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote 







Panel A: Dependent Variable = Financial Performance Variables 
  Return Carvw Carind 
Variable Type Variables Low Normal High Low Normal High Low Normal High 
Independent Variables: Main 
Enforce_index 0.010*** -0.001* -0.016*** 0.008*** -0.000 -0.015*** 0.008*** -0.000 -0.013*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
# of Observations  31,522 43,762 32,206 31,453 43,596 32,134 31,431 43,904 32,155 
R2  0.0030 0.0001 0.0029 0.0025 0.0000 0.0038 0.0029 0.0000 0.0033 
Independent Variables: Main Ncc_dummy 0.070*** -0.004 -0.105*** 0.048*** -0.005** -0.090*** 0.050*** -0.003** -0.078*** 
  [0.007] [0.003] [0.009] [0.006] [0.002] [0.009] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] 
# of Observations  31,202 43,411 31,859 31,141 43,232 31,796 31,122 43,530 31,820 







Panel B: Dependent Variable = Operating Performance Variables 
  Ebitda_ta Ni_sales 
Variable Type Variables Low Normal High Low Normal High 
Independent Variables: Main 
Enforce_index 0.015*** 0.000*** 0.009* -0.511 0.000** -0.026 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.005] [0.492] [0.000] [0.049] 
# of Observations  32,566 43,007 32,528 31,927 44,101 32,237 
R2  0.0009 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Independent Variables: Main Ncc_dummy 0.085*** 0.002*** 0.060*** -0.794 -0.000 -0.210 
  [0.011] [0.000] [0.018] [2.160] [0.000] [0.415] 
# of Observations  32,283 42,611 32,182 31,605 43,700 31,936 
R2  0.0008 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  Roa Roe 
Variable Type Variables Low Normal High Low Normal High 
Independent Variables: Main 
Enforce_index 0.009*** -0.000 0.016** -0.002 0.001*** -0.058 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.006] [0.021] [0.000] [0.059] 
# of Observations  29,278 40,605 29,826 29,323 40,727 29,635 
R2  0.0006 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 
Independent Variables: Main Ncc_dummy 0.065*** -0.001** 0.087*** 0.026 0.005*** 0.529*** 
  [0.008] [0.000] [0.022] [0.110] [0.001] [0.147] 
# of Observations  28,977 40,275 29,508 29,026 40,368 29,342 

















Panel C: Dependent Variable = Employee Variables 
  Employees Staffexpense Averagewage 
Variable Type Variables Low Normal High Low Normal High Low Normal High 
Independent Variables: Main 
Enforce_index 0.000 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.082 2.858*** -165.658*** 809.929*** 1107.599*** -7841.405 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.073] [0.616] [56.161] [256.668] [275.500] [6815.022] 
# of Observations  32,379 42,068 28,504 7,501 9,656 5,117 4,574 7,815 5,416 
R2  0.0001 0.0059 0.0005 0.0002 0.0022 0.0016 0.0021 0.0020 0.0005 
Independent Variables: Main Ncc_dummy -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** -1.801*** 8.425** 730.434 15802.510*** 4309.656** -30348.090 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.525] [3.850] [485.081] [2021.524] [1871.870] [33559.930] 
# of Observations  32,009 41,589 28,346 7,455 9,602 5,060 4,530 7,749 5,394 




Subsample Multivariate Regressions by Low, Normal, and High Portfolios 
The table reports the multivariate regression results of financial performance (Panel A), operating performance (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C), on 
non-compete clause (NCC) enforcement. Specifically, the subsample consists of low, normal, and high portfolios formed for each dependent variable based on 
30%/40%/30% respectively. Variables are defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A1: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance Variables 
 LS = Return LS = Carvw LS = Carind 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Enforce_index 0.002** -0.001** -0.004*** 0.003*** -0.000 -0.004*** 0.002** -0.000** -0.004*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.000 -0.006*** -0.066*** 0.003 -0.006*** -0.072*** 0.003 -0.004*** -0.070*** 
 [0.004] [0.001] [0.008] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] [0.004] [0.001] [0.008] 
Firmage 0.041*** -0.000 -0.015*** 0.041*** -0.000 -0.019*** 0.035*** -0.001 -0.015*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] 
Size 0.029*** 0.001*** -0.055*** 0.026*** 0.001** -0.053*** 0.030*** 0.001*** -0.055*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] 
Bm 0.001 -0.000 -0.011** 0.001 -0.006*** -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.010** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.005] 
Blev -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Zeropayout -0.044*** 0.001 0.069*** -0.040*** 0.000 0.066*** -0.041*** 0.001 0.067*** 
 [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.004] [0.001] [0.006] 
Constant -0.488*** 0.153*** 1.088*** -0.548*** 0.052*** 0.913*** -0.690*** -0.044*** 0.829*** 
 [0.032] [0.011] [0.059] [0.027] [0.011] [0.051] [0.034] [0.011] [0.047] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 31,460 43,724 32,181 31,410 43,557 32,108 31,384 43,855 32,126 











Panel A2: Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance Variables 
 LS = Return LS = Carvw LS = Carind 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Ncc_dummy 0.018*** -0.003** -0.032*** 0.019*** -0.002 -0.031*** 0.014*** -0.003** -0.029*** 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] 
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.000 -0.006*** -0.066*** 0.004 -0.006*** -0.073*** 0.003 -0.004*** -0.071*** 
 [0.004] [0.001] [0.008] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] [0.004] [0.001] [0.008] 
Firmage 0.040*** 0.000 -0.014*** 0.039*** 0.001 -0.016*** 0.034*** -0.000 -0.013*** 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] 
Size 0.028*** 0.001*** -0.056*** 0.024*** 0.001*** -0.054*** 0.029*** 0.001*** -0.055*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] 
Bm 0.002* -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.003** -0.000 0.002** -0.001 -0.004 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
Blev -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Zeropayout -0.046*** 0.001 0.065*** -0.045*** -0.001 0.062*** -0.042*** 0.001 0.062*** 
 [0.004] [0.001] [0.006] [0.004] [0.001] [0.006] [0.004] [0.001] [0.005] 
Constant -0.315*** 0.276*** 1.146*** -0.558*** -0.006 0.769*** -0.626*** -0.070*** 0.735*** 
 [0.025] [0.009] [0.045] [0.023] [0.009] [0.037] [0.025] [0.010] [0.035] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 31,141 43,373 31,834 31,098 43,193 31,770 31,075 43,482 31,791 




Panel B1:  Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Operating Performance Variables 
 LS = Ebitda_ta LS = Ni_sales LS = Roa LS = Roe 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High (10) Low (11) Normal (12) High 
Enforce_index 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.009* -0.923 -0.000 -0.030 0.003*** 0.000* 0.013* -0.005 0.000** -0.064 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.005] [0.577] [0.000] [0.041] [0.001] [0.000] [0.008] [0.023] [0.000] [0.060] 
Firmage 0.008 0.000 0.076*** 1.063 0.000 -0.166 0.026*** 0.000*** 0.091*** 0.062 0.002*** 0.764*** 
 [0.008] [0.000] [0.018] [1.751] [0.000] [0.184] [0.005] [0.000] [0.025] [0.060] [0.000] [0.179] 
Size 0.120*** 0.001*** -0.112*** 3.273*** 0.002*** -0.250* 0.077*** -0.000 -0.155*** 0.144*** 0.003*** -0.817*** 
 [0.020] [0.000] [0.028] [0.647] [0.000] [0.129] [0.008] [0.000] [0.037] [0.045] [0.000] [0.141] 
Bm 0.004 -0.000 -0.0247* 0.044 -0.001 -1.212 0.012* -0.000* -0.121 0.079** -0.000* -0.017 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.013] [0.031] [0.001] [1.158] [0.007] [0.000] [0.097] [0.032] [0.000] [0.012] 
Blev 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** 0.019* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.011] 
Zeropayout 0.028*** -0.002*** -0.088*** 2.276 -0.004*** -0.622 0.026*** -0.002*** -0.094*** 0.060 -0.004*** -0.129 
 [0.011] [0.000] [0.019] [2.971] [0.000] [0.423] [0.006] [0.000] [0.033] [0.120] [0.000] [0.305] 
Constant -0.641*** 0.079*** 0.716*** -7.706 0.031*** 2.735 -0.604*** 0.025*** 0.773*** -1.139*** 0.056*** 2.954*** 
 [0.074] [0.003] [0.122] [3.914] [0.003] [1.817] [0.045] [0.002] [0.192] [0.350] [0.004] [0.529] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 32,446 42,940 32,472 31,810 44,024 32,191 29,178 40,561 29,771 29,236 40,685 29,573 




















Panel B2:  Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Operating Performance Variables 
 LS = Ebitda_ta LS = Ni_sales LS = Roa LS = Roe 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High (10) Low (11) Normal (12) High 
Ncc_dummy 0.027*** 0.001** 0.023** -3.746 -0.001** -0.315 0.021*** 0.000 0.052** 0.003 0.001* 0.446*** 
 [0.010] [0.000] [0.010] [2.756] [0.000] [0.443] [0.006] [0.000] [0.024] [0.118] [0.001] [0.138] 
Firmage 0.002 0.000 0.064*** 0.703 -0.000** 0.074 0.018*** 0.000*** 0.084*** 0.045 0.001*** 0.668*** 
 [0.008] [0.000] [0.016] [1.288] [0.000] [0.205] [0.005] [0.000] [0.021] [0.048] [0.000] [0.156] 
Size 0.094*** 0.001*** -0.090*** 2.558*** 0.001*** -0.619 0.065*** -0.000* -0.124*** 0.144*** 0.003*** -0.735*** 
 [0.013] [0.000] [0.022] [0.485] [0.000] [0.405] [0.006] [0.000] [0.029] [0.033] [0.000] [0.113] 
Bm 0.003** -0.000 -0.020** 0.037 -0.001 -20.847 0.009 -0.001* -0.117 0.112*** -0.000* -0.019* 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.009] [0.021] [0.001] [19.854] [0.005] [0.000] [0.088] [0.039] [0.000] [0.010] 
Blev 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** 0.016* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.009] 
Zeropayout 0.031*** -0.002*** -0.073*** 1.917 -0.004*** -0.426 0.025*** -0.002*** -0.078*** 0.024 -0.005*** 0.204 
 [0.007] [0.000] [0.015] [2.183] [0.000] [0.387] [0.005] [0.000] [0.024] [0.104] [0.000] [0.309] 
Constant -0.404*** 0.118*** 0.539*** -6.984** 0.048*** 16.659 -0.419*** 0.054*** 0.526*** -0.646*** 0.119*** 1.317*** 
 [0.037] [0.003] [0.065] [2.698] [0.002] [14.793] [0.027] [0.002] [0.117] [0.216] [0.003] [0.293] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 32,163 42,544 32,127 31,488 43,623 31,891 28,877 40,231 29,453 28,939 40,326 29,280 











Panel C1: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Employee Variables 
 LS = Employees LS = Staffexpense LS = Averagewage 
Variables (1) Low 
(2) 
Normal 
(3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Enforce_index -0.000 0.000*** 0.001*** -0.186*** 0.305 -60.971 -139.673 -473.596*** -2182.991 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.048] [0.432] [45.277] [146.216] [91.884] [6489.996] 
Firmage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 1.177*** 7.517*** -190.578* 1542.377*** -604.498** -26019.800* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.114] [1.062] [105.461] [347.329] [240.532] [14934.780] 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.020*** 2.352*** 53.040*** 3144.529*** 513.145** 1705.413*** 2191.570 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.125] [1.208] [136.878] [216.426] [126.618] [6767.081] 
Bm -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.082 -5.680*** 84.418 916.202*** -259.288 2912.755 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.069] [1.360] [64.325] [292.109] [232.201] [3444.171] 
Blev -0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.001 -0.709 1.012 0.838*** 22.220 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.013] [4.104] [1.205] [0.038] [22.503] 
Zeropayout 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.095 12.910*** 217.392 438.467 2216.569*** 26353.720 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.196] [2.523] [259.677] [712.353] [501.612] [37008.570] 
Constant -0.000 -0.001*** -0.138*** 3.042** -424.069*** -24547.780*** 26946.100*** 37262.920*** -36241.010 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [1.390] [15.367] [1110.837] [4209.344] [1572.860] [26555.800] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 32,249 42,014 28,489 7,478 9,650 5,114 4,566 7,812 5,412 













Panel C2: Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Employee Variables 
 LS = Employees LS = Staffexpense LS = Averagewage 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Ncc_dummy -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** -0.629** 3.022 168.452 -2792.663** -2870.529*** -25469.720 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.244] [2.824] [416.999] [1216.798] [614.568] [37558.240] 
Firmage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 1.089*** 6.814*** -77.164 1502.229*** -518.830** -14512.200 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.092] [0.940] [84.841] [307.997] [202.386] [15016.330] 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.019*** 1.893*** 51.010*** 2855.183*** -367.538** 1318.807*** 3296.961 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.083] [1.001] [116.926] [166.820] [96.167] [4848.492] 
Bm -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** -0.037 -1.331** 22.675 220.873 -79.738 6556.939 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.029] [0.668] [55.296] [145.569] [81.184] [5546.736] 
Blev -0.000** -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** 0.002 -1.001 -1.228 0.826*** -5.657 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.013] [3.628] [1.269] [0.036] [13.340] 
Zeropayout 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 0.069 10.628*** 31.361 187.374 1662.694*** 26368.840 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.168] [2.190] [226.768] [587.773] [424.944] [28992.680] 
Constant 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.117*** 3.710** -178.044*** -21114.180*** 6590.962*** 6498.472*** -82613.550*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [1.454] [7.471] [881.908] [2462.409] [1004.045] [25897.450] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 31,879 41,536 28,331 7,432 9,596 5,057 4,522 7,746 5,390 




Subsample Multivariate Regressions – Firm Fixed Effects 
 
The table reports the multivariate regression results of financial performance (Panel A), operating performance (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C), on 
non-compete clause (NCC) enforcement. Specifically, the subsample consists of low, normal, and high portfolios formed for each dependent variable based on 
30%/40%/30% respectively. Instead of year and industry fixed effects (as in the previous Table 5), this table examines year and firm fixed effects. Variables are 
defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level. 
Panel A: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance Variables 
 LS = Return LS = Carvw LS = Carind 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Enforce_index 0.020** 0.003 -0.018 0.012 0.002 -0.024** 0.015* 0.000 -0.015 
 [0.008] [0.003] [0.013] [0.008] [0.003] [0.012] [0.008] [0.002] [0.012] 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.004 -0.013*** -0.088*** 0.002 -0.015*** -0.094*** -0.003 -0.009*** -0.094*** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.007] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] [0.004] [0.002] [0.008] 
Firmage 0.019*** 0.001 -0.017** 0.019*** 0.001 -0.027*** 0.015** -0.001 -0.017** 
 [0.006] [0.002] [0.009] [0.006] [0.002] [0.009] [0.006] [0.002] [0.008] 
Size 0.016*** -0.009*** -0.097*** 0.007 -0.009*** -0.103*** 0.021*** -0.005*** -0.091*** 
 [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] [0.005] [0.001] [0.007] [0.004] [0.001] [0.007] 
Bm 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.007*** 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] 
Blev -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Zeropayout -0.018*** 0.006*** 0.031*** -0.016*** 0.005*** 0.030*** -0.021*** 0.003 0.028*** 
 [0.006] [0.002] [0.009] [0.006] [0.002] [0.009] [0.006] [0.002] [0.009] 
Constant -0.453*** 0.213*** 1.384*** -0.514*** 0.113*** 1.326*** -0.672*** -0.016 1.080*** 
 [0.040] [0.013] [0.063] [0.041] [0.013] [0.059] [0.039] [0.013] [0.063] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 31,460 43,724 32,181 31,410 43,557 32,108 31,384 43,855 32,126 












Panel B:  Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Operating Performance Variables 
 LS = Ebitda_ta LS = Ni_sales LS = Roa LS = Roe 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High (10) Low (11) Normal (12) High 
Enforce_index -0.013 -0.001 0.045* 6.986 -0.001* -0.251 0.017* -0.001* 0.230 0.108 -0.001 -0.468* 
 [0.023] [0.001] [0.027] [7.121] [0.001] [0.198] [0.009] [0.000] [0.156] [0.090] [0.001] [0.279] 
Firmage -0.020 0.002*** 0.130 -2.269 -0.003*** 0.533 0.021* 0.000 0.373 -0.463** 0.001 0.184 
 [0.022] [0.001] [0.129] [2.854] [0.000] [0.544] [0.012] [0.000] [0.319] [0.222] [0.001] [0.351] 
Size 0.464*** -0.001*** -0.666 3.138 0.002*** 0.140 0.194*** -0.001*** -0.797 0.604*** 0.000 -0.723 
 [0.168] [0.000] [0.585] [2.452] [0.000] [0.565] [0.051] [0.000] [0.692] [0.135] [0.001] [0.714] 
Bm -0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.031 -0.001 -1.219 0.010 -0.001 0.030*** 0.041* -0.000 0.010 
 [0.003] [0.000] [0.007] [0.020] [0.000] [1.076] [0.007] [0.001] [0.009] [0.023] [0.000] [0.013] 
Blev -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.004 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.006 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] 
Zeropayout 0.004 -0.002*** -0.047 4.250 -0.001*** -0.339 0.012 -0.001*** -0.026 0.115 -0.001* 0.341 
 [0.017] [0.000] [0.083] [4.900] [0.000] [0.236] [0.008] [0.000] [0.036] [0.210] [0.001] [0.243] 
Constant -2.020*** 0.097*** 3.488 -45.645* 0.037*** 1.077 -1.109*** 0.034*** 4.123 -2.756*** 0.085*** 4.081 
 [0.618] [0.004] [2.641] [26.273] [0.003] [3.046] [0.197] [0.002] [3.266] [0.696] [0.005] [4.080] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 32,446 42,940 32,472 31,810 44,024 32,191 29,178 40,561 29,771 29,236 40,685 29,573 












Panel C: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Employee Variables 
 LS = Employees LS = Staffexpense LS = Averagewage 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Enforce_index 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.706** 2.037 -182.572 -653.366 -1144.871 -6295.565 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.330] [6.001] [242.118] [1328.902] [839.884] [8496.995] 
Firmage 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.002 2.127*** -12.894*** -1789.055* 2521.815 -1676.378** 21358.170 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.455] [4.592] [1028.099] [1676.521] [841.575] [19450.740] 
Size 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.019*** 4.025*** 77.562*** 2386.817*** -1080.370 2220.786** 9966.086 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.522] [5.675] [789.319] [1497.855] [1011.604] [19615.320] 
Bm 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** 0.111 0.404 40.690 -485.031 43.017 1763.361 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.118] [0.769] [37.061] [348.094] [236.733] [1374.747] 
Blev -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.002 -0.058 4.102*** 0.381*** -8.482 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [2.939] [1.137] [0.034] [8.991] 
Zeropayout -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.790** -10.074** -48.342 1169.313 -639.214 13901.240 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.336] [4.130] [421.051] [871.983] [795.723] [14019.560] 
Constant -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.110*** -18.576*** -458.887*** -14527.530*** 37275.180*** 37163.430*** 50338.030 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [3.031] [45.854] [5219.076] [9928.063] [7288.699] [111068.100] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 32,249 42,014 28,489 7,478 9,650 5,114 4,566 7,812 5,412 




Subsample Multivariate Regressions – Alternative Low, Normal, And High Portfolios 
The table reports the multivariate regression results of financial performance (Panel A), operating performance (Panel B), and employee measures (Panel C), on 
non-compete clause (NCC) enforcement. Instead of the subsample consisting of low, normal, and high portfolios formed based on 30%/40%30% (as in the 
previous Table 5), this table examines low, normal, and high portfolios formed based on 20%/60%/20%. Variables are defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard 
errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A1: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance Variables 
 LS = Return LS = Carvw LS = Carind 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Enforce_index 0.002*** -0.000 -0.003** 0.003** -0.000 -0.004*** 0.002** -0.000* -0.003*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] 
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.005 -0.014*** -0.070*** 0.010* -0.010*** -0.078*** 0.002 -0.010*** -0.070*** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.009] [0.005] [0.002] [0.009] [0.004] [0.002] [0.009] 
Firmage 0.041*** -0.000 -0.016*** 0.041*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.035*** -0.001 -0.017*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] 
Size 0.029*** 0.002*** -0.062*** 0.026*** 0.003*** -0.060*** 0.031*** 0.002*** -0.062*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] 
Bm 0.005*** -0.000 -0.007* 0.007*** -0.000 -0.002 0.006*** -0.000 -0.009* 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.004] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.005] 
Blev -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Zeropayout -0.029*** 0.002 0.050*** -0.029*** -0.001 0.042*** -0.027*** 0.001 0.055*** 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] 
Constant -0.577*** 0.168*** 1.355*** -0.642*** 0.054*** 1.141*** -0.816*** -0.052*** 1.042*** 
 [0.038] [0.015] [0.074] [0.034] [0.014] [0.067] [0.042] [0.015] [0.062] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 20,708 65,292 21,365 20,707 65,049 21,319 20,684 65,395 21,286 











Panel A2: Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance Variables 
 LS = Return LS = Carvw LS = Carind 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Ncc_dummy 0.012** 0.000 -0.029*** 0.019*** -0.001 -0.031*** 0.010** 0.000 -0.025*** 
 [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] [0.005] [0.002] [0.009] [0.005] [0.002] [0.008] 
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.006 -0.013*** -0.071*** 0.011** -0.010*** -0.078*** 0.003 -0.010*** -0.071*** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.009] [0.005] [0.002] [0.009] [0.004] [0.002] [0.009] 
Firmage 0.039*** 0.001 -0.014*** 0.038*** 0.001** -0.014*** 0.034*** -0.000 -0.014*** 
 [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003] 
Size 0.027*** 0.004*** -0.063*** 0.023*** 0.003*** -0.062*** 0.028*** 0.003*** -0.063*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] 
Bm 0.004*** -0.000 -0.002 0.003** -0.000 -0.000 0.004*** -0.001 -0.003 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] 
Blev -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** 0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Zeropayout -0.030*** 0.000 0.049*** -0.032*** -0.003* 0.040*** -0.028*** 0.000 0.051*** 
 [0.004] [0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.002] [0.007] 
Constant -0.357*** 0.282*** 1.358*** -0.601*** -0.007 0.936*** -0.688*** -0.066*** 0.861*** 
 [0.029] [0.012] [0.066] [0.028] [0.012] [0.047] [0.029] [0.013] [0.044] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 20,480 64,744 21,124 20,485 64,490 21,086 20,457 64,845 21,046 












Panel B1:  Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Operating Performance Variables 
 LS = Ebitda_ta LS = Ni_sales LS = Roa LS = Roe 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High (10) Low (11) Normal (12) High 
Enforce_index 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.013** -1.662* 0.000 -0.032 0.003** 0.000*** 0.017** -0.014 0.000*** -0.137 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.006] [0.932] [0.000] [0.061] [0.001] [0.000] [0.007] [0.033] [0.000] [0.091] 
Firmage 0.031*** 0.001*** 0.106*** 1.291 0.000* -0.260 0.028*** 0.001*** 0.124*** 0.016 0.004*** 1.028*** 
 [0.007] [0.000] [0.025] [2.657] [0.000] [0.296] [0.007] [0.000] [0.030] [0.091] [0.000] [0.248] 
Size 0.178*** 0.002*** -0.154*** 5.063*** 0.004*** -0.352** 0.103*** 0.001*** -0.203*** 0.137** 0.006*** -1.078*** 
 [0.031] [0.000] [0.040] [1.013] [0.000] [0.179] [0.012] [0.000] [0.050] [0.069] [0.000] [0.188] 
Bm 0.003 -0.000 -0.022 0.058 -0.001 -1.520 0.011 -0.001** -0.119 0.096** -0.001* -0.015 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.016] [0.039] [0.000] [1.477] [0.007] [0.001] [0.100] [0.046] [0.000] [0.012] 
Blev -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.009 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.033** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.014] 
Zeropayout 0.031* -0.006*** -0.108*** 3.483 -0.011*** -0.940 0.036*** -0.007*** -0.126*** 0.149 -0.014*** -0.131 
 [0.016] [0.000] [0.025] [4.485] [0.000] [0.638] [0.009] [0.000] [0.047] [0.181] [0.001] [0.463] 
Constant -0.890*** 0.080*** 0.910*** -9.670* 0.026*** 3.751 -0.796*** 0.025*** 0.995*** -1.174** 0.028*** 3.611*** 
 [0.105] [0.004] [0.171] [5.433] [0.004] [2.494] [0.065] [0.003] [0.256] [0.510] [0.005] [0.759] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 21,246 64,957 21,655 20,889 65,860 21,276 19,296 60,457 19,757 19,419 60,593 19,482 












Panel B2:  Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Operating Performance Variables 
 LS = Ebitda_ta LS = Ni_sales LS = Roa LS = Roe 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High (10) Low (11) Normal (12) High 
Ncc_dummy 0.025** 0.002*** 0.018** -4.525 0.000 0.287 0.013** 0.000 0.037*** -0.110 0.003*** 0.611*** 
 [0.010] [0.000] [0.009] [2.860] [0.000] [0.739] [0.06] [0.000] [0.011] [0.132] [0.001] [0.177] 
Firmage 0.015 0.000*** 0.090*** 0.784 -0.001*** 0.054 0.019*** 0.001*** 0.112*** 0.011 0.003*** 0.896*** 
 [0.009] [0.000] [0.022] [1.949] [0.000] [0.302] [0.007] [0.000] [0.027] [0.072] [0.000] [0.216] 
Size 0.142*** 0.002*** -0.123*** 3.953*** 0.003*** -0.610* 0.087*** 0.001*** -0.165*** 0.140*** 0.006*** -0.978*** 
 [0.021] [0.000] [0.031] [0.760] [0.000] [0.335] [0.009] [0.000] [0.039] [0.050] [0.000] [0.153] 
Bm 0.004* -0.000* -0.017* 0.044* -0.001* -22.497 0.008 -0.002** -0.116 0.136** -0.001** -0.017* 
 [0.002] [0.000] [0.010] [0.024] [0.000] [21.565] [0.006] [0.001] [0.093] [0.055] [0.001] [0.010] 
Blev -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.012 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.026** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] 
Zeropayout 0.047*** -0.006*** -0.089*** 2.853 -0.010*** -0.481 0.037*** -0.007*** -0.105*** 0.102 -0.014*** 0.268 
 [0.009] [0.000] [0.019] [3.280] [0.000] [0.636] [0.007] [0.000] [0.035] [0.155] [0.001] [0.436] 
Constant -0.627*** 0.118*** 0.659*** -9.522** 0.048*** 15.581 -0.534*** 0.055*** 0.640*** -0.531* 0.097*** 1.328*** 
 [0.059] [0.003] [0.093] [4.032] [0.003] [13.584] [0.038] [0.002] [0.146] [0.314] [0.004] [0.442] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 21,031 64,405 21,398 20,681 65,240 21,081 19,085 59,960 19,516 19,218 60,056 19,271 











Panel C1: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Employee Variables 
 LS = Employees LS = Staffexpense LS = Averagewage 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Enforce_index -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** -0.205*** -0.768 -94.199 99.581 -1338.436*** -1385.732 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.038] [0.748] [75.512] [135.286] [124.665] [9238.355] 
Firmage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.638*** 7.963*** -228.306 1287.293*** -3086.526*** -46967.690*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.089] [1.817] [169.614] [371.284] [320.297] [13898.100] 
Size 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.027*** 0.827*** 101.270*** 4130.232*** 155.441 3733.215*** 4950.081 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.084] [1.729] [195.276] [220.582] [170.711] [5886.424] 
Bm 0.000*** -0.000* -0.000* 0.037 -5.138*** 159.769* 207.275 -732.395*** 2543.528 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.039] [1.710] [84.690] [242.516] [199.912] [4256.292] 
Blev -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.016 -4.054 1.273 0.821*** 32.024 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.020] [7.893] [1.059] [0.073] [21.016] 
Zeropayout 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.055 12.440*** 185.108 1120.271 3601.670*** 29837.930 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.151] [3.868] [463.469] [707.880] [659.808] [56323.450] 
Constant 0.000*** -0.003*** -0.199*** 14.090*** -744.261*** -32929.180*** 19160.250*** 30163.630*** -109221.600*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.010] [1.376] [17.226] [1657.651] [7173.223] [2654.423] [37913.690] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 21,537 62,998 18,217 4,920 14,236 3,086 2,685 11,519 3,586 


















Panel C2: Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Employee Variables 
 LS = Employees LS = Staffexpense LS = Averagewage 
Variables (1) Low (2) Normal (3) High (4) Low (5) Normal (6) High (7) Low (8) Normal (9) High 
Ncc_dummy -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.006*** -0.804*** -6.222 181.194 1057.925 -7540.398*** -20633.480 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.192] [5.203] [475.768] [783.005] [801.327] [43023.750] 
Firmage 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.580*** 7.268*** -39.341 1183.378*** -2568.377*** -24694.490 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.070] [1.592] [134.240] [302.546] [268.291] [15698.130] 
Size 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.025*** 0.597*** 92.003*** 3837.669*** -122.329 2935.516*** 3981.608 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.057] [1.373] [170.966] [161.988] [130.326] [4860.177] 
Bm 0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* 0.012 -1.590* 91.644 -1.369 -343.595* 7546.559 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.018] [0.944] [76.457] [72.012] [182.401] [7435.536] 
Blev -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.014 -1.542 0.262 0.784*** 1.187 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.019] [6.803] [1.059] [0.076] [12.932] 
Zeropayout 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 0.002 11.106*** 59.524 976.982* 2951.166*** 30712.190 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.126] [3.358] [402.284] [569.415] [563.378] [42097.240] 
Constant 0.000*** -0.002*** -0.162*** 8.773** -562.038*** -29686.470*** 3433.962 6638.219*** -171903.900*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [4.303] [58.914] [1323.811] [2898.980] [1874.195] [38388.700] 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# obs 21,283 62,340 18,123 4,876 14,162 3,047 2,668 11,413 3,577 





Subsample Multivariate Regressions: Low Versus High Institutional Ownership 
The table reports the multivariate regression results of financial performance on non-compete clause (NCC) 
enforceability index (Panel A), and NCC enforceability indicator (Panel B). The subsample consists of 
firms with low (bottom 30%) and high (top 30%) institutional ownership. Variables are defined in detail in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance 
Variables 
 DV: Return DV: Carvw DV: Carind 
Variables 
Institutional ownership Institutional ownership Institutional ownership 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Enforce_index -0.003 -0.003*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002 -0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.095*** -0.065*** -0.074*** -0.062*** -0.088*** -0.063*** 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] 
firmage 0.051*** -0.006** 0.042*** -0.006** 0.044*** -0.008*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
size -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
bm -0.004** -0.076*** -0.000 -0.056*** -0.003 -0.065*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
blev 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
zeropayout 0.018* 0.042*** 0.018* 0.029*** 0.017* 0.035*** 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
Constant 0.211** 0.276*** 0.007 0.204*** 0.029 0.063 
 (0.095) (0.051) (0.093) (0.050) (0.091) (0.049) 
       
Observations 22,558 29,785 22,461 29,712 22,558 29,785 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1171 0.1770 0.0539 0.0744 0.0102 0.0463 
Difference -0.000 0.002 0.001 



















Panel B: Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance 
Variables 
 DV: Return DV: Carvw DV: Carind 
Variables 
Institutional ownership Institutional ownership Institutional ownership 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ncc_dummy -0.019 -0.025*** -0.018 -0.025*** -0.014 -0.029*** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.093*** -0.065*** -0.071*** -0.063*** -0.087*** -0.063*** 
 [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] 
firmage 0.051*** -0.006** 0.043*** -0.006** 0.044*** -0.008*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
size 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
bm -0.004** -0.075*** -0.000 -0.056*** -0.003 -0.065*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
blev 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
zeropayout 0.019* 0.042*** 0.021** 0.028*** 0.018* 0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
Constant 0.204** 0.281*** 0.005 0.210*** 0.021 0.070 
 (0.095) (0.051) (0.092) (0.050) (0.091) (0.049) 
       
Observations 22,314 29,560 22,218 29,488 22,314 29,560 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1173 0.1779 0.0541 0.0745 0.0101 0.0461 
Difference 0.005 0.006 0.015 


























Subsample Multivariate Regressions: Low Versus High Fraction Of Inside Directors 
The table reports the multivariate regression results of financial performance on non-compete clause (NCC) 
enforceability index (Panel A), and NCC enforceability indicator (Panel B). The subsample consists of 
firms with low (bottom 30%) and high (top 30%) fraction of inside directors (compared to total directors). 
Variables are defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in 
brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance 
Variables 
 DV: Return DV: Carvw DV: Carind 
Variables 
Frac. Inside Directors Frac. Inside Directors Frac. Inside Directors 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Enforce_index -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.042*** -0.064*** -0.044*** -0.062*** -0.054*** -0.067*** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
firmage -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
size -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
bm -0.033*** -0.003 -0.019*** -0.001 -0.025*** -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
blev -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
zeropayout 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Constant 0.367*** 0.482*** 0.257*** 0.396*** 0.147** 0.282*** 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.070) (0.072) (0.067) (0.069) 
       
Observations 13,894 11,419 13,858 11,399 13,894 11,419 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1683 0.1307 0.0582 0.0452 0.0399 0.0302 
Difference -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 


















Panel B: Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance 
Variables 
 DV: Return DV: Carvw DV: Carind 
Variables 
Frac. Inside Directors Frac. Inside Directors Frac. Inside Directors 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ncc_dummy -0.029*** -0.014 -0.023** -0.014 -0.033*** -0.015 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.041*** -0.065*** -0.043*** -0.064*** -0.053*** -0.068*** 
 [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009] 
firmage -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
size -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
bm -0.033*** -0.003 -0.019*** -0.001 -0.024*** -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
blev -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
zeropayout 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.060*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Constant 0.367*** 0.485*** 0.255*** 0.399*** 0.148** 0.285*** 
 (0.070) (0.073) (0.070) (0.073) (0.067) (0.069) 
       
Observations 13,827 11,306 13,791 11,286 13,827 11,306 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1696 0.1318 0.0591 0.0455 0.049 0.0309 
Difference -0.016 -0.009 -0.018 


























Subsample Multivariate Regressions: Low Versus High Market Concentration 
The table reports the multivariate regression results of financial performance on non-compete clause (NCC) 
enforceability index (Panel A), and NCC enforceability indicator (Panel B). The subsample consists of 
firms with low (bottom 30%) and high (top 30%) market concentration (based on Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index). Variables are defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard errors adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in 
brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Panel A: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance 
Variables 
 DV: Return DV: Carvw DV: Carind 
Variables 
HHI HHI HHI 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Enforce_index -0.002* 0.001 -0.002* 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.072*** -0.084*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] 
firmage 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.006* 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
size 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.003* 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
bm -0.014*** -0.000 -0.011*** 0.000 -0.011*** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
blev -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
zeropayout 0.011 0.017** 0.007 0.011 0.010 0.017** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 0.170 0.110* -0.029 -0.109** 0.048 -0.059 
 (0.157) (0.048) (0.156) (0.048) (0.145) (0.047) 
       
Observations 26,326 26,056 26,268 25,962 26,326 26,056 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1332 0.1310 0.0690 0.0510 0.0047 0.0063 
Difference -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 


















Panel B: Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance 
Variables 
 DV: Return DV: Carvw DV: Carind 
Variables 
HHI HHI HHI 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ncc_dummy 0.001 0.005 -0.000 0.009 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.081*** -0.082*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.073*** -0.083*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] 
firmage 0.014*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.006** 0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
size 0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
bm -0.013*** -0.000 -0.011*** 0.000 -0.011*** -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
blev -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
zeropayout 0.014* 0.018** 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.018** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant 0.160 0.108** -0.040 -0.112** 0.045 -0.061 
 (0.157) (0.048) (0.156) (0.048) (0.145) (0.048) 
       
Observations 26,151 25,782 26,094 25,689 26,151 25,782 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1332 0.1316 0.0691 0.0514 0.0049 0.0062 
Difference -0.004 -0.009 -0.006 


























Subsample Multivariate Regressions: Low Versus High Financial Constraints 
The table reports the multivariate regression results of financial performance on non-compete clause (NCC) 
enforceability index (Panel A), and NCC enforceability indicator (Panel B). The subsample consists of 
firms with low (bottom 30%) and high (top 30%) financial constraints which are measured using the 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) HP index. Variables are defined in detail in Appendix 1. Standard errors 
adjusting for heteroskedasticity are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Main Independent Variable = Enforce_index, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance 
Variables 
 DV: Return DV: Carvw DV: Carind 
Variables 
HP index HP index HP index 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Enforce_index -0.002** -0.001 -0.003** -0.002 -0.003** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.063*** -0.105*** -0.050*** -0.097*** -0.062*** -0.100*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
firmage -0.001 0.058*** -0.001 0.048*** -0.002 0.052*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
size -0.001 0.018*** -0.002 0.008* -0.002 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
bm 0.000 -0.036*** 0.001 -0.020*** 0.000 -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) 
blev 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
zeropayout 0.034*** 0.023** 0.029*** 0.016* 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Constant 0.276*** 0.030 0.180*** -0.118 0.063 -0.126 
 (0.069) (0.098) (0.069) (0.097) (0.065) (0.096) 
       
Observations 30,493 31,873 30,452 31,738 30,493 31,873 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1733 0.1367 0.0802 0.0630 0.0253 0.0141 
Difference -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 















Panel B: Main Independent Variable = Ncc_dummy, Dependent Variable = Financial Performance 
Variables 
 DV: Return DV: Carvw DV: Carind 
Variables 
HP index HP index HP index 
Low High Low High Low High 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Ncc_dummy -0.015** -0.011 -0.017** -0.013 -0.020*** -0.012 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) 
Lagged Dep. Var. -0.063*** -0.105*** -0.051*** -0.097*** -0.063*** -0.100*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
firmage -0.001 0.058 -0.001 0.048*** -0.003 0.052*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
size -0.001 0.017*** -0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
bm 0.000 -0.035*** 0.001* -0.020*** 0.000 -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) 
blev 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
zeropayout 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.018** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Constant 0.273*** 0.030 0.179** -0.120 0.066 -0.127 
 (0.069) (0.098) (0.069) (0.097) (0.065) (0.096) 
       
Observations 30,296 31,394 30,255 31,261 30,296 31,394 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1737 0.1374 0.0804 0.0635 0.0259 0.0141 
Difference -0.004 -0.003 -0.008 
























Table 3.1: Description of Performance Measures and Performance Categorization
This table describes the construction of financial and operating performance measures (Panel A),
how the use of these measures define a firm-year as firm-specific success or distress (Panel B), and
the construction of additional diagnostics for success and distress (Panel C). All variables are defined
in Appendix 2, and performance categorization approaches of firms are elaborated in Appendix 4.
Panel A: Performance Measures
Measure Description
1. Financial Calendar year cumulative abnormal returns (CAR).
A. Tier 1 (absolute) Firm absolute CAR.
B. Tier 2 (industry relative) Firm CAR minus 48 Fama-French industry CAR.
2. Operating Fiscal year accounting measures.
pc gprof First principal component of gross profitability measures: ebitda/total
assets, (earnings+depreciation+amortization-gains on sales)/sales, and
operating income/average total assets.
pc cashflow First principal component of cash flow measures: operating cash
flow/sales, operating cash flow/ending total assets and operating cash
flow/beginning total assets.
A. Tier 1 (absolute) Firm absolute measure.
B. Tier 2 (industry relative) Firm measure minus 48 Fama-French industry measure.
3. Altman (2000) Z-score Z-score = 6.56*(working capital/total assets)+3.26*(retained
earnings/total assets)+6.72*(ebit/total assets)+1.05*(book value
equity/total liabilities)
Panel B: Categorization of Distress and Success
Measure Categorization Approach
1. Financial Each calendar year the mean and standard deviation (SD) of CAR
across all firms are calculated. A firm year is labelled as distress
(success) if the firm’s CAR is more than one SD below (above) the
mean CAR; otherwise the firm year is labelled as normal.
2. Operating Each calendar year the median and median absolute deviation (MAD)
of each operating measure across all firms are calculated. A firm year
is labelled as distress (success) if the firm’s measure is more than one
MAD below (above) the median operating measure; otherwise the firm
year is labelled as normal.
3. Altman (2000) Z-score Firm-specific Z-scores are computed each year. A firm year is classified
as distress if Z < 1.10, success if Z > 2.60, and normal otherwise.
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For financial measures, it is calculated each calendar year as the
absolute value of (firm return − mean return)/(standard deviation of
returns); for operating measures, it is calculated as the absolute value
of (operating measure − median operating measure)/(median absolute
deviation of operating measure).
Chronicity score (3 and 5 year)
CS3d, CS3s, CS5d, CS5s
For each measure, it is calculated as the number of years in a 3- or
5-year period that the firm is in distress or success.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics For Success And Distress Measures
This table describes the summary statistics (total number of firms, percentage of firms undergoing
success and distress, average annual returns, and mean intensity and chronicity scores) for the
measures defined in Table 1. Average returns corresponding to financial measures are calendar
year returns whereas average returns corresponding to operating measures are fiscal year returns.
Reported p-values [in brackets] correspond to the test if average normal return > average distress
return and average success return > average normal return, and for tests of difference between
distress and success for intensity score and chronicity score. All variables are defined in Appendix 2,
and performance categorization approaches of firms are elaborated in Appendix 4. Sample period
encompasses 1980 through 2017.
average scores
performance measure total firms % of firms average return IS CS3 CS5
1. Financial
a) Tier 1
distress 17,133 11.22% −70.84% [0.000] 1.63 1.33 1.60
normal 17,133 76.66% 13.73% - - -
success 17,133 12.12% 108.80% [0.000] 1.80 [0.000] 1.41 [0.000] 1.82 [0.000]
a) Tier 2
distress 17,133 11.35% −65.65% [0.000] 1.59 1.33 1.61
normal 17,133 76.52% 13.62% - - -




distress 17,133 26.42% 7.03% [0.000] 3.80 2.39 3.66
normal 17,133 42.89% 16.09% - - -
success 17,133 30.69% 20.31% [0.000] 1.96 [0.000] 2.41 [0.000] 3.58 [0.000]
a) Tier 2
distress 17,133 23.14% 5.43% [0.000] 5.24 2.27 3.37
normal 17,133 42.24% 16.44% - - -
success 17,133 34.62% 19.59% [0.000] 2.61 [0.000] 2.47 [0.000] 3.73 [0.000]
pc cashflow
a) Tier 1
distress 17,133 20.10% 8.15% [0.000] 3.75 2.13 3.06
normal 17,133 42.91% 14.51% - - -
success 17,133 36.99% 19.24% [0.000] 1.98 [0.000] 2.36 [0.000] 3.54 [0.000]
a) Tier 2
distress 17,133 21.48% 8.31% [0.000] 3.82 2.16 3.09
normal 17,133 46.00% 14.55% - - -
success 17,133 32.52% 20.01% [0.000] 2.01 [0.000] 2.29 [0.000] 3.42 [0.000]
3. Altman (2000) Z-score
a) Tier 1
distress 17,133 34.11% 10.25% [0.000] 5.46 2.65 4.17
normal 17,133 15.98% 14.88% - - -
success 17,133 49.91% 18.23% [0.000] 3.79 [0.023] 2.77 [0.000] 4.48 [0.000]
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Table 3.3: Changes In Corporate Strategies In Response To Firm-Specific Success/Distress
This table reports mean values of changes in corporate strategies from year t to t+1 for (i)
firms experiencing firm-specific success/distress in year t. Success and distress events are further
subclassified based on whether intensity score is below or above median and whether the chronicity
score is short (1-year) or long (> 1-year). Reported p-values [in brackets] correspond to tests of
differences between low vs. high intensity score and between short vs. long chronicity score while the
last two p-values reported for each performance measure performs a difference-in-differences (DID)
estimation between distress/success and low/high intensity score and between distress/success and
short/long chronicity score. All variables are defined in Appendix 2, and performance categorization
approaches of firms are defined in Appendix 4. Sample period encompasses 1980 through 2017.
Performance Measure Change In Corporate Strategy
capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
1. Financial
a) Tier 1
distress −0.022 −0.001 −0.005 −10.232 −0.008
success 0.004 −0.003 0.001 0.574 0.002
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.308] [0.001] [0.275] [0.155]
distress and low intensity score −0.018 0.002 −0.006 0.045 −0.005
distress and high intensity score −0.026 −0.002 −0.003 −21.660 −0.012
p-value of difference [0.007] [0.335] [0.191] [0.310] [0.547]
distress and short chronicity score −0.023 0.002 0.001 −21.535 −0.013
distress and long chronicity score −0.009 −0.006 0.005 4.885 −0.014
p-value of difference [0.186] [0.344] [0.022] [0.516] [0.952]
success and low intensity score −0.005 0.001 −0.002 1.156 −0.003
success and high intensity score 0.014 −0.003 0.001 0.105 0.001
p-value of difference [0.043] [0.207] [0.280] [0.463] [0.525]
success and short chronicity score 0.013 −0.005 0.008 0.766 0.001
success and long chronicity score −0.001 −0.004 −0.001 0.144 0.010
p-value of difference [0.025] [0.764] [0.001] [0.694] [0.872]
p-value of DID (distress/success and low/high intensity score) [0.005] [0.977] [0.926] [0.360] [0.393]
p-value of DID (distress/success and short/long chronicity score) [0.012] [0.454] [0.010] [0.197] [0.509]
b) Tier 2
distress −0.017 0.001 −0.004 −12.593 −0.008
success 0.007 −0.002 −0.001 0.510 0.002
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.342] [0.003] [0.197] [0.152]
distress and low intensity score −0.015 0.003 −0.006 −3.640 −0.014
distress and high intensity score −0.019 −0.002 −0.002 −22.502 −0.002
p-value of difference [0.167] [0.193] [0.024] [0.386] [0.241]
distress and short chronicity score −0.019 0.003 0.001 −20.955 −0.012
distress and long chronicity score −0.008 −0.007 0.004 −8.173 −0.011
p-value of difference [0.498] [0.209] [0.045] [0.980] [0.915]
success and low intensity score 0.001 0.001 −0.002 0.939 −0.002
success and high intensity score 0.014 −0.002 −0.001 0.169 0.001
p-value of diff. [0.004] [0.433] [0.284] [0.671] [0.771]
success and short chronicity score 0.013 −0.004 0.007 −0.386 0.002
success and long chronicity score −0.003 −0.005 0.001 2.064 0.010
p-value of difference [0.011] [0.089] [0.008] [0.918] [0.855]
p-value of DID (distress/success and low/high intensity score) [0.002] [0.612] [0.464] [0.427] [0.428]
p-value of DID (distress/success and short/long chronicity score) [0.007] [0.280] [0.027] [0.570] [0.716]
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Performance Measure Change In Corporate Strategy
capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
2. Operating (Gross Profitability)
a) Tier 1
distress −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 −0.071 −0.002
success −0.007 0.002 −0.009 0.395 0.003
p-value of difference [0.150] [0.146] [0.000] [0.936] [0.531]
distress and low intensity score −0.002 0.001 0.001 −1.702 0.001
distress and high intensity score −0.004 −0.001 −0.007 1.636 −0.005
p-value of difference [0.457] [0.600] [0.000] [0.304] [0.229]
distress and short chronicity score −0.010 0.001 0.005 −3.041 −0.006
distress and long chronicity score −0.001 −0.001 −0.004 0.421 −0.002
p-value of difference [0.013] [0.359] [0.000] [0.844] [0.250]
success and low intensity score −0.003 0.001 −0.001 0.326 0.003
success and high intensity score −0.008 0.001 −0.004 0.409 0.008
p-value of difference [0.307] [0.435] [0.007] [0.995] [0.725]
success and short chronicity score 0.003 −0.001 0.003 1.512 0.001
success and long chronicity score −0.005 0.001 −0.030 −6.392 0.012
p-value of difference [0.388] [0.600] [0.044] [0.938] [0.408]
p-value of DID (distress/success and low/high intensity score) [0.585] [0.548] [0.003] [0.825] [0.489]
p-value of DID (distress/success and short/long chronicity score) [0.000] [0.577] [0.094] [0.158] [0.370]
b) Tier 2
distress −0.005 −0.001 −0.003 0.477 −0.002
success −0.006 0.002 −0.008 0.301 0.004
p-value of difference [0.738] [0.106] [0.000] [0.976] [0.488]
distress and low intensity score −0.006 0.002 0.001 0.800 0.001
distress and high intensity score −0.004 −0.003 −0.009 0.134 −0.004
p-value of difference [0.286] [0.114] [0.000] [0.809] [0.411]
distress and short chronicity score −0.012 0.002 0.004 −2.527 −0.004
distress and long chronicity score −0.003 −0.001 −0.003 1.282 −0.003
p-value of difference [0.035] [0.292] [0.000] [0.111] [0.175]
success and low intensity score −0.003 0.001 −0.001 0.377 0.003
success and high intensity score −0.006 0.001 −0.004 0.116 0.008
p-value of difference [0.387] [0.611] [0.000] [0.983] [0.666]
success and short chronicity score 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.348 0.005
success and long chronicity score −0.005 0.001 −0.003 −5.175 0.010
p-value of difference [0.899] [0.997] [0.098] [0.962] [0.476]
p-value of DID (distress/success and low/high intensity score) [0.186] [0.111] [0.000] [0.974] [0.476]
p-value of DID (distress/success and short/long chronicity score) [0.000] [0.472] [0.245] [0.190] [0.428]
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Performance Measure Change In Corporate Strategy
capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
Cashflow
a) Tier 1
distress −0.004 0.002 −0.003 −1.353 −0.001
success −0.005 0.001 −0.008 0.107 0.004
p-value of difference [0.491] [0.547] [0.000] [0.217] [0.535]
distress and low intensity score −0.002 0.003 −0.001 −2.565 −0.006
distress and high intensity score −0.005 0.001 −0.006 −0.131 0.004
p-value of difference [0.273] [0.555] [0.002] [0.448] [0.626]
distress and short chronicity score −0.007 0.001 0.003 −5.595 −0.004
distress and long chronicity score −0.002 0.001 −0.001 −0.424 0.004
p-value of difference [0.526] [0.814] [0.028] [0.203] [0.500]
success and low intensity score −0.001 0.001 −0.007 −0.096 0.001
success and high intensity score −0.008 0.001 −0.007 0.285 0.002
p-value of difference [0.020] [0.061] [0.992] [0.378] [0.472]
success and short chronicity score 0.001 0.001 −0.005 −0.387 0.018
success and long chronicity score −0.004 0.001 −0.005 0.267 0.002
p-value of difference [0.027] [0.824] [0.000] [0.147] [0.243]
p-value of DID (distress/success and low/high intensity score) [0.284] [0.687] [0.005] [0.523] [0.671]
p-value of DID (distress/success and short/long chronicity score) [0.011] [0.941] [0.082] [0.415] [0.574]
b) Tier 2
distress −0.003 0.001 −0.004 −0.504 −0.003
success −0.006 0.001 −0.008 3.523 0.006
p-value of difference [0.351] [0.688] [0.000] [0.348] [0.309]
distress and low intensity score −0.001 0.002 −0.002 −1.137 −0.005
distress and high intensity score −0.005 −0.001 −0.005 0.141 −0.002
p-value of difference [0.143] [0.419] [0.063] [0.365] [0.879]
distress and short chronicity score −0.007 0.001 0.005 −2.134 0.002
distress and long chronicity score −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 −0.022 0.003
p-value of difference [0.402] [0.560] [0.048] [0.232] [0.622]
success and low intensity score −0.001 0.002 −0.007 7.412 0.002
success and high intensity score −0.009 0.002 −0.008 0.243 0.003
p-value of difference [0.011] [0.994] [0.328] [0.327] [0.657]
success and short chronicity score −0.002 0.001 −0.005 −0.333 0.019
success and long chronicity score −0.004 0.001 −0.006 0.177 0.001
p-value of difference [0.342] [0.221] [0.000] [0.388] [0.850]
p-value of DID (distress/success and low/high intensity score) [0.250] [0.430] [0.270] [0.263] [0.941]
p-value of DID (distress/success and short/long chronicity score) [0.110] [0.440] [0.100] [0.907] [0.510]
3. Altman (2000) Z-score
distress −0.004 −0.003 0.003 −0.328 −0.001
success −0.002 0.003 −0.010 0.161 0.004
p-value of difference [0.043] [0.000] [0.000] [0.918] [0.321]
distress and low intensity score −0.006 0.011 0.001 6.511 0.001
distress and high intensity score −0.003 −0.007 0.005 −7.877 −0.004
p-value of difference [0.216] [0.000] [0.000] [0.218] [0.642]
distress and short chronicity score −0.024 0.004 0.011 −0.032 −0.017
distress and long chronicity score −0.001 −0.003 0.003 −7.993 0.003
p-value of difference [0.001] [0.002] [0.077] [0.466] [0.305]
success and low intensity score −0.006 0.001 −0.002 0.185 0.001
success and high intensity score 0.001 0.005 −0.018 0.130 0.009
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.518] [0.187]
success and short chronicity score 0.004 0.008 −0.013 −0.013 0.013
success and long chronicity score −0.002 0.001 −0.005 0.117 0.004
p-value of difference [0.112] [0.595] [0.040] [0.771] [0.747]
p-value of DID (distress/success and low/high intensity score) [0.106] [0.000] [0.000] [0.215] [0.260]
p-value of DID (distress/success and short/long chronicity score) [0.000] [0.286] [0.000] [0.144] [0.002]
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Table 3.4: Proportion Of Managers That Increase/Decrease Corporate Strategies In
Response To Firm-Specific Success/Distress
This table reports the proportion of managers that have an increase/decrease in corporate strategies
from year t to t+1 for firms experiencing firm-specific success/distress in year t. Increase (decrease)
in corporate strategies is defined as the manager having a change in corporate strategy more than
one median absolute deviation above the median (below the median). Reported p-values [in brackets]
correspond to tests of differences between increase in strategies following distress vs. success and
decrease in strategies following distress vs. success using Chi-squared tests while the last p-value
reported for each performance measure performs a difference-in-differences (DID) estimation between
distress/success and increase/decrease. All variables are defined in Appendix 2, and performance
categorization approaches of firms are defined in Appendix 4. Sample period encompasses 1980
through 2017.
Performance Measure Change In Corporate Strategy
1. Financial capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
a) Tier 1
distress, increase 39.30% 37.97% 38.10% 42.48% 29.27%
success, increase 47.09% 31.40% 36.73% 29.73% 30.01%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.000] [0.113]
distress, decrease 29.22% 18.75% 24.67% 18.95% 21.89%
success, decrease 20.01% 22.75% 28.50% 27.36% 16.14%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of DID (distress/success and increase/decrease) [0.008] [0.011] [0.000] [0.204] [0.863]
a) Tier 2
distress, increase 39.31% 39.00% 38.34% 41.74% 29.96%
success, increase 47.13% 31.65% 36.78% 29.78% 30.38%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.375]
distress, decrease 28.47% 19.72% 24.82% 18.63% 21.64%
success, decrease 20.46% 22.55% 28.66% 27.01% 16.71%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of DID (distress/success and increase/decrease) [0.000] [0.086] [0.000] [0.152] [0.920]
2. Operating (Gross Profitability)
a) Tier 1
distress, increase 26.71% 31.19% 34.95% 39.54% 26.75%
success, increase 52.51% 28.72% 30.33% 27.91% 35.64%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
distress, decrease 18.98% 18.42% 25.04% 23.50% 18.04%
success, decrease 21.94% 17.89% 26.75% 18.10% 23.90%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.037] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of DID (distress/success and increase/decrease) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.394] [0.420]
a) Tier 2
distress, increase 32.95% 36.64% 37.82% 37.80% 28.38%
success, increase 47.23% 28.67% 30.33% 28.80% 35.34%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
distress, decrease 26.23% 22.76% 27.48% 19.90% 19.57%
success, decrease 20.07% 17.52% 26.31% 18.71% 23.83%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of DID (distress/success and increase/decrease) [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.582] [0.048]
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Performance Measure Change In Corporate Strategy
Cashflow capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
a) Tier 1
distress, increase 36.60% 37.26% 36.60% 38.34% 27.57%
success, increase 40.23% 26.35% 28.69% 29.35% 34.01%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
distress, decrease 22.21% 22.10% 27.07% 21.58% 17.18%
success, decrease 22.03% 16.51% 25.12% 19.87% 23.03%
p-value of difference [0.514] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of DID (distress/success and increase/decrease) [0.086] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
a) Tier 2
distress, increase 42.04% 35.92% 36.31% 37.00% 28.49%
success, increase 38.12% 27.80% 29.55% 29.97% 33.32%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
distress, decrease 23.17% 21.72% 27.08% 20.69% 18.48%
success, decrease 21.44% 16.96% 25.96% 20.02% 21.69%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.014] [0.000]
p-value of DID (distress/success and increase/decrease) [0.143] [0.000] [0.000] [0.719] [0.000]
3. Altman (2000) Z-score
distress, increase 32.85% 24.68% 31.09% 43.57% 28.30%
success, increase 36.37% 33.43% 30.34% 23.32% 33.57%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000]
distress, decrease 15.55% 12.33% 18.65% 32.88% 16.65%
success, decrease 25.47% 21.61% 28.05% 11.57% 24.19%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
p-value of DID (distress/success and increase/decrease) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
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Table 3.5: Regressions Of Changes In Corporate Strategies On Firm-Specific Dis-
tress/Success
This table reports results of univariate regressions (Panel A) and multivariate regressions (Panel B)
of changes in corporate strategies from year t to t+1 on firm-specific distress and success indicators,
intensity score, 3-year chronicity score, firm attributes, CEO attributes and market controls. All
regressions use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity; multivariate regressions also control
for industry fixed effects. Each reported coefficient in Panel A is a separate univariate regression.
*** indicate significant coefficients at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level, respectively. All
variables are defined in Appendix 2 and performance categorization approaches of firms are defined
in Appendix 4. Sample period encompasses 1980 through 2017 except for regressions that include
CEO attributes which cover 1992 through 2017.
Panel A: Univariate Regressions
Variable Change In Corporate Strategy
Distress And Success Indicators capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
Financial Tier 1 (distress) −0.019*** −0.001 −0.001 −11.492 −0.011*
Financial Tier 1 (success) 0.010** −0.004** 0.004*** 0.578 0.001
Financial Tier 2 (distress) −0.014*** −0.001 −0.001 −14.148 −0.011*
Financial Tier 2 (success) 0.013*** −0.003* 0.004*** 0.505 0.001
Operating Tier 1 (gross profitability, distress) 0.002 −0.001 0.001 −0.185 −0.004
Operating Tier 1 (gross profitability, success) −0.003 0.001* −0.007*** 0.474 0.003
Operating Tier 2 (gross profitability, distress) −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.528 −0.004
Operating Tier 2 (gross profitability, success) −0.002 0.002** −0.006*** 0.360 0.004
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, distress) 0.010 0.001 0.001 −1.758 −0.004
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, success) −0.001 −0.001 −0.006*** 0.065 0.004
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, distress) 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.720 −0.006
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, success) −0.001 0.001 −0.007*** 5.135 0.006
Altman (2000) Z-score (distress) 0.001 −0.005*** 0.010*** −0.590 −0.004
Altman (2000) Z-score (success) 0.005*** 0.005*** −0.012*** 0.191 0.005
Intensity Score Measures
Financial Tier 1 (distress) −0.012*** −0.002 −0.001 −7.662 −0.005
Financial Tier 1 (success) 0.008*** −0.002* 0.002*** 0.261 −0.001
Financial Tier 2 (distress) −0.009*** −0.002 0.001 −7.971 −0.005
Financial Tier 2 (success) 0.009*** −0.001 0.002** 0.324 −0.001
Operating Tier 1 (gross profitability, distress) 0.001 −0.001** −0.001*** 0.104 0.001
Operating Tier 1 (gross profitability, success) −0.002 0.001 −0.001*** −0.319 0.004
Operating Tier 2 (gross profitability, distress) 0.001 −0.001** −0.001*** 0.070 0.001
Operating Tier 2 (gross profitability, success) −0.001 0.001 −0.001*** 0.109 0.002
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, distress) −0.001 −0.002** −0.001* 0.015 0.001
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, success) −0.003 0.001 −0.002*** 0.073 0.001
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, distress) −0.001 −0.002*** −0.001* 0.048 0.001
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, success) −0.002 0.001*** −0.002*** 0.581 0.001
Altman (2000) Z-score (distress) 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.001
Altman (2000) Z-score (success) 0.001** 0.001* −0.001* 0.001 −0.001
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Variable Change In Corporate Strategy
Chronicity Score Measures capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
Financial Tier 1 (distress) −0.001 −0.002 0.006*** −3.783 −0.009**
Financial Tier 1 (success) −0.001 −0.001 0.001* −0.201 0.005
Financial Tier 2 (distress) 0.001 −0.001 0.005*** −5.116 −0.008**
Financial Tier 2 (success) −0.001 −0.001 0.001** 0.518 0.006
Operating Tier 1 (gross profitability, distress) 0.002*** −0.001 0.001*** 0.024 −0.001
Operating Tier 1 (gross profitability, success) −0.001*** −0.001 0.001*** −3.495 0.003
Operating Tier 2 (gross profitability, distress) 0.001** −0.001 0.001*** 0.100 −0.001
Operating Tier 2 (gross profitability, success) −0.001* −0.001 0.001*** −3.101 0.003
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, distress) 0.002** −0.001 0.002*** −1.443 0.004
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, success) 0.001 −0.001 0.001 −0.727 0.001
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, distress) 0.002** −0.001 0.002*** −1.105 0.004
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, success) 0.001 0.001 −0.001* −1.725 0.001
Altman (2000) Z-score (distress) 0.001*** −0.001*** 0.003*** −3.803* 0.001
Altman (2000) Z-score (success) 0.001 0.001** −0.001 0.025 0.001
Firm Attributes
firmage 0.003*** −0.001*** 0.006*** −0.926 0.002
size −0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** −0.028 −0.001
bm 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.009 0.001
nopayout −0.005*** 0.003*** −0.003*** 4.952 0.002
finance 0.005*** −0.001* 0.003*** 0.409 0.004
CEO Attributes
ceoage 0.009*** 0.001 0.016*** −2.139 −0.001
gender −0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.253 0.001
tenure 0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.220 0.001
founder −0.003 −0.001* 0.002 0.059 −0.001
outsider −0.003 −0.001 −0.001 −0.113 0.001
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Panel B: Multivariate Regressions
Variable Change In Corporate Strategy
Financial Tier 1 capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
distress 0.003 0.016 −0.010* 7.316 −0.021***
success −0.006 −0.002 −0.002 1.739 −0.001
intensity score (distress) −0.013*** −0.009 0.011** −5.288 0.005
intensity score (success) 0.011*** −0.002 0.006 −0.626 0.004
chronicity score (distress) 0.002** −0.001 0.006*** −0.103 0.001
chronicity score (success) −0.004** 0.001* −0.003** −1.826 0.001
Adj. R2 0.0157 0.0036 0.0139 0.0012 0.0111
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Tier 2
distress 0.005 0.017* −0.016** 3.417 −0.017**
success −0.007 0.001 −0.003 −0.521 −0.004
intensity score (distress) −0.012*** −0.009 0.010*** −4.031 0.002
intensity score (success) 0.011*** −0.002 0.006 0.761 0.004
chronicity score (distress) 0.002*** −0.002 0.006*** 0.751 0.002
chronicity score (success) −0.003** −0.001 −0.003* −3.094 0.002
Adj. R2 0.0132 0.0033 0.0131 0.0013 0.0109
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Operating (gross profitability) Tier 1
distress −0.003 0.005 0.006 0.880 −0.009***
success 0.008*** 0.001 0.002 1.822 0.010***
intensity score (distress) −0.001 −0.003* −0.001 0.493 0.001
intensity score (success) −0.001 0.001 −0.003*** 0.204 −0.002
chronicity score (distress) 0.002* −0.001 −0.001 −0.906 0.003***
chronicity score (success) −0.003*** −0.001 0.001 −0.346 −0.002***
Adj. R2 0.0104 0.0112 0.0126 0.0012 0.0107
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Operating (gross profitability) Tier 2
distress −0.008** 0.007** 0.002 −1.661 −0.007***
success 0.007*** 0.001 −0.003 0.992 0.006
intensity score (distress) 0.001 −0.003** 0.001 0.407 0.001
intensity score (success) −0.001 −0.001 −0.001** 0.136 −0.001
chronicity score (distress) 0.004*** −0.001 0.001 0.109 0.002**
chronicity score (success) −0.002*** −0.001 0.001 −0.293 −0.002**
Adj. R2 0.0108 0.0119 0.0120 0.0012 0.0103
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Variable Change In Corporate Strategy
Operating (cashflow) Tier 1 capex lagta rd ta cash ta blev payout ta
distress −0.006*** 0.009** 0.004 2.314 −0.007**
success 0.008*** 0.001 0.001 −0.317 0.002
intensity score (distress) −0.001** −0.005** 0.001* 0.659* 0.001
intensity score (success) −0.003*** −0.001 −0.004*** 0.306 0.001
chronicity score (distress) 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 −1.374 0.001
chronicity score (success) −0.001 −0.001 0.001** 0.130 −0.001**
Adj. R2 0.0119 0.0151 0.0145 0.0012 0.0100
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Operating (cashflow) Tier 2
distress −0.004*** 0.010*** 0.004 −1.061 −0.006*
success 0.004** 0.001 −0.002* −1.276 0.003
intensity score (distress) −0.001** −0.005*** 0.001 0.759 0.001
intensity score (success) −0.002*** −0.001 −0.003*** 0.296 0.001
chronicity score (distress) 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 −0.192 0.001
chronicity score (success) −0.001 −0.001 0.001** 0.525 −0.001*
Adj. R2 0.0109 0.0132 0.0140 0.0011 0.0099
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Altman (2000) Z-score
distress −0.006* −0.001 0.013*** −0.492 −0.019***
success 0.007** 0.002** −0.012*** −1.955 0.010***
intensity score (distress) 0.001 −0.003*** 0.001 0.025 0.001
intensity score (success) 0.001 0.001*** −0.005*** −0.059 0.003***
chronicity score (distress) 0.004*** 0.002*** −0.005*** −0.757 0.006***
chronicity score (success) −0.002** −0.001*** 0.004*** 0.374 −0.004***
Adj. R2 0.0104 0.0251 0.0243 0.0011 0.0151
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.6: Behavioral Categorization Of Managers Based On Changes In Corporate
Strategies
This table describes how changes in corporate strategy variables (capital expenditures, R&D, cash,
book leverage, and total payout) from year t to t+1 are used to create a managerial risk-profile score
in year t+1 (Panel A) and how this managerial risk-profile score is used to categorize managers into
six behavioral groups based on bias dispositions displayed (Panel B). All variables are defined in
Appendix 2, and behavioral categorization approaches of firms are defined in Appendix 4. Sample
period encompasses 1980 through 2017 except for CEO attributes which cover 1992 through 2017.
Panel A: Developing Managerial Risk-Profile Score
Step Description
1. Categorization of corporate
strategy variables
For each of the five corporate strategy variables, (capex lagta, rd ta, cash ta, blev
and payout ta), each firm year is labeled as having either a significant increase (+1),
no significant change (0) or a significant decrease (−1) in terms of corresponding
strategy.
2. Computation of managerial
risk-profile score
Each firm year, all +1, 0, −1 values are summed up to obtain a risk-profile score
ranging from −5 through +5.
3. Categorization based on risk
behavior
Each firm year, based on managerial risk-profile score a manager is categorized as
risk-avoiding (score from −5 through −2), risk neutral (score from −1 through +1)
or risk-taking (score from +2 through +5).
Panel B: Behavioral Categorization Of Managers
Behavioral Bias Categorization Approach
Trying-to-break-even effect Following firm-specific distress over [t,t+1], the manager is risk-taking at [t+1].
Status quo effect (distress) Following firm-specific distress over [t,t+1], the manager is risk neutral at [t+1].
Snake-bite effect Following firm-specific distress over [t,t+1], the manager is risk-avoiding at [t+1].
Conservatism effect Following firm-specific success over [t,t+1], the manager is risk-avoiding at [t+1].
Status quo effect (success) Following firm-specific success over [t,t+1], the manager is risk neutral at [t+1].
House-money effect Following firm-specific success over [t,t+1], the manager is risk-taking at [t+1].
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Table 3.7: Firm Attributes, CEO Attributes And Performance Measures Across Be-
havioral Categorization Of Managers
This table reports mean firm attributes, mean CEO attributes, the mean managerial risk-profile
score, and percentage of managers (based on all managers experiencing success or distress) for each
of the six behavioral categorizations of managers defined in Table 6. Panel A and B reports mean
firm and CEO attributes respectively as well as percentage of all distress/success managers for
each behavioral group.*** indicate significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level for
the tests of: trying-to-break-even vs. status quo (distress), status quo (distress) vs. snake-bite,
conservatism vs. status quo (success) and status quo (success) vs. house-money. Panel C examines
behavioral categorization of managers following distress (Sub Panel C1) and following success (Sub
Panel C2). Panel D examines performance measures conditional on intensity and chronicity scores
across behavioral categorization of managers following distress (Sub Panel D1) and following success
(Sub Panel D2). p-values [in brackets] correspond to the test of difference between risk profile scores
and between short vs. long (1 year/more than 1 year) chronicity scores in Panel D. All variables are
defined in Appendix 2, performance categorization approaches of firms and behavioral categorization
approaches of managers are elaborated in Appendix 4. Total sample period encompass 1980 through
2017.
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Panel A: Mean Firm Attributes Across Behavioral Categorizations
Behavioral Bias % of all managers firmage size bm finance nopayout
Financial Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even effect 28.95% 1.472*** 4.069*** 0.592** 0.102 0.607**
Status quo effect (distress) 56.67% 1.782 4.677 1.016 0.121 0.531
Snake-bite effect 14.38% 1.990*** 4.697 0.945 0.084** 0.386***
Conservatism effect 11.74% 2.105*** 4.488** 0.505 0.100 0.441***
Status quo effect (success) 62.34% 1.974 4.564 0.340 0.111 0.541
House-money effect 25.92% 1.852** 4.500 0.419 0.112 0.511
Financial Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even effect 29.23% 1.529*** 4.137*** 0.599** 0.101 0.596
Status quo effect (distress) 56.56% 1.831 4.636 0.970 0.107 0.528
Snake-bite effect 14.21% 2.006* 4.650 0.921 0.078** 0.394***
Conservatism effect 11.89% 2.110*** 4.465 0.515 0.094 0.434**
Status quo effect (success) 62.21% 1.962 4.518 0.350 0.106 0.543
House-money effect 25.90% 1.839 4.427 0.426 0.100 0.516
Operating Gross-Profitability Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even effect 23.91% 1.978*** 4.462*** 0.623** 0.275** 0.502*
Status quo effect (distress) 62.88% 2.110 5.232 0.944 0.391 0.440
Snake-bite effect 13.21% 2.091 4.700*** 0.786 0.251** 0.417
Conservatism effect 10.64% 2.322*** 5.809*** 0.473 0.063*** 0.211**
Status quo effect (success) 61.70% 1.863 5.565 0.530 0.119 0.339
House-money effect 27.66% 1.436*** 5.297*** 0.621 0.146* 0.396
Operating Gross-Profitability Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even effect 25.71% 2.030*** 4.097*** 0.596 0.082 0.552
Status quo effect (distress) 59.64% 2.145 4.472 0.736 0.094 0.541
Snake-bite effect 14.64% 2.110 4.284 0.760 0.068 0.451*
Conservatism effect 10.68% 2.282*** 5.805*** 0.497* 0.157** 0.222**
Status quo effect (success) 62.37% 1.881 5.644 0.669 0.227 0.338
House-money effect 26.95% 1.481*** 5.355*** 0.635 0.216 0.392
Operating Cashflow Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even effect 27.11% 1.711*** 4.477*** 0.499 0.180 0.542
Status quo effect (distress) 60.18% 1.965 4.848 0.654 0.219 0.527
Snake-bite effect 12.72% 2.062 4.436*** 0.667 0.122*** 0.476
Conservatism effect 11.95% 2.374*** 6.042 0.525 0.128*** 0.220**
Status quo effect (success) 63.87% 2.095 6.009 0.674 0.236 0.300
House-money effect 24.18% 1.796*** 5.647*** 0.646 0.205 0.357
Operating Cashflow Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even effect 27.80% 1.649*** 4.546** 0.526 0.089 0.549
Status quo effect (distress) 59.75% 1.901 4.797 0.800 0.104 0.540
Snake-bite effect 12.45% 2.086 4.526** 0.665 0.067* 0.454*
Conservatism effect 11.86% 2.339*** 5.921 0.516 0.155** 0.242**
Status quo effect (success) 63.92% 2.088 5.968 0.564 0.287 0.312
House-money effect 24.22% 1.795*** 5.607** 0.603 0.256 0.366
Altman (2000) Z-score
Trying-to-break-even effect 25.73% 1.752*** 5.165*** 0.445 0.344** 0.426*
Status quo effect (distress) 62.54% 2.076 6.098 0.743 0.469 0.340
Snake-bite effect 11.73% 2.145 5.517*** 0.646 0.310 0.365
Conservatism effect 12.24% 2.420** 5.429 0.678 0.048 0.242**
Status quo effect (success) 64.48% 2.275 5.404 0.706 0.089 0.344
House-money effect 23.28% 2.107 5.274** 0.739 0.079 0.378
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Panel B: Mean CEO Attributes Across Behavioral Categorizations
Behavioral Bias % of all managers ceoage gender tenure founder outsider
Financial Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even effect 28.95% 3.981* 0.038** 1.566*** 0.006* 0.182
Status quo effect (distress) 56.67% 3.988 0.019 1.653 0.011 0.191
Snake-bite effect 14.38% 4.000* 0.025 1.645 0.009 0.196
Conservatism effect 11.74% 3.965 0.018 1.723 0.018 0.205
Status quo effect (success) 62.34% 3.981 0.020 1.628 0.014 0.171
House-money effect 25.92% 3.981 0.013 1.638 0.016 0.188
Financial Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even effect 29.23% 3.980* 0.028 1.582** 0.007 0.156
Status quo effect (distress) 56.56% 3.991 0.022 1.683 0.010 0.183
Snake-bite effect 14.21% 4.000* 0.024 1.655 0.011 0.192
Conservatism effect 11.89% 3.968** 0.020 1.718*** 0.017 0.191
Status quo effect (success) 62.21% 3.980 0.018 1.630 0.014 0.172
House-money effect 25.90% 3.981 0.013 1.590*** 0.015 0.180
Operating Gross-Profitability Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even effect 23.91% 4.001* 0.020* 1.665* 0.008* 0.188
Status quo effect (distress) 62.88% 4.006 0.013 1.706 0.014 0.145
Snake-bite effect 13.21% 4.003 0.012 1.676 0.009 0.197**
Conservatism effect 10.64% 4.005 0.020 1.715** 0.027 0.152
Status quo effect (success) 61.70% 4.007 0.023 1.678 0.023 0.135
House-money effect 27.66% 4.008 0.024 1.640** 0.023 0.131
Operating Gross-Profitability Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even effect 25.71% 4.001** 0.024* 1.622 0.007 0.185
Status quo effect (distress) 59.64% 4.008 0.015 1.638 0.010 0.169
Snake-bite effect 14.64% 4.007 0.020 1.654 0.007 0.213*
Conservatism effect 10.68% 4.003 0.019 1.725 0.029 0.165*
Status quo effect (success) 62.37% 4.003 0.020 1.702 0.025 0.143
House-money effect 26.95% 4.005 0.022 1.649* 0.024 0.149
Operating Cashflow Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even effect 27.11% 4.003** 0.016 1.522*** 0.010 0.178
Status quo effect (distress) 60.18% 3.998 0.017 1.628 0.011 0.160
Snake-bite effect 12.72% 3.999 0.012 1.642 0.006* 0.227*
Conservatism effect 11.95% 4.002** 0.018 1.702 0.026 0.149
Status quo effect (success) 63.87% 4.009 0.019 1.706 0.021 0.142
House-money effect 24.18% 4.007 0.022 1.648** 0.020 0.148
Operating Cashflow Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even effect 27.80% 4.000 0.020 1.436** 0.015 0.158
Status quo effect (distress) 59.75% 3.999 0.021 1.570 0.014 0.157
Snake-bite effect 12.45% 4.000 0.020 1.630* 0.007* 0.202
Conservatism effect 11.86% 3.997*** 0.019 1.707 0.023 0.161
Status quo effect (success) 63.92% 4.006 0.018 1.720 0.019 0.149
House-money effect 24.22% 4.005 0.021 1.681** 0.018 0.154
Altman (2000) Z-score
Trying-to-break-even effect 25.73% 4.012 0.016 1.527** 0.012 0.110
Status quo effect (distress) 62.54% 4.015 0.015 1.622 0.016 0.111
Snake-bite effect 11.73% 4.008* 0.020 1.609 0.017 0.139
Conservatism effect 12.24% 4.009 0.018 1.706 0.019 0.156
Status quo effect (success) 64.48% 4.013 0.020 1.735 0.019 0.142
House-money effect 23.28% 4.011 0.025 1.689* 0.019 0.150
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Panel C1: Behavioral Categorizations Following Distress
Break-even Status-quo Snake-bite
Performance risk-score % of managers risk-score % of managers risk-score % of managers
1. Financial
a) Tier 1 3.728 28.95% −0.001 56.67% −2.383 14.38%
a) Tier 2 3.706 29.23% 0.011 56.56% −2.383 14.21%
2. Operating
pc gprof
a) Tier 1 3.606 23.91% −0.005 62.88% −2.324 13.21%
a) Tier 2 3.596 25.71% −0.003 59.64% −2.364 14.64%
pc cashflow
a) Tier 1 3.484 27.11% 0.029 60.18% −2.356 12.72%
a) Tier 2 3.422 27.80% 0.047 59.75% −2.357 12.45%
3. Z-score 3.494 25.73% 0.026 62.54% −2.307 11.73%
Panel C2: Behavioral Categorizations Following Success
Conservatism Status-quo House-money
Performance risk-score % of managers risk-score % of managers risk-score % of managers
1. Financial
a) Tier 1 −2.319 11.74% 0.062 62.34% 3.223 25.92%
a) Tier 2 −2.328 11.89% 0.066 62.21% 3.239 25.90%
2. Operating
pc gprof
a) Tier 1 −2.331 10.64% 0.106 61.70% 3.055 27.66%
a) Tier 2 −2.320 10.68% 0.098 62.37% 3.064 26.95%
pc cashflow
a) Tier 1 −2.323 11.95% 0.056 63.87% 3.152 24.18%
a) Tier 2 −2.328 11.86% 0.050 63.92% 3.183 24.22%
3. Z-score −2.320 12.24% 0.049 64.48% 3.068 23.28%
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Panel D1: Performance Measures Conditional On Intensity And Chronicity Scores Following Distress
Break-even Status-quo Snake-bite
Performance risk-score % of managers risk-score % of managers risk-score % of managers
1. Financial
a) Tier 1
low IS 3.512 50.00% −0.002 50.00% −2.361 50.00%
high IS 3.943 50.00% 0.001 50.00% −2.404 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.000] - [0.821] - [0.062] -
short CS 3.630 75.56% 0.014 79.28% −2.379 78.69%
long CS 4.029 24.44% −0.056 20.72% −2.396 21.31%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.556] [0.000]
b) Tier 2
low IS 3.468 50.00% 0.017 50.00% −2.340 50.00%
high IS 3.943 50.00% 0.005 50.00% −2.427 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.000] - [0.439] - [0.000] -
short CS 3.618 76.03% 0.016 78.72% −2.380 78.87%
long CS 3.982 23.97% −0.005 21.28% −2.398 21.13%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.258] [0.000] [0.534] [0.000]
2. Operating
a) pc gprof Tier 1
low IS 3.486 50.00% −0.004 50.00% −2.244 50.00%
high IS 3.725 50.00% −0.005 50.00% −2.404 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.000] - [0.854] - [0.000] -
short CS 3.713 28.92% −0.031 26.96% −2.378 30.38%
long CS 3.562 71.08% 0.004 73.04% −2.300 69.62%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
b) Tier 2
low IS 3.420 50.00% 0.007 50.00% −2.320 50.00%
high IS 3.771 50.00% −0.014 50.00% −2.408 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.000] - [0.040] - [0.000] -
short CS 3.661 30.10% −0.042 30.89% −2.372 33.41%
long CS 3.568 69.90% 0.014 69.11% −2.360 66.59%
p-value of difference [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.472] [0.000]
a) pc cashflow Tier 1
low IS 3.365 50.00% 0.057 50.00% −2.301 50.00%
high IS 3.603 50.00% 0.001 50.00% −2.410 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.000] - [0.000] - [0.000] -
short CS 3.411 46.08% 0.052 42.14% −2.359 37.38%
long CS 3.547 53.92% 0.012 57.86% −2.354 62.62%
p-value of diff. [0.000] [0.491] [0.000] [0.170] [0.798] [0.000]
b) Tier 2
low IS 3.262 50.00% 0.078 50.00% −2.321 50.00%
high IS 3.581 50.00% 0.016 50.00% −2.393 50.00%
p-value of diff. [0.000] - [0.000] - [0.000] -
short CS 3.324 47.55% 0.089 43.93% −2.359 37.72%
long CS 3.511 52.45% 0.014 56.07% −2.356 62.28%
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.725] [0.000] [0.345] [0.876] [0.000]
Altman Z-score
low IS 3.269 50.00% 0.035 50.00% −2.220 50.00%
high IS 3.718 50.00% 0.016 50.00% −2.393 50.00%
p-value of diff. [0.000] - [0.020] - [0.000] -
short CS 3.473 35.41% 0.099 24.76% −2.391 24.52%
long CS 3.505 64.59% 0.002 75.24% −2.279 75.48%
p-value of diff. [0.183] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
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Panel D2: Performance Measures Conditional On Intensity And Chronicity Scores Following Success
Conservatism Status-quo House-money
Performance risk-score % of managers risk-score % of managers risk-score % of managers
1. Financial
a) Tier 1
low IS −2.293 50.00% 0.058 50.00% 3.284 50.00%
high IS −2.341 50.00% 0.065 50.00% 3.168 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.042] - [0.616] - [0.002] -
short CS −2.297 66.62% 0.078 72.05% 3.245 76.24%
long CS −2.363 33.38% 0.022 27.95% 3.153 23.76%
p-value of difference [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.034] [0.000]
b) Tier 2
low IS −2.298 50.00% 0.074 50.00% 3.287 50.00%
high IS −2.353 50.00% 0.059 50.00% 3.194 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.022] - [0.283] - [0.011] -
short CS −2.304 66.23% 0.081 72.18% 3.266 75.76%
long CS −2.374 33.77% 0.027 27.82% 3.154 24.24%
p-value of difference [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.000]
2. Operating
a) pc gprof Tier 1
low IS −2.344 50.00% 0.026 50.00% 3.033 50.00%
high IS −2.320 50.00% 0.150 50.00% 3.063 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.132] - [0.000] - [0.207] -
short CS −2.290 25.48% 0.227 42.99% 3.082 58.83%
long CS −2.345 74.52% 0.014 57.01% 3.016 41.17%
p-value of difference [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.233] [0.002] [0.087]
b) Tier 2
low IS −2.302 50.00% 0.026 50.00% 3.036 50.00%
high IS −2.336 50.00% 0.142 50.00% 3.075 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.017] - [0.000] - [0.078] -
short CS −2.296 24.84% 0.213 39.60% 3.087 54.40%
long CS −2.328 75.16% 0.024 60.40% 3.036 45.60%
p-value of difference [0.053] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.013] [0.776]
a) pc cashflow Tier 1
low IS −2.285 50.00% 0.100 50.00% 3.193 50.00%
high IS −2.357 50.00% 0.018 50.00% 3.117 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.000] - [0.000] - [0.000] -
short CS −2.301 25.48% 0.147 35.46% 3.164 46.94%
long CS −2.331 74.52% 0.007 64.54% 3.141 53.06%
p-value of diff. [0.055] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.288] [0.862]
b) Tier 2
low IS −2.280 50.00% 0.083 50.00% 3.244 50.00%
high IS −2.369 50.00% 0.022 50.00% 3.131 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.000] - [0.000] - [0.000] -
short CS −2.311 28.69% 0.120 36.84% 3.191 48.10%
long CS −2.335 71.31% 0.009 63.16% 3.176 51.90%
p-value of difference [0.130] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.535] [0.967]
Altman Z-score
low IS −2.325 50.00% 0.031 50.00% 3.075 50.00%
high IS −2.316 50.00% 0.065 50.00% 3.062 50.00%
p-value of difference [0.379] - [0.000] - [0.510] -
short CS −2.288 12.91% 0.167 19.52% 3.105 27.00%
long CS −2.325 87.09% 0.020 80.48% 3.055 73.00%
p-value of difference [0.025] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.015] [0.000]
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Table 3.8: Changes In Firm Performance Based On Behavioral Categorization Of
Managers
This table reports mean values of changes in firm performance from year t+1 to t+2 based on
behavioral categorization of managers in year t+1. p-values [in brackets] correspond to tests
of differences between low vs. high intensity score (below/above median score) and between
short vs. long chronicity score (1 year/more than 1 year). All variables are defined in Appendix
2, performance categorization approaches of firms and behavioral categorization approaches of
managers are elaborated in Appendix 4. Total sample period encompass 1980 through 2017.
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Behavioral Categorization Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
1. Financial Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Tier 1
trying-to-break-even (all obs.) 0.014 0.015 0.103 0.112 −0.052 −0.060 −0.860
low IS 0.046 0.024 0.055 0.069 −0.060 −0.064 −0.700
high IS −0.031 0.001 0.171 0.173 −0.040 −0.054 −1.086
p-value of difference [0.189] [0.657] [0.016] [0.022] [0.669] [0.832] [0.626]
short CS 0.059 0.059 0.118 0.122 −0.027 −0.038 −0.746
long CS −0.197 −0.194 0.034 0.062 −0.167 −0.160 −1.389
p-value of difference [0.001] [0.000] [0.174] [0.307] [0.017] [0.035] [0.528]
status quo (distress)(all obs.) −0.011 −0.019 0.050 0.058 0.036 0.026 −1.019
low IS 0.051 0.028 0.037 0.041 0.031 0.018 −0.669
high IS −0.078 −0.069 0.065 0.076 0.042 0.035 −1.395
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.114] [0.048] [0.581] [0.418] [0.314]
short CS 0.019 0.012 0.050 0.056 0.036 0.025 −0.968
long CS −0.136 −0.146 0.051 0.066 0.037 0.030 −1.225
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.982] [0.630] [0.983] [0.846] [0.777]
snake-bite (all obs.) −0.067 −0.056 0.073 0.079 0.113 0.104 −0.562
low IS 0.020 0.011 0.038 0.044 0.070 0.062 −1.368
high IS −0.160 −0.128 0.110 0.116 0.160 0.147 0.286
p-value of difference [0.001] [0.004] [0.019] [0.018] [0.025] [0.031] [0.243]
short CS −0.026 −0.020 0.067 0.065 0.103 0.088 −0.509
long CS −0.229 −0.198 0.098 0.135 0.155 0.162 −0.764
p-value of difference [0.003] [0.003] [0.410] [0.064] [0.287] [0.132] [0.884]
conservatism (all obs.) −0.036 −0.032 −0.062 −0.034 0.086 0.092 −3.365
low IS −0.022 −0.017 −0.041 −0.021 0.056 0.054 −0.402
high IS −0.052 −0.047 −0.080 −0.045 0.111 0.123 −5.816
p-value of difference [0.494] [0.458] [0.354] [0.541] [0.243] [0.134] [0.671]
short CS −0.057 −0.025 −0.045 −0.026 0.104 0.104 −9.293
long CS 0.011 −0.047 −0.095 −0.050 0.053 0.068 8.219
p-value of difference [0.155] [0.602] [0.259] [0.565] [0.295] [0.455] [0.191]
status quo (success)(all obs.) −0.007 −0.008 −0.070 −0.043 −0.023 −0.019 0.564
low IS 0.005 0.004 −0.067 −0.045 −0.018 −0.018 −0.481
high IS −0.018 −0.020 −0.073 −0.041 −0.027 −0.019 1.461
p-value of difference [0.235] [0.159] [0.688] [0.784] [0.633] [0.995] [0.902]
short CS −0.033 −0.027 −0.062 −0.038 −0.013 −0.012 −0.526
long CS 0.070 0.045 −0.091 −0.057 −0.047 −0.034 3.261
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.086] [0.258] [0.118] [0.311] [0.827]
house-money (all obs.) −0.007 −0.015 −0.062 −0.039 −0.112 −0.111 −1.391
low IS 0.009 0.015 −0.039 −0.025 −0.102 −0.107 −0.712
high IS −0.022 −0.042 −0.082 −0.050 −0.120 −0.115 −1.936
p-value of difference [0.418] [0.089] [0.330] [0.555] [0.650] [0.845] [0.684]
short CS −0.020 −0.023 −0.060 −0.039 −0.084 −0.087 −2.454
long CS 0.039 0.014 −0.070 −0.039 −0.192 −0.179 1.629
p-value of difference [0.192] [0.353] [0.847] [0.994] [0.021] [0.048] [0.231]
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Behavioral Categorization Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Tier 2
trying-to-break-even (all obs.) 0.015 0.016 0.090 0.113 −0.069 −0.070 −0.748
low IS 0.059 0.038 0.064 0.085 −0.090 −0.095 −0.618
high IS −0.053 −0.017 0.129 0.156 −0.036 −0.032 −0.943
p-value of difference [0.049] [0.276] [0.156] [0.111] [0.247] [0.169] [0.671]
short CS 0.052 0.058 0.106 0.128 −0.043 −0.046 −0.576
long CS −0.158 −0.179 0.016 0.048 −0.188 −0.178 −1.522
p-value of difference [0.004] [0.000] [0.127] [0.155] [0.014] [0.024] [0.331]
status quo (distress)(all obs.) −0.022 −0.020 0.049 0.070 0.032 0.033 −1.164
low IS 0.009 0.001 0.032 0.050 0.025 0.024 −1.313
high IS −0.056 −0.043 0.067 0.093 0.040 0.043 −1.003
p-value of difference [0.015] [0.070] [0.043] [0.014] [0.476] [0.364] [0.661]
short CS 0.006 0.011 0.049 0.065 0.033 0.030 −1.127
long CS −0.134 −0.144 0.048 0.091 0.031 0.045 −1.306
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.991] [0.224] [0.965] [0.548] [0.839]
snake-bite (all obs.) −0.071 −0.054 0.076 0.092 0.116 0.111 −0.676
low IS −0.006 0.002 0.054 0.064 0.092 0.086 −1.697
high IS −0.140 −0.113 0.099 0.121 0.141 0.138 0.398
p-value of difference [0.017] [0.018] [0.147] [0.056] [0.231] [0.199] [0.147]
short CS −0.037 −0.020 0.064 0.075 0.099 0.090 −0.876
long CS −0.203 −0.184 0.122 0.158 0.181 0.193 0.087
p-value of difference [0.016] [0.007] [0.132] [0.025] [0.102] [0.038] [0.589]
conservatism (all obs.) −0.028 −0.026 −0.058 −0.042 0.100 0.098 −3.311
low IS −0.004 0.000 −0.047 −0.038 0.079 0.071 −0.507
high IS −0.050 −0.052 −0.068 −0.046 0.116 0.120 −5.638
p-value of difference [0.289] [0.178] [0.599] [0.836] [0.411] [0.274] [0.683]
short CS −0.047 −0.028 −0.040 −0.032 0.112 0.106 −9.232
long CS 0.015 −0.023 −0.092 −0.061 0.076 0.082 8.001
p-value of difference [0.181] [0.896] [0.221] [0.472] [0.446] [0.601] [0.191]
status quo (success)(all obs.) −0.000 −0.003 −0.060 −0.044 −0.014 −0.017 0.483
low IS 0.016 0.017 −0.054 −0.044 −0.012 −0.019 −0.826
high IS −0.016 −0.022 −0.065 −0.044 −0.017 −0.016 1.605
p-value of difference [0.104] [0.025] [0.474] [0.976] [0.809] [0.873] [0.877]
short CS −0.023 −0.020 −0.047 −0.031 −0.004 −0.008 −0.733
long CS 0.066 0.048 −0.094 −0.079 −0.041 −0.040 3.542
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.003] [0.088] [0.137] [0.805]
house-money (all obs.) 0.008 −0.009 −0.064 −0.047 −0.112 −0.118 −1.407
low IS 0.017 0.009 −0.066 −0.057 −0.109 −0.124 −0.616
high IS −0.001 −0.025 −0.062 −0.039 −0.115 −0.114 −2.046
p-value of difference [0.627] [0.313] [0.915] [0.642] [0.892] [0.808] [0.637]
short CS −0.005 −0.022 −0.062 −0.044 −0.092 −0.099 −2.707
long CS 0.051 0.035 −0.070 −0.057 −0.168 −0.172 2.162
p-value of difference [0.200] [0.138] [0.850] [0.752] [0.094] [0.106] [0.152]
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Behavioral Categorization Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
2. Operating (pc gprof) Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Tier 1
trying-to-break-even (all obs.) 0.024 0.004 0.071 0.086 −0.034 −0.035 −1.758
low IS 0.043 0.024 0.029 0.031 −0.036 −0.047 −0.323
high IS −0.001 −0.022 0.123 0.154 −0.031 −0.020 −3.470
p-value of difference [0.188] [0.116] [0.013] [0.001] [0.874] [0.445] [0.149]
short CS 0.073 0.061 0.095 0.091 −0.043 −0.060 −4.285
long CS 0.006 −0.017 0.062 0.084 −0.031 −0.026 −0.852
p-value of difference [0.072] [0.018] [0.441] [0.856] [0.756] [0.397] [0.164]
status quo (distress) (all obs.) −0.008 −0.008 0.041 0.053 0.028 0.027 0.101
low IS 0.019 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.008 −3.748
high IS −0.038 −0.032 0.073 0.096 0.045 0.048 4.158
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.001] [0.253]
short CS 0.009 0.005 0.078 0.080 0.031 0.022 −0.551
long CS −0.015 −0.013 0.028 0.043 0.027 0.029 0.340
p-value of difference [0.120] [0.179] [0.000] [0.003] [0.795] [0.599] [0.909]
snake-bite (all obs.) −0.043 −0.024 0.058 0.073 0.151 0.151 −2.362
low IS −0.035 −0.020 0.014 0.013 0.071 0.064 −5.245
high IS −0.052 −0.027 0.105 0.137 0.236 0.243 0.645
p-value of difference [0.624] [0.810] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.297]
short CS −0.032 −0.016 0.068 0.071 0.109 0.093 −1.656
long CS −0.048 −0.027 0.054 0.074 0.170 0.175 −2.668
p-value of difference [0.665] [0.713] [0.613] [0.905] [0.064] [0.011] [0.869]
conservatism (all obs.) −0.004 −0.009 −0.069 −0.057 0.023 0.019 −0.925
low IS −0.003 0.001 −0.051 −0.041 0.042 0.037 −0.120
high IS −0.006 −0.017 −0.086 −0.071 0.007 0.004 −1.644
p-value of difference [0.889] [0.320] [0.002] [0.010] [0.052] [0.075] [0.101]
short CS −0.019 −0.027 −0.080 −0.067 0.035 0.033 −0.471
long CS 0.000 −0.003 −0.065 −0.054 0.020 0.015 −1.073
p-value of difference [0.425] [0.259] [0.257] [0.341] [0.465] [0.401] [0.577]
status quo (success)(all obs.) −0.000 −0.010 −0.064 −0.047 −0.017 −0.021 −0.105
low IS −0.004 −0.009 −0.052 −0.040 −0.011 −0.018 0.008
high IS 0.002 −0.010 −0.072 −0.050 −0.021 −0.023 −0.173
p-value of difference [0.561] [0.980] [0.001] [0.100] [0.268] [0.583] [0.948]
short CS −0.004 −0.012 −0.057 −0.037 0.010 0.005 −1.243
long CS 0.002 −0.008 −0.070 −0.054 −0.036 −0.040 0.714
p-value of difference [0.540] [0.705] [0.025] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.469]
house-money (all obs.) 0.022 0.013 −0.027 −0.008 −0.072 −0.075 −0.507
low IS −0.001 −0.014 −0.052 −0.033 −0.070 −0.075 −0.297
high IS 0.032 0.024 −0.017 0.002 −0.073 −0.075 −0.592
p-value of difference [0.106] [0.027] [0.033] [0.034] [0.856] [0.995] [0.658]
short CS 0.046 0.032 0.005 0.022 −0.046 −0.050 −0.669
long CS −0.010 −0.012 −0.069 −0.048 −0.107 −0.107 −0.295
p-value of difference [0.002] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.538]
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Behavioral Categorization Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Tier 2
trying-to-break-even (all obs.) 0.013 −0.010 0.068 0.089 −0.039 −0.039 −1.701
low IS 0.028 −0.000 0.010 0.028 −0.078 −0.084 −0.183
high IS −0.008 −0.024 0.148 0.174 0.016 0.023 −3.759
p-value of difference [0.330] [0.459] [0.000] [0.000] [0.012] [0.004] [0.111]
short CS 0.082 0.039 0.062 0.073 −0.050 −0.059 −4.050
long CS −0.015 −0.030 0.071 0.096 −0.034 −0.031 −0.767
p-value of difference [0.013] [0.043] [0.838] [0.568] [0.700] [0.487] [0.181]
status quo (distress)(all obs.) −0.011 −0.007 0.052 0.069 0.042 0.040 0.129
low IS 0.019 0.021 0.015 0.026 0.020 0.012 −0.424
high IS −0.043 −0.037 0.092 0.115 0.066 0.070 0.710
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] [0.000] [0.891]
short CS 0.019 0.019 0.077 0.084 0.033 0.024 −0.456
long CS −0.024 −0.019 0.041 0.063 0.046 0.047 0.388
p-value of difference [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.150] [0.434] [0.162] [0.925]
snake-bite (all obs.) −0.034 −0.016 0.061 0.081 0.169 0.167 −2.532
low IS −0.006 0.004 0.012 0.024 0.103 0.098 −5.604
high IS −0.063 −0.038 0.113 0.140 0.238 0.239 0.677
p-value of difference [0.109] [0.180] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.281]
short CS −0.019 −0.002 0.053 0.063 0.105 0.095 −1.384
long CS −0.041 −0.024 0.065 0.090 0.201 0.203 −3.110
p-value of difference [0.539] [0.499] [0.667] [0.346] [0.004] [0.001] [0.780]
conservatism (all obs.) −0.009 −0.002 −0.065 −0.055 0.026 0.023 −0.786
low IS −0.007 0.018 −0.040 −0.037 0.049 0.041 0.020
high IS −0.011 −0.020 −0.088 −0.071 0.004 0.007 −1.510
p-value of difference [0.828] [0.034] [0.000] [0.003] [0.010] [0.054] [0.067]
short CS −0.049 −0.051 −0.077 −0.064 0.048 0.049 −0.493
long CS 0.003 0.013 −0.061 −0.052 0.018 0.015 −0.880
p-value of difference [0.026] [0.002] [0.192] [0.374] [0.149] [0.102] [0.690]
status quo (success)(all obs.) −0.003 −0.010 −0.058 −0.043 −0.015 −0.018 −0.353
low IS −0.008 −0.010 −0.042 −0.037 −0.010 −0.019 −0.379
high IS 0.001 −0.009 −0.069 −0.046 −0.018 −0.017 −0.337
p-value of difference [0.291] [0.927] [0.000] [0.111] [0.347] [0.796] [0.986]
short CS −0.002 −0.013 −0.056 −0.040 0.008 0.002 −1.261
long CS −0.003 −0.007 −0.060 −0.045 −0.029 −0.031 0.222
p-value of difference [0.842] [0.472] [0.464] [0.416] [0.000] [0.000] [0.542]
house-money (all obs.) 0.025 0.012 −0.025 −0.007 −0.074 −0.076 −0.487
low IS 0.019 −0.007 −0.038 −0.030 −0.067 −0.077 −0.135
high IS 0.028 0.020 −0.019 0.003 −0.077 −0.075 −0.639
p-value of difference [0.631] [0.107] [0.203] [0.033] [0.595] [0.937] [0.406]
short CS 0.049 0.032 0.007 0.023 −0.053 −0.057 −0.699
long CS −0.002 −0.012 −0.061 −0.041 −0.097 −0.096 −0.247
p-value of difference [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.014] [0.418]
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Behavioral Categorization Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
(pc cashflow) Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Tier 1
trying-to-break-even (all obs.) 0.032 0.011 0.043 0.069 −0.038 −0.026 −1.563
low IS 0.045 0.028 0.037 0.051 −0.040 −0.034 −0.103
high IS 0.014 −0.012 0.051 0.090 −0.037 −0.017 −3.286
p-value of difference [0.405] [0.209] [0.761] [0.370] [0.947] [0.687] [0.188]
short CS 0.066 0.045 0.036 0.055 −0.065 −0.056 −3.032
long CS −0.003 −0.023 0.051 0.082 −0.014 0.001 −0.174
p-value of difference [0.060] [0.030] [0.734] [0.545] [0.217] [0.164] [0.235]
status quo (distress)(all obs.) −0.012 −0.002 0.025 0.044 0.063 0.070 5.584
low IS 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.026 0.027 2.164
high IS −0.025 −0.015 0.049 0.080 0.102 0.115 9.016
p-value of difference [0.168] [0.110] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.413]
short CS 0.001 0.012 0.033 0.045 0.074 0.077 8.180
long CS −0.022 −0.012 0.019 0.044 0.055 0.065 3.659
p-value of difference [0.197] [0.136] [0.413] [0.954] [0.308] [0.503] [0.593]
snake-bite (all obs.) −0.041 −0.025 0.044 0.063 0.196 0.203 0.463
low IS 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.011 0.091 0.096 −0.191
high IS −0.096 −0.063 0.083 0.118 0.305 0.316 1.137
p-value of difference [0.012] [0.042] [0.025] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.737]
short CS −0.046 −0.030 −0.017 −0.010 0.107 0.104 −0.795
long CS −0.038 −0.021 0.081 0.108 0.250 0.264 1.228
p-value of difference [0.850] [0.816] [0.006] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.620]
conservatism (all obs.) −0.034 −0.020 −0.037 −0.034 0.041 0.033 −0.454
low IS −0.030 −0.016 −0.015 −0.013 0.071 0.063 −0.205
high IS −0.038 −0.024 −0.056 −0.053 0.014 0.006 −0.675
p-value of difference [0.642] [0.638] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.403]
short CS −0.061 −0.041 −0.018 −0.016 0.098 0.087 −0.056
long CS −0.025 −0.013 −0.043 −0.040 0.022 0.014 −0.587
p-value of difference [0.086] [0.132] [0.019] [0.024] [0.000] [0.000] [0.411]
status quo (success)(all obs.) −0.012 −0.009 −0.035 −0.029 −0.025 −0.031 −2.420
low IS −0.001 −0.001 −0.016 −0.012 0.014 0.007 −5.370
high IS −0.022 −0.016 −0.053 −0.044 −0.059 −0.064 0.171
p-value of difference [0.008] [0.035] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.087]
short CS −0.015 −0.014 −0.036 −0.031 0.004 −0.007 −6.931
long CS −0.011 −0.007 −0.035 −0.027 −0.040 −0.043 −0.038
p-value of difference [0.641] [0.304] [0.675] [0.334] [0.000] [0.000] [0.042]
house-money (all obs.) 0.017 0.013 −0.022 −0.012 −0.085 −0.091 −0.389
low IS 0.054 0.044 0.008 0.015 −0.030 −0.038 −0.220
high IS −0.014 −0.012 −0.046 −0.034 −0.131 −0.134 −0.527
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.489]
short CS 0.050 0.041 0.001 0.007 −0.050 −0.061 −0.246
long CS −0.011 −0.010 −0.041 −0.028 −0.116 −0.116 −0.511
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.550]
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Behavioral Categorization Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Tier 2
trying-to-break-even (all obs.) 0.024 0.010 0.033 0.051 −0.032 −0.024 −1.325
low IS 0.048 0.028 0.004 0.004 −0.043 −0.048 −0.157
high IS −0.009 −0.015 0.072 0.114 −0.017 0.007 −2.860
p-value of difference [0.094] [0.144] [0.055] [0.001] [0.463] [0.125] [0.184]
short CS 0.067 0.055 0.024 0.033 −0.067 −0.065 −2.314
long CS −0.023 −0.039 0.043 0.071 0.005 0.019 −0.281
p-value of difference [0.006] [0.001] [0.600] [0.260] [0.041] [0.016] [0.313]
status quo (distress)(all obs.) −0.011 −0.004 0.026 0.043 0.062 0.069 4.102
low IS −0.004 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.029 0.029 0.043
high IS −0.019 −0.010 0.050 0.081 0.096 0.111 8.279
p-value of difference [0.378] [0.414] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.275]
short CS 0.004 0.011 0.025 0.032 0.067 0.068 −0.844
long CS −0.023 −0.016 0.027 0.051 0.058 0.070 8.039
p-value of difference [0.121] [0.083] [0.911] [0.208] [0.610] [0.918] [0.242]
snake-bite (all obs.) −0.042 −0.023 0.040 0.059 0.194 0.201 −2.857
low IS −0.027 −0.009 −0.007 −0.001 0.111 0.114 −6.710
high IS −0.058 −0.037 0.090 0.121 0.282 0.293 1.157
p-value of difference [0.458] [0.432] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.291]
short CS −0.066 −0.037 −0.027 −0.015 0.106 0.106 −1.011
long CS −0.027 −0.013 0.083 0.105 0.248 0.261 −3.998
p-value of difference [0.360] [0.512] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.697]
conservatism (all obs.) −0.036 −0.023 −0.037 −0.033 0.034 0.026 −0.499
low IS −0.026 −0.017 −0.005 −0.008 0.060 0.047 −0.131
high IS −0.045 −0.029 −0.065 −0.054 0.011 0.008 −0.820
p-value of difference [0.352] [0.483] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.030] [0.288]
short CS −0.081 −0.065 −0.018 −0.016 0.085 0.072 −0.203
long CS −0.019 −0.007 −0.045 −0.040 0.014 0.008 −0.617
p-value of difference [0.004] [0.003] [0.022] [0.060] [0.000] [0.002] [0.564]
status quo (success)(all obs.) −0.013 −0.012 −0.038 −0.029 −0.027 −0.034 −1.215
low IS −0.006 −0.005 −0.019 −0.011 0.008 0.003 −2.586
high IS −0.019 −0.019 −0.056 −0.046 −0.059 −0.066 −0.005
p-value of difference [0.131] [0.072] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.138]
short CS −0.012 −0.015 −0.043 −0.035 −0.001 −0.012 −3.059
long CS −0.014 −0.011 −0.036 −0.026 −0.042 −0.046 −0.182
p-value of difference [0.865] [0.573] [0.115] [0.061] [0.000] [0.000] [0.112]
house-money (all obs.) 0.013 0.007 −0.017 −0.003 −0.093 −0.098 −0.436
low IS 0.050 0.035 0.002 0.013 −0.035 −0.042 −0.219
high IS −0.017 −0.015 −0.031 −0.015 −0.139 −0.142 −0.604
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.002] [0.033] [0.068] [0.000] [0.000] [0.466]
short CS 0.047 0.029 0.008 0.019 −0.060 −0.071 −0.302
long CS −0.018 −0.012 −0.038 −0.022 −0.123 −0.122 −0.554
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.009] [0.002] [0.007] [0.000] [0.003] [0.632]
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Behavioral Categorization Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Altman Z-score Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Tier 1
trying-to-break-even (all obs.) 0.011 −0.001 0.048 0.057 −0.003 −0.008 −0.729
low IS 0.027 0.008 0.014 0.015 −0.025 −0.032 −0.120
high IS −0.012 −0.014 0.096 0.115 0.028 0.025 −1.501
p-value of difference [0.125] [0.315] [0.000] [0.000] [0.026] [0.017] [0.359]
short CS 0.036 0.010 0.087 0.091 0.024 0.015 −2.106
long CS −0.003 −0.007 0.027 0.039 −0.018 −0.020 0.034
p-value of difference [0.137] [0.453] [0.004] [0.010] [0.089] [0.154] [0.170]
status quo (distress)(all obs.) −0.014 −0.013 0.021 0.027 0.033 0.029 0.086
low IS 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.004 −0.002 −0.050
high IS −0.039 −0.029 0.041 0.056 0.064 0.062 0.226
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.962]
short CS 0.008 0.001 0.073 0.074 0.075 0.064 −0.784
long CS −0.020 −0.017 0.005 0.013 0.020 0.018 0.360
p-value of difference [0.024] [0.102] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.866]
snake-bite (all obs.) −0.057 −0.032 0.039 0.049 0.117 0.115 −1.331
low IS −0.029 −0.008 0.011 0.008 0.038 0.033 −0.105
high IS −0.088 −0.060 0.069 0.094 0.202 0.201 −2.614
p-value of difference [0.041] [0.044] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.612]
short CS −0.049 −0.036 0.063 0.073 0.094 0.086 0.063
long CS −0.059 −0.031 0.031 0.042 0.125 0.123 −1.771
p-value of difference [0.769] [0.858] [0.181] [0.185] [0.303] [0.221] [0.752]
conservatism (all obs.) −0.000 0.006 −0.033 −0.024 0.059 0.053 −0.991
low IS −0.006 0.004 −0.021 −0.013 0.056 0.045 −0.102
high IS 0.006 0.008 −0.046 −0.034 0.062 0.060 −1.869
p-value of difference [0.445] [0.757] [0.017] [0.038] [0.661] [0.262] [0.002]
short CS −0.043 −0.037 −0.033 −0.020 0.044 0.041 −1.617
long CS 0.006 0.012 −0.034 −0.025 0.061 0.054 −0.901
p-value of difference [0.042] [0.021] [0.963] [0.738] [0.383] [0.515] [0.415]
status quo (success)(all obs.) 0.006 −0.000 −0.037 −0.021 −0.007 −0.013 0.059
low IS 0.012 0.005 −0.021 −0.005 0.014 0.005 0.210
high IS −0.001 −0.005 −0.052 −0.037 −0.027 −0.030 −0.090
p-value of difference [0.073] [0.126] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.753]
short CS 0.011 0.004 −0.068 −0.045 −0.016 −0.017 −2.052
long CS 0.004 −0.001 −0.030 −0.016 −0.005 −0.012 0.532
p-value of difference [0.478] [0.566] [0.000] [0.000] [0.160] [0.588] [0.036]
house-money (all obs.) 0.019 0.001 −0.028 −0.008 −0.083 −0.088 −0.647
low IS 0.016 −0.005 −0.018 0.003 −0.029 −0.037 −0.206
high IS 0.021 0.007 −0.038 −0.019 −0.136 −0.137 −1.077
p-value of difference [0.710] [0.335] [0.134] [0.081] [0.000] [0.000] [0.041]
short CS 0.078 0.066 −0.014 0.010 −0.077 −0.077 −1.464
long CS −0.001 −0.020 −0.033 −0.014 −0.085 −0.091 −0.381
p-value of difference [0.000] [0.000] [0.211] [0.117] [0.571] [0.370] [0.029]
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Table 3.9: Regressions Of Changes In Firm Performance On Behavioral Categorization
Of Managers
This table reports coefficients and adjusted R2 values from univariate regressions (Panel A) and
multivariate regressions (Panel B) of changes in firm performance from year t+1 to t+2 on behavioral
categorization of managers in year t+1 as well as for firm-specific distress indicator, firm-specific
success indicator, intensity score and 3-year chronicity score, firm attributes, CEO attributes and
market controls. All regressions use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity; multivariate
regressions also control for industry fixed effects. Each reported coefficient in Panel A is a separate
univariate regression. *** indicate significant coefficients at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10%
level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 2, performance categorization of firms and
behavioral categorization of managers are defined in Appendix 4. Total sample period encompass
1980 through 2017 except for regressions that include CEO attributes which cover 1992 through
2017.
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Panel A: Univariate Regressions
Variable Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Behavioral Groups Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Financial Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even 0.037 0.042 0.047* 0.049** −0.104*** −0.103*** 0.063
Status quo (distress) 0.016 0.003 −0.037** −0.037** 0.003 0.002 −0.313
Snake-bite −0.061** −0.044* 0.012 0.011 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.425
Conservatism −0.029 −0.022 0.007 0.008 0.129*** 0.131*** −3.495
Status quo (success) 0.011 0.013 −0.008 −0.006 0.008 0.010 2.758
House-money 0.005 −0.002 0.006 0.003 −0.107*** −0.111*** −1.313
Financial Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even 0.047 0.043 0.036 0.039* −0.119*** −0.120*** 0.313
Status quo (distress) 0.006 −0.001 −0.034** −0.032** 0.008 0.012 −0.452
Snake-bite −0.056* −0.041 0.019 0.013 0.105*** 0.099*** 0.402
Conservatism −0.029 −0.022 0.003 0.003 0.136*** 0.137*** −3.378
Status quo (success) 0.006 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.012 2.674
House-money 0.013 −0.002 −0.005 −0.004 −0.117*** −0.120*** −1.263
Gross Profitability Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even 0.038** 0.015 0.027 0.029 −0.084*** −0.084*** −1.415
Status quo (distress) 0.003 0.002 −0.023* −0.027** −0.036*** −0.036*** 2.179
Snake-bite −0.040** −0.017 0.012 0.015 0.133*** 0.133*** −2.159
Conservatism −0.010 −0.005 −0.014** −0.020*** 0.054*** 0.054*** −0.717
Status quo (success) −0.013 −0.015** −0.023*** −0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.549
House-money 0.023** 0.023*** 0.038*** 0.040*** −0.062*** −0.060*** −0.274
Gross Profitability Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even 0.028 −0.001 0.014 0.018 −0.107*** −0.105*** −1.288
Status quo (distress) 0.001 0.006 −0.012 −0.016 −0.028** −0.029** 2.267
Snake-bite −0.027 −0.009 0.006 0.008 0.142*** 0.142*** −2.317
Conservatism −0.013 0.003 −0.015** −0.021*** 0.055*** 0.055*** −0.400
Status quo (success) −0.015* −0.016** −0.019*** −0.019*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.241
House-money 0.028*** 0.020** 0.035*** 0.038*** −0.065*** −0.064*** −0.067
Cashflow Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even 0.049** 0.017 0.015 0.021 −0.126*** −0.121*** −6.208*
Status quo (distress) −0.010 0.003 −0.019 −0.022 −0.007 −0.010 6.198
Snake-bite −0.038* −0.025 0.015 0.014 0.153*** 0.153*** −3.673
Conservatism −0.028*** −0.015* −0.004 −0.009* 0.079*** 0.076*** 1.535
Status quo (success) −0.008 −0.009 −0.007* −0.007* 0.008 0.008 −2.004
House-money 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.014** 0.018*** −0.071*** −0.070*** 1.711
Cashflow Tier 2
Trying-to-break-even 0.040** 0.017 0.004 0.006 −0.118*** −0.117*** −4.184
Status quo (distress) −0.006 0.000 −0.010 −0.012 −0.004 −0.005 6.095
Snake-bite −0.039* −0.022 0.013 0.014 0.152*** 0.153*** −5.771
Conservatism −0.028*** −0.015 −0.003 −0.009 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.553
Status quo (success) −0.005 −0.006 −0.013** −0.014** 0.012 0.012 −0.752
House-money 0.030*** 0.021** 0.022*** 0.027*** −0.076*** −0.074*** 0.663
Z-score Tier 1
Trying-to-break-even 0.031** 0.015 0.024** 0.026** −0.049*** −0.050*** −0.584
Status quo (distress) 0.006 0.003 −0.023*** −0.026*** −0.019* −0.020** 1.094
Snake-bite −0.048*** −0.022 0.013 0.017 0.091*** 0.093*** −1.267
Conservatism −0.009 0.006 0.001 −0.005 0.082*** 0.082*** −0.900*
Status quo (success) −0.005 −0.003 −0.006 −0.006 0.015*** 0.015** 0.854*
House-money 0.014* 0.000 0.008 0.014** −0.087*** −0.086*** −0.530
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Variable Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Success/Distress Indicators Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
Financial Tier 1 (distress) −0.018 −0.017* 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.030*** 0.027*** −0.794
Financial Tier 1 (success) −0.011 −0.010 −0.066*** −0.049*** −0.038*** −0.027*** −0.152
Financial Tier 2 (distress) −0.026** −0.017* 0.077*** 0.088*** 0.024*** 0.031*** −0.902
Financial Tier 2 (success) −0.002 −0.004 −0.058*** −0.052*** −0.029*** −0.026*** −0.214
Operating Tier 1 (gross prof., distress) −0.011* −0.006 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.041*** 0.048*** −0.455
Operating Tier 1 (gross prof., success) 0.007 −0.000 −0.068*** −0.059*** −0.047*** −0.043*** −0.141
Operating Tier 2 (gross prof., distress) −0.013* −0.006 0.084*** 0.092*** 0.055*** 0.061*** −0.533
Operating Tier 2 (gross prof., success) 0.005 −0.000 −0.065*** −0.059*** −0.047*** −0.042*** −0.364
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, distress) −0.010 0.001 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.088*** 4.624
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, success) −0.015*** −0.004 −0.038*** −0.045*** −0.057*** −0.057*** −2.576*
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, distress) −0.010 0.000 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.069*** 0.086*** 2.847
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, success) −0.016*** −0.009** −0.037*** −0.040*** −0.059*** −0.058*** −1.171
Altman (2000) Z-score (distress) −0.021*** −0.013*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.048*** −0.059
Altman (2000) Z-score (success) 0.016*** 0.011*** −0.052*** −0.043*** −0.041*** −0.040*** −0.037
Intensity Score Measures
Financial Tier 1 (distress) −0.025*** −0.021*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.021*** 0.019*** −0.555
Financial Tier 1 (success) −0.012** −0.010** −0.036*** −0.025*** −0.024*** −0.016*** −0.410**
Financial Tier 2 (distress) −0.026*** −0.020*** 0.050*** 0.059*** 0.017*** 0.022*** −0.611
Financial Tier 2 (success) −0.007 −0.007* −0.034*** −0.028*** −0.021*** −0.017*** −0.505*
Operating Tier 1 (gross prof., distress) −0.006*** −0.004** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.272
Operating Tier 1 (gross prof., success) −0.003 −0.005** −0.044*** −0.040*** −0.037*** −0.035*** 0.034
Operating Tier 2 (gross prof., distress) −0.004*** −0.003** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.233
Operating Tier 2 (gross prof., success) −0.002 −0.003** −0.023*** −0.015*** −0.020*** −0.014*** 0.034
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, distress) −0.006*** −0.004** 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.856
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, success) −0.008*** −0.006*** −0.022*** −0.023*** −0.035*** −0.033*** −0.350
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, distress) −0.005*** −0.003* 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.831
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, success) −0.007*** −0.006*** −0.020*** −0.018*** −0.032*** −0.029*** −0.121
Altman (2000) Z-score (distress) 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.348
Altman (2000) Z-score (success) 0.000** 0.000** −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.157
Chronicity Score Measures
Financial Tier 1 (distress) −0.042*** −0.034*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.011** 0.012** 0.052
Financial Tier 1 (success) 0.013*** 0.005 −0.033*** −0.024*** −0.019*** −0.012** 2.089
Financial Tier 2 (distress) −0.037*** −0.035*** 0.024*** 0.034*** 0.007 0.014*** −0.415
Financial Tier 2 (success) 0.009** 0.007 −0.031*** −0.027*** −0.016*** −0.012** 2.141
Operating Tier 1 (gross prof., distress) −0.008*** −0.006*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.014*** −0.001
Operating Tier 1 (gross prof., success) 0.001 −0.000 −0.023*** −0.022*** −0.018*** −0.018*** 0.153
Operating Tier 2 (gross prof., distress) −0.010*** −0.008*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.019*** −0.027
Operating Tier 2 (gross prof., success) 0.000 0.000 −0.021*** −0.019*** −0.017*** −0.015*** 0.097
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, distress) −0.013*** −0.007** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.497
Operating Tier 1 (cashflow, success) 0.001 −0.001 −0.012*** −0.016*** −0.025*** −0.023*** −0.005
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, distress) −0.011*** −0.007** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.082
Operating Tier 2 (cashflow, success) 0.000 −0.001 −0.012*** −0.014*** −0.025*** −0.023*** −0.071
Altman (2000) Z-score (distress) −0.010*** −0.006*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.083
Altman (2000) Z-score (success) 0.003* 0.001 −0.010*** −0.009*** −0.008*** −0.009*** 0.210
Firm Attributes
firmage −0.003 −0.001 −0.004** −0.005*** −0.007*** −0.006*** 0.856***
size −0.003*** −0.002** −0.003*** −0.004*** −0.003*** −0.003*** −0.251
bm 0.001 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.040
nopayout −0.016*** −0.003 0.010** 0.019*** 0.008 0.014*** −0.082
finance −0.000 0.003 0.008*** −0.007*** −0.006 −0.007* 0.848
CEO Attributes
ceoage 0.018 0.025 −0.006 0.007 −0.010 0.002 0.430***
gender −0.005 −0.000 0.005 −0.002 −0.000 −0.002 0.011
tenure 0.002 0.003 −0.003* −0.001 −0.003 −0.001 0.002
founder −0.012 −0.004 0.003 −0.009 −0.017 −0.014 0.212
outsider −0.003 −0.005 −0.003 −0.006 −0.006 −0.012 −0.117***
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Panel B: Multivariate Regressions
Variable Change In Firm Performance
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Financial Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
trying-to-break-even 0.245** 0.151 −0.045 −0.034 −0.132* −0.123 −0.250
status quo (distress) 0.234** 0.157* −0.146*** −0.145*** −0.177*** −0.187*** −0.245
snake-bite 0.207 0.131 −0.095* −0.096* −0.049 −0.056 0.259
conservatism 0.156** 0.155*** −0.014 0.022 0.021 0.054 −0.112
status quo (success) 0.129** 0.146*** −0.010 0.028 −0.012 0.016 −0.058
house-money 0.185*** 0.180*** −0.007 0.025 −0.087* −0.060 0.218
intensity score (distress) −0.153** −0.112* 0.120*** 0.109*** 0.099** 0.101** −0.000
intensity score (success) −0.100*** −0.081*** −0.004 −0.012 −0.011 −0.017 0.029
chronicity score (distress) −0.056*** −0.038** 0.023*** 0.019** 0.017 0.012 0.125
chronicity score (success) 0.035*** 0.004 −0.037*** −0.032*** −0.034*** −0.034*** −0.052
Adj. R2 0.0185 0.0064 0.0134 0.0146 0.0027 0.0054 0.0053
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Tier 2
trying-to-break-even 0.214* 0.221** 0.060 0.021 −0.062 −0.090 0.277
status quo (distress) 0.192* 0.195** −0.036 −0.068 −0.112 −0.146** −0.202
snake-bite 0.134 0.135 0.039 −0.011 0.071 0.030 0.504
conservatism 0.125* 0.147*** 0.008 0.020 0.057 0.075 −0.026
status quo (success) 0.084 0.110** 0.006 0.025 0.008 0.025 −0.096
house-money 0.187*** 0.150*** 0.007 0.015 −0.069 −0.064 0.174
intensity score (distress) −0.130* −0.126** 0.025 0.047 0.047 0.069 −0.139
intensity score (success) −0.085** −0.070** −0.007 −0.015 −0.013 −0.020 0.072
chronicity score (distress) −0.042** −0.046*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.019 0.020 0.121
chronicity score (success) 0.031*** 0.016 −0.036*** −0.037*** −0.035*** −0.038*** −0.038
Adj. R2 0.0178 0.0066 0.0101 0.0150 0.0025 0.0061 0.0059
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gross Profitability Tier 1
trying-to-break-even 0.137*** 0.094** 0.145** 0.140** −0.003 0.004 0.324
status quo (distress) 0.037 0.027 0.108** 0.101** 0.031 0.033 0.043
snake-bite 0.054 0.068* 0.168*** 0.155*** 0.206*** 0.200*** 0.669**
conservatism −0.017 −0.010 −0.022** −0.014 0.034* 0.033 0.186**
status quo (success) −0.011 −0.011 −0.028*** −0.019* −0.004 −0.005 0.110*
house-money −0.010 −0.003 −0.029*** −0.022* −0.059*** −0.060*** −0.018
intensity score (distress) −0.004 −0.003 −0.001 −0.004 0.010 0.008 −0.044
intensity score (success) 0.008 −0.000 −0.038*** −0.032*** −0.053*** −0.048*** −0.089***
chronicity score (distress) −0.019* −0.017* −0.024*** −0.022*** −0.010 −0.010 −0.079
chronicity score (success) 0.005 0.006 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.011** 0.011** −0.039**
Adj. R2 0.0154 0.0043 0.0265 0.0235 0.0132 0.0141 0.0064
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Gross Profitability Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
trying-to-break-even 0.121** 0.069* 0.105* 0.107** −0.007 −0.001 0.353
status quo (distress) 0.011 0.013 0.081** 0.080** 0.029 0.036 −0.038
snake-bite 0.040 0.050 0.139*** 0.133*** 0.201*** 0.203*** 0.654***
conservatism −0.006 0.010 −0.039*** −0.072*** −0.002 −0.024 0.122
status quo (success) 0.018 0.004 −0.047*** −0.073*** −0.045*** −0.065*** 0.044
house-money 0.011 0.010 −0.046*** −0.073*** −0.103*** −0.124*** −0.027
intensity score (distress) −0.003 −0.003 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.005 −0.029
intensity score (success) 0.002 −0.006 −0.014*** 0.001 −0.021*** −0.012*** −0.031
chronicity score (distress) −0.011 −0.012 −0.018*** −0.015*** −0.008 −0.008 −0.084*
chronicity score (success) 0.002 0.007 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.012** −0.038*
Adj. R2 0.0154 0.0043 0.0212 0.0215 0.0116 0.0131 0.0060
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cashflow Tier 1
trying-to-break-even 0.107** 0.046 0.013 0.024 −0.035 −0.022 0.301
status quo (distress) 0.010 0.013 0.015 0.021 −0.005 0.007 −0.044
snake-bite 0.023 0.035 0.079 0.065 0.163*** 0.165*** 0.589**
conservatism −0.012 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.079*** 0.087*** 0.037
status quo (success) 0.010 0.013 0.001 0.010 0.033*** 0.043*** −0.042
house-money 0.011 0.019 0.005 0.014* −0.020 −0.010 −0.129*
intensity score (distress) −0.013 −0.008 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.007 −0.073
intensity score (success) −0.000 −0.005 −0.026*** −0.022*** −0.040*** −0.038*** −0.037**
chronicity score (distress) −0.006 −0.001 −0.000 −0.005 0.013 0.006 −0.052
chronicity score (success) −0.001 0.008* 0.005** 0.002 0.001 −0.002 0.003
Adj. R2 0.0161 0.0047 0.0147 0.0164 0.0116 0.0129 0.0066
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cashflow Tier 2
trying-to-break-even 0.085** 0.032 0.067 0.064 −0.023 −0.018 0.263
status quo (distress) 0.009 0.007 0.038 0.032 0.039 0.041 0.074
snake-bite −0.015 0.013 0.105* 0.083 0.177*** 0.170*** 0.668**
conservatism −0.005 −0.014 −0.006 −0.005 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.083
status quo (success) 0.007 −0.010 −0.013* −0.006 0.017 0.020 −0.036
house-money 0.004 −0.002 −0.008 −0.007 −0.043*** −0.044*** −0.128*
intensity score (distress) −0.013 −0.008 −0.009 −0.004 −0.003 −0.001 −0.094
intensity score (success) −0.001 −0.005 −0.019*** −0.020*** −0.031*** −0.033*** −0.029
chronicity score (distress) 0.004 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002 0.003 0.001 −0.038
chronicity score (success) 0.003 0.015*** 0.006** 0.005* 0.001 0.001 −0.004
Adj. R2 0.0161 0.0048 0.0142 0.0184 0.0104 0.0143 0.0066
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Altman (2000) Z-score
trying-to-break-even 0.008 0.023 0.081*** 0.067*** 0.025* 0.030 0.249
status quo (distress) −0.043 −0.016 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.061*** 0.052
snake-bite −0.064* −0.027 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.151*** 0.148*** 0.395**
conservatism −0.043* −0.012 −0.037*** −0.033*** 0.024** 0.013 0.079
status quo (success) −0.007 −0.003 −0.043*** −0.034*** −0.042*** −0.030** −0.015
house-money 0.004 0.002 −0.046*** −0.034*** −0.120*** −0.085*** −0.098
intensity score (distress) −0.001 −0.002 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.014* −0.024
intensity score (success) 0.005 −0.001 −0.011*** −0.010*** 0.000 −0.017*** −0.273***
chronicity score (distress) 0.017* 0.004 −0.022*** −0.020*** −0.017*** −0.025*** −0.022
chronicity score (success) 0.002 0.003 0.008*** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006 0.072***
Adj. R2 0.0161 0.0044 0.0120 0.0152 0.0043 0.0126 0.0293
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3.10: Multivariate Probits Of Firm-Specific Success/Distress Status On Behav-
ioral Categorization Of Managers
This table reports coefficients and pseudo R2 values from multivariate Probits of firm-specific distress
status (equal to 1 if firm successfully exits distress and is now labeled as normal or success, equal
to 0 if firm is still labeled as distress) in Panel A and firm-specific success status (equal to 1 if
firm successfully maintains success status, equal to 0 if firm is now labeled as normal or distress)
in Panel B in year t+2 based on behavioral categorization of managers in year t+1 as well as for
intensity score and 3-year chronicity score, firm attributes, CEO attributes and market controls. All
regressions use standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and control for industry fixed effects.
indicate significant coefficients at 1% level, at 5% level and at 10% level, respectively. All variables
are defined in Appendix 2, performance categorization of firms and behavioral categorization of
managers are defined in Appendix 4. Total sample period encompass 1992 through 2017.
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Panel A: Firm-Specific Distress
Variable Firm-Specific Distress Status: Prob(Leaves Distress, Distress)
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Financial Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
trying-to-break-even 0.308* 0.318** −0.040 −0.037 −0.123 −0.026 −0.015
status quo (distress) 0.264* 0.178 −0.134 −0.121 −0.099 −0.057 −0.087
snake-bite 0.282* 0.176 −0.041 −0.032 −0.156 −0.065 0.014
intensity score (distress) −0.144 −0.117 0.049 0.052 0.025 0.010 0.015
chronicity score (distress) 0.009 0.034 0.048** 0.027 0.023 0.034 0.027
Pseudo R2 0.0046 0.0039 0.0014 0.0023 0.0057 0.0025 0.0016
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Tier 2
trying-to-break-even 0.131 0.176 −0.039 0.008 −0.110 −0.125 −0.002
status quo (distress) 0.051 0.067 −0.152 −0.173 −0.156 −0.235** −0.105
snake-bite 0.075 0.083 0.019 −0.008 −0.217* −0.180 0.051
intensity score (distress) −0.011 −0.046 0.036 0.037 0.049 0.103 0.025
chronicity score (distress) 0.012 0.034 0.052** 0.039 0.052** 0.027 0.023
Pseudo R2 0.0045 0.0038 0.0015 0.0025 0.0058 0.0026 0.0017
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gross Profitability Tier 1
trying-to-break-even −0.014 0.053 −0.047 0.020 −0.017 −0.016 −0.012
status quo (distress) −0.023 −0.031 −0.116** −0.085* −0.066 −0.123*** −0.020
snake-bite −0.020 −0.022 −0.101 −0.114* −0.025 −0.070 0.035
intensity score (distress) −0.007 −0.004 0.009 0.012 0.003 −0.001 0.006
chronicity score (distress) 0.010 0.010 0.022 0.026 0.018 0.033** −0.008
Pseudo R2 0.0044 0.0037 0.0015 0.0024 0.0056 0.0027 0.0016
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Variable Firm-Specific Distress Status: Prob(Leaves Distress, Distress)
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Gross Profitability Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
trying-to-break-even 0.030 0.066 −0.065 −0.071 −0.011 −0.024 −0.065
status quo (distress) 0.045 0.026 −0.138*** −0.122*** −0.052 −0.054 −0.025
snake-bite −0.091 −0.102 −0.048 −0.077 −0.017 −0.010 0.006
intensity score (distress) −0.005 −0.004 0.007 0.013* −0.002 −0.005 0.003
chronicity score (distress) −0.012 0.002 0.033** 0.034** 0.027* 0.026 0.007
Pseudo R2 0.0046 0.0038 0.0016 0.0025 0.0057 0.0025 0.0016
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cashflow Tier 1
trying-to-break-even −0.004 0.052 0.020 0.087 −0.018 −0.036 −0.048
status quo (distress) 0.020 0.029 −0.027 −0.005 −0.056 −0.052 −0.013
snake-bite 0.061 0.006 0.030 −0.018 0.016 −0.037 −0.012
intensity score (distress) 0.002 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.004 −0.005 0.013
chronicity score (distress) −0.009 −0.017 0.005 −0.006 0.018 0.023 −0.003
Pseudo R2 0.0044 0.0038 0.0013 0.0023 0.0057 0.0025 0.0016
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cashflow Tier 2
trying-to-break-even −0.028 −0.018 −0.017 −0.014 −0.050 −0.051 −0.074
status quo (distress) −0.004 −0.042 −0.030 −0.026 −0.044 −0.044 −0.044
snake-bite −0.073 −0.103 0.013 −0.026 −0.057 −0.053 −0.080
intensity score (distress) 0.005 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.002 −0.005 0.015*
chronicity score (distress) 0.009 0.025 0.025* 0.018 0.032** 0.029** 0.020
Pseudo R2 0.0044 0.0038 0.0015 0.0023 0.0057 0.0026 0.0017
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Altman (2000) Z-score
trying-to-break-even −0.024 −0.006 0.051 0.053 −0.003 −0.057 0.046
status quo (distress) −0.011 −0.040 −0.058 −0.020 −0.051 −0.072* −0.037
snake-bite −0.002 −0.031 −0.075 −0.016 −0.044 −0.050 −0.055
intensity score (distress) 0.002 0.004 0.005 −0.001 0.005 −0.003 0.009*
chronicity score (distress) 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.021 0.012 0.017 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.0044 0.0037 0.0015 0.0024 0.0057 0.0026 0.0017
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
267
Panel B: Firm-Specific Success
Variable Firm-Specific Success Status: Prob(Success, Leaves Success)
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Financial Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
conservatism −0.118 −0.055 0.013 −0.043 −0.099 −0.107 0.027
status quo (success) −0.033 0.046 −0.038 −0.042 −0.085 −0.051 0.013
house-money −0.056 0.045 0.121 0.045 0.015 0.029 0.029
intensity score (success) 0.018 −0.027 0.003 −0.016 0.030 0.002 −0.034
chronicity score (success) 0.017 0.023 −0.006 0.024 −0.037** −0.025 0.029*
Pseudo R2 0.0039 0.0042 0.0020 0.0021 0.0297 0.0146 0.0014
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Financial Tier 2
conservatism −0.047 −0.013 −0.057 −0.045 −0.158* −0.072 0.071
status quo (success) −0.024 0.076 −0.057 −0.032 −0.097 −0.016 0.024
house-money 0.042 0.099 0.053 −0.014 −0.001 0.029 −0.003
intensity score (success) 0.007 −0.038 0.025 −0.011 0.048 0.001 −0.036
chronicity score (success) 0.007 0.009 −0.004 0.026 −0.036** −0.035** 0.022
Pseudo R2 0.0038 0.0042 0.0019 0.0020 0.0297 0.0145 0.0014
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gross Profitability Tier 1
conservatism −0.082 −0.105* 0.038 0.125*** 0.029 0.045 −0.021
status quo (success) −0.041 −0.049 0.002 0.099*** 0.073** 0.099*** −0.023
house-money −0.041 −0.032 0.030 0.110** 0.032 0.003 −0.034
intensity score (success) 0.006 0.009 0.004 −0.025* −0.019 −0.016 0.007
chronicity score (success) 0.013 0.015 −0.011 −0.021* −0.012 −0.019* 0.013
Pseudo R2 0.0038 0.0045 0.0020 0.0022 0.0288 0.0141 0.0014
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Variable Firm-Specific Success Status: Prob(Success, Leaves Success)
Financial Gross Profitability Cashflow Z-score
Gross Profitability Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 1
conservatism −0.025 −0.061 0.028 0.104** 0.072* 0.049 0.038
status quo (success) 0.006 −0.008 0.007 0.080** 0.086*** 0.072** 0.013
house-money −0.005 −0.022 0.059 0.098** 0.087** 0.041 −0.006
intensity score (success) 0.003 0.006 0.005 −0.009 −0.016** −0.013** −0.002
chronicity score (success) −0.008 −0.004 −0.014 −0.021** −0.013 −0.012 0.008
Pseudo R2 0.0037 0.0044 0.0021 0.0022 0.0289 0.0140 0.0014
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cashflow Tier 1
conservatism −0.080* −0.088* 0.007 0.018 0.043 0.031 0.030
status quo (success) −0.040 −0.024 −0.008 0.017 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.006
house-money −0.027 −0.021 0.018 0.018 0.079** 0.037 0.018
intensity score (success) 0.001 0.008 0.005 0.001 −0.006 −0.006 0.003
chronicity score (success) 0.016 0.007 −0.008 −0.012 −0.003 −0.005 0.002
Pseudo R2 0.0039 0.0043 0.0019 0.0019 0.0299 0.0147 0.0014
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cashflow Tier 2
conservatism −0.115** −0.146*** 0.026 0.062 0.072* 0.081** 0.059
status quo (success) −0.079** −0.074** 0.000 0.025 0.095*** 0.109*** −0.002
house-money −0.068 −0.074 0.042 0.036 0.091** 0.059 0.016
intensity score (success) 0.014 0.021** 0.005 −0.001 −0.015** −0.016** 0.005
chronicity score (success) 0.007 0.003 −0.010 −0.013 −0.003 −0.009 −0.001
Pseudo R2 0.0041 0.0046 0.0019 0.0020 0.0298 0.0147 0.0014
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Altman (2000) Z-score
conservatism −0.069 −0.076 −0.050 −0.040 −0.002 −0.010 0.017
status quo (success) −0.037 −0.035 −0.059* −0.043 0.037 0.039 −0.002
house-money −0.022 −0.005 −0.039 −0.041 0.037 −0.001 −0.000
intensity score (success) 0.007 0.004 −0.006 −0.007 −0.011** −0.007 −0.005
chronicity score (success) 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.011 −0.023** −0.022** −0.002
Pseudo R2 0.0038 0.0042 0.0021 0.0021 0.0299 0.0147 0.0013
Firm & CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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